

Responsibility and *Pagmamahal*: Relating Levinas' Ethical Responsibility to Florentino Hornedo's *Pagmamahal* and *Pagmumura*¹

Patrick Andre C. Mencias

Far Eastern University | pmencias@feu.edu.ph

Abstract: This paper aims to establish a potential connection between Emmanuel Levinas' Ethical Responsibility and Florentino Hornedo's reading on *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*. Responsibility in Levinas is what gives a disposition of man towards to the Other due to his unique Otherness, while *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*, as Hornedo explains, pertains to how one can either add or demean the value of oneself and others. The discussion will provide a foundation for understanding the disposition of man toward the Other. The discussion on Levinas will begin with his metaphysical standpoint of the "Il y a" and progresses to the opening of intersubjective relation through the Face and ultimately leading to Responsibility as Substitution. In discussing Responsibility, the paper will reemphasize the concepts of Totality and Infinity to articulate the Other's unique Otherness and its implication for the subject's responsibility. These concepts will provide the foundation to Levinas' ethical philosophy. The paper will then proceed with a reading of Hornedo's essay, which elaborates on how he arrived at his understanding of *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* through its historical roots and his philosophical analysis. In this regard, his analysis will also explain various concepts related to *pagmamahal* and its application towards others in the light of Filipino culture. By examining these concepts, the paper will demonstrate the interconnection between them by relating similarities in terms of self-becoming of man and its ethical implication towards other people. Ultimately, the discussion will show how *pagmamahal*, as a concept, can be understood as an act towards the Other. As such, the analysis of these concepts will illustrate how one can understand part of Levinas' philosophy through Hornedo and demonstrate that *pagmamahal* can indeed be considered ethical.

Keywords: *responsibility, violence, pagmamahal, pagmumura*

Introduction

The paper aims to relate the Levinasian concept of Responsibility for the Other to Florentino Hornedo's *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*. It exposes a dialogue in which both Hornedo and Levinas might agree on certain concepts. The paper answers the problem of how these concepts could be compatible with one another insofar the theories are concerned to how one must act towards another due to his capability of self-becoming. Such actions toward other people would seem to be elusive insofar that one's understanding would be in various interpretations and ways. In

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this regard, these philosophers have given their account on ethical theories. Their theories stress the importance of the self-becoming of man that will give a reason for the disposition towards people. With this being said, the paper shall also give a possibility of how *pagmamahal* can also be an act towards the *Other* as an implication of such relation if it permits to be valid.

Infinity and Totality towards Ethical Responsibility

In discussing the Levinasian concepts of Totality and Infinity, it is important to start from his metaphysical notions from the “*Il y a*” or “*There Is*” up to his theory of Ethical Responsibility as he concludes that Ethics is First Philosophy. This chapter shall discuss the concepts of the “*Il y a*”, *Jouissance* or Enjoyment, Separation until it reaches to the encounter to the Other through the Face until the Responsibility as Substitution. It is important to discuss such concepts as to give a comprehensive understanding of the concepts of Totality and Infinity in the light of his applicative notion.

Levinas explains his metaphysical standpoint of the “*Il y a*” or “*There Is*” as something that goes a step backward from the Heideggerian notion of *seiendes* (existents) and *Sein* (existence)² before nothingness. In a commentary by Roger Burggraeve, he reiterates how Levinas also opposes the tradition of Western Metaphysics insofar that Being’s characteristic of Essence can be reduced to the same. This is because the act of being deprives the Being’s radical dynamism insofar that everything that being does is because of the Essence in which all actions should be in accordance to it, and this is said to unescapable thus constituting the Levinasian concept of Totality.³ In Levinas’ book entitled *On Escape*, indicates a movement of being that there is a need to escape the ontological totality of for the subject to be allowed to multiple possibilities.⁴ He further critiques the traditional western metaphysics that due to essence, it creates a possibility of conceptualizing being to an idea that will be explained in the latter as an act of violence.

Returning to the discussion of the *Il y a*, he describes it as rumbling silence of nothingness that its sound could be likened to the sound of a hollow shell heard when close to the ear.⁵ Such a sound gives a terrifying feeling that one does not understand what it is. The phrase “*There Is*” would always presuppose something as one could say that “There is a chair” that would connote the existence of a chair. However, “*There Is*” alone would not necessarily mean nothing but it is something that is yet to be determined, thus it is void of its identity that constitutes its anonymity as Levinas discusses about the *Il y a* in his short work of *Existents to Existence*.⁶ “*Il y a*” is also a bridge from the nothingness to something. To escape such anonymity through the act of hypostasis that he is to be conscious and to be the master of his being.⁷

² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1962): 22-27. For Heidegger there is a need to differentiate the ontological difference of being insofar the *seiendes* refers to “something that is” that is often used to refer to entities in general while contrast to *Sein* connotes the existence of something.

³ Roger Burggraeve, *Proximity with the Other: A Multidimensional Ethic of Responsibility in Levinas* (India: Dharmaram Publications, 2009), 8.

⁴ Emmanuel Levinas, *On Escape*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 55.

⁵ Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), 48.

⁶ Emmanuel Levinas, *Existents and Existence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Netherlands, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1978), 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 60 and 82-83.

In creating one's identity, a Being dwells into the world and uses the things in it with things that bring enjoyment to him. Levinas thoroughly explains this as *Jouissance* or Enjoyment in Totality and Infinity.⁸ *Jouissance* would entail one's understanding that life is indeed beautiful as he enjoys things such as sleep, eating, dancing, etc. He enjoys such things that he assimilates these from the world towards himself as he builds his own identity through his need. In the state of *Jouissance*, Levinas recognizes the necessity of being part of the world in such a way as it emphasizes the concept of Totality.

Following such creation of one's identity follows a concretized act of enjoyment and the end of his participation in "*Il y a*" called Separation. Levinas explains Separation as a phenomenon where Being is in the process of self-identification, thus opening the possibility of the I for transcendence. This is how Levinas explains transcendence as a way of existing of its exteriority that prevents itself from being totalized or reduced to the same.⁹ Such transcendence would imply the idea of the Infinity, insofar as he continually creates himself through a continuous hypostasis. Burggraeve articulates the cause of the continuous hypostasis is still due to the dread of *Il y a*, or anonymity, which persists in creeping into one's being, creating an internal struggle to continually create oneself.¹⁰

Separation, in another sense, is one's separation from the Other through distance. Such distance would mean that the Other is also capable of self-creating himself that would constitute his distinct character through an accomplished enjoyment. Thus, it is in separation that the subjectivity of the I arises, creating a distinction between the I and the Other as it avoids being reduced to the Same. The Self further creates himself due to his radical dynamism in relation to his transcendental notion that totalization of his interiority cannot be permitted because of the idea of the Infinity that he possesses. With this, the self is distinct from the Other that makes him a host that welcomes the Other.¹¹

The intersubjective encounter with the Other starts with the subject having a character of Desire. For Levinas, Desire is not a condition for one to be satisfied, just like how one has a desire to be full when one is hungry. It is a "desire that cannot be satisfied," in which to desire can also be a feeling of self-hallowing. If such is the reality of desire, then the subject longs for something that could not satisfy him, hence he longs for something that is infinite. Infinity is something a being is in the state of due to his transcendental notion.¹² Concretely, the encounter with the Infinite is best exemplified through the meeting of the subject with the Other, through the Epiphany of the Face. Levinas describes the Face not from its usual definitions or through an example of a usual human face that consists of the eyes, the nose etc. The Face is the manifestation of the Infinity of the Other of which he desires. Such Infinity that both the I and the Other possess would disturb one another's being, compelling them to each other as it opens a face-to-face encounter with the Other. It is through this encounter that would involve how the I of its Ontology of Being would resemble a home wherein the Other intrudes upon me like a "Stranger"¹³ that surprises and disturbs me to welcome him.

⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 111.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 35 and 40.

¹⁰ Burggraeve, *Proximity with the Other*, 9-12.

¹¹ Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 299.

¹² *Ibid.*, 33-34.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 39.

The Face has the attributes of a destituteness and essential poverty that expresses itself with the command of “*Thou shall not kill*,”¹⁴ as it invites the Other to an act of murder or to not killing it at the same time. The Face already involves the ethical implications of the I towards the Other insofar as his disposition would either kill or welcome the Other. The act of murder would consequently mean the violence that it conceptualizes the Other through knowledge, removing the alterity of the Other. To know is to grasp an idea, and in grasping creates a notion of power thus, to grasp or to know the Other is to have power over him. As Burggraeve would presume that having the power over the Other would be a reduction to the Same, which would eventually pave way to other forms of violence that bring terror to people, either physical or social.¹⁵ Therefore, the relation of the I to the Other is through Desire, which seeks the Infinity that the being possesses due to his transcendence that would not necessarily presume knowledge nor intentionality towards the Other. To be ethical is to respect Infinity, the capability of transcendence, which the Other possesses that will eventually lead towards goodness. Totalization, however, would mean to him as an act of violence, as it removes its alterity, making him possible to comprehend.

The concept of Substitution is another dynamic of responsibility in Levinas’ thought. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Levinas describes the phenomena of being responsible for the Other, and “being responsible even for the Other’s responsibility but one cannot take his place.”¹⁶ This explains two things. First, the subject’s responsibility is doubled, or the weight of responsibility becomes heavier, since one must be also become responsible even for the Other’s responsibilities. Second, the saying that one cannot take his own place means that responsibility falls under his charge alone. The responsible subject does not expect that people will cover for him despite mentioning that any responsible subject takes into consideration even towards the Other’s responsibilities.

In another light, Responsibility as Substitution, as Paul Marcus comments, is the decentralization of the I, where the subject shifts from being the center to being “*the-one-for-the-other*.”¹⁷ Leovino Garcia also explains the shift of the I towards the Other by examining how the “Law of the I” involves how the subject begins thinking from himself towards the Other and returns to him. The “Law of I” would then constitute totality towards the Other. Therefore, Garcia proposes the “Law of the Other” in which the subject does not return to himself when he is thinking towards the Other.¹⁸ This then explains the notion of the I or the subject, being at home, where the Other surprises him. Then the I, being surprised by the arrival of the Other, places his freedom into question, and welcomes him unconditionally. This is what Levinas meant by meeting the Other as a form of hostage. The subject becomes a hostage to the Other, insofar as his freedom is in question, and the Other surprises him that forces him to respond. In this situation, there is no opportunity to evade responsibility. One is perhaps condemned to be responsible. The Subject welcomes the Other’s destituteness and the poverty that the Face expresses.

However, to do otherwise would already mean the act of violence committed by the subject towards the Other. Violence, here, is illustrated in how the subject can decline or ignore the Other.

¹⁴ Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 199.

¹⁵ Burggraeve, *Proximity with the Other*, 35.

¹⁶ Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, 158.

¹⁷ Paul Marcus, *Being for The Other: Emmanuel Levinas, Ethical Living and Psychoanalysis* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1953), 28.

¹⁸ Leovino Garcia, “Philosophically Speaking: What it means to be human,” *The Sunday Chronicle* (July 13, 1987): 25.

One of the factors that lead to this non-response to the Other is knowledge, wherein the subject may judge the Other with prejudice. Substitution is void of deliberating about whether to act or not because, in doing so, there is the tendency to act selectively that one might act for one but not somebody else.

To recap this discussion is to conclude how Ethics is indeed First Philosophy for Levinas. He insists that such Responsibility for the Other is in the act of existing for the Other, which is beyond Being, towards an *excedence*¹⁹ to which the movement of Being is transcendent towards the Good. This responsibility is realized through how the Face from the Other pleads with the I not to commit an act of violence, thereby constituting a relation that enables the I to be responsible for the Other through Substitution.

Earlier parts of the paper have explained that Desire is what attracts beings towards Infinity, and that to access such is only through the Other, who is in the state of Infinity due to his transcendence. As a being accesses the Other, who is void of knowledge, he encounters the Face in its straightforwardness, thus revealing its exterior characteristic. With encounters that are void of knowledge, this would mean the encounter is pre-rational. As the Face appeals to the I, it is up to the I to decide upon an action towards the Other. And it is through the I that his freedom is put into question, such that he welcomes the Other as he indeed embodies the characteristic of being “For the Other,” in line with his Responsibility towards the Other as Substitution. If a being is indeed oriented towards Good due to his transcendence, then his action to the Other promises goodness. Levinas, thus, concludes that man exists to be good; thus, ethics is indeed first philosophy.

Pagmamahal and Pagmumura

To understand the study of *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*, it is important to know the intellectual prowess of its ideas, which stems from the scholarly background of Florentino Hornedo. Regarded as a Renaissance man for his contributions to the human sciences and his efforts in reminding the academe to give great emphasis to such, the man behind the title is given to Florentino Hornedo. After finishing high school, Hornedo initially pursued the sciences, particularly biology, due to his love for animal life. However, economic constraints prevented him from pursuing such a path, which eventually brought him instead to study education at University Santo Tomas in 1957. This decision opened and led him to discover the realm of the humanities.

His reputation as Renaissance man was evident in his diverse interests in the humanities. Roland Theuas Pada describes him as “an intellectual tangled with a caboodle of disciplines in the humanities,”²⁰ or simply, a person who delved in the different paths in understanding the very nature of one’s humanity. The studies he pursued in the academe spanned across history, philosophy, literature and anthropology. Hornedo’s commitment to the humanities was shaped by his Ivatan heritage, which inspired him to advocate for the recognition of his cultural traditions. In fact, his 1977 dissertation *Laji: An Ivatan Folk Lyric Tradition*,²¹ presented at the University of Santo Tomas, was a

¹⁹ Levinas, *On Escape*, 54.

²⁰ Roland Theuas DS. Pada, “The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities,” *Kritike* 9, no. 2 (December 2015): 1.

²¹ Lloyd Rivera, et. al., *Florentino Hornedo* (2016, an exhibit material presented in the UST Graduate School in honor of Florentino Hornedo)

call for the preservation of his heritage and practices of his culture in Batanes.²² This rendered him being a pioneer in ethno-history and cultural studies in the Philippines.

In the field of philosophy, Hornedo was particularly drawn to phenomenology as a method. His master's thesis, written in 1972, was regarding the notion of freedom with the title, *Philosophy of Freedom*. This work was later republished by the UST Publishing House in 2000 under the title *The Power to Be: The Phenomenology of Freedom*.²³ In this thesis, Hornedo redefined the notion of freedom in the logical and metaphysical sense.²⁴ He particularly included a number of literary works and philosophical theories that led to his conclusion of how freedom is a faculty that empowers both the self and others. This notion was closely tied to his advocacy for the development of his hometown in Batanes. Hornedo's notion of freedom extended to the making of one's value through work that involves the use of creativity for self-building. Fleurdeliz Altez-Albela further explains that it was through phenomenology that led Hornedo to explore the answer to the question: "What does it mean to be human?"²⁵ Therefore, in this context, Hornedo defines freedom as intertwined with strength, self-creation, and ultimately, the empowerment of others.²⁶ With the background being established, it is then important to utilize the knowledge of his scholarly expertise in history, literature, and philosophy that will give a great context in reading his essay "*Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*."

In his essay, "*Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*," Hornedo first cites the world of the pre-literature society. The society he recalls demonstrates a cognition of value that is separate from knowledge. Such cognition of value shapes their disposition in assessing at things to whether they are good or bad, associating them with the light or darkness based on myths of struggles they have known.²⁷ With this in mind, the reality they face is structured vertically, distinguished by what is considered as high-priced or low-priced, a perception of value that corresponds to the concepts of *mahal* and *mura*, respectively.²⁸ Therefore, for Hornedo, a society structured vertically describes social relationships, where people are analogous to commodities. Hornedo references definitions of these words from Father Pedro de San Buenaventura's *Vocabulario* (1613)²⁹ and Jose Villa Panganiban's *Diksiyunaryo – Tesouro: Pilipino-Ingles*,³⁰ comparing their meanings to one another:

²² Pada, *The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities*, 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁴ Fleurdeliz Altez-Albela, "Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought: Florentino H. Hornedo's Philosophical Anthropology," *Kritike* 10, no. 2 (December 2016): 62.

²⁵ Hornedo primarily adheres to Husserlian phenomenology where the body is able to have a consciousness or *Kamalayan* of the things around him and the people he interacts with coinciding with Cartesian dualism of the body and spirit. In the light of Husserl, he defines it with the *Malay tao* and its content that is *nilalaman ng malay tao*. Fleurdeliz Altez-Albela, *Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought: Florentino H. Hornedo's Philosophical Anthropology*: 63. See also Florentino Hornedo, *Pagpakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas*, (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2002): 1-3.

²⁶ Altez-Albela, *Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought*, 64.

²⁷ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura: Essays* (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publication, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, 2002), 143.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁹ *Ibid.* Cf. Pedro de San Buenaventura, *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala; el Romance Castellano Puesto Primero*, (Laguna: Pila, 1613).

³⁰ *Ibid.* Cf. Jose Villa Panganiban, *Diksiyunaryo–Tesouro: Pilipino – Ingles*, (Quezon City: Manlapaz Publishing Co., 1973).

Fr. P. de San Buenaventura ³¹		Jose Villa Panganiban ³²	
<i>Mahal</i>	- noble	<i>Mahal</i>	- expensive
	- enoblecer		- high-priced
	- estima		- beloved
	-preciado		- held highly in great esteem
	-preciosa		- noble
	-honroso	- highly born	
	-grave	<i>Mura</i>	- cheap
	- tenerse		- inexpensive
	- lactarse		- low-priced
	- entonarse		- scolding
- valor	- reproach		
<i>Mora</i>	- afrenta		- young and unripe fruit, etc.
	- deshonra		- very young coconut fruit
	- vituperio		- immature
	- abaratar		- undeveloped
	- barato		- fresh and young
		- light, as in <i>asul na mura</i> (light blue)	

A way to access such society, as Hornedo explains, is through hermeneutics, particularly in the light of Paul Ricouer’s *Techne Hermenutike*. This method explains how a person from the present may understand and interpret words from the past through the ontology of understanding. Thus, this method explains how the person of the present grows in self-understanding as it assimilates itself with the past by making itself contemporary with the text and appropriate the meaning of the text to himself.³³

In line with the theoretical framework established, the understanding of *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* is possible through historical references, such as the earlier linguistic records Hornedo cites. As such, the words are understood through their practical application, how they are used and perceived in behavior. In this sense, words do not merely refer to an individual but also to the essence of their being.³⁴ Hornedo further cites another historical document to highlight how the words *mahal* and *mura*, as root words from *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*, were seen in “Declaracion de los Mandamientos de la Ley de Dios,” a text written by the Franciscan Venerable Juan de Oliver between 1585 and 1590. In Hornedo’s translation and interpretation of the text from Spanish to Ivatan, the passage states:

Ang tauong may baet, may vasto, ybinobocodniya sa caniyang loob, ang magaling sa masama, minamahal niya ang mahal at ang moray minomora rin, di may vasto pa ang tauo cun pauain niya ang lahat, masaman man, magaling man, cun yhalimbawa ang mahal sa mora, at ang

The reasonable man, who has discernment distinguishes within his heart what is good and what is evil; he esteems the precious and the worthless he treats as worthless. Would a man be considered right if he treats equally everything, both good and the evil as if they were the same, and if he regards as equal both that which is

³¹ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 146. Cf. Buenaventura, *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala*, 673, 677.

³² *Ibid.* Cf. Panganiban, *Diksiyunaryo-Tesouro*, 683, 717.

³³ *Ibid.*, 145.

³⁴ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 148-149.

mora sa mahal, di bulag ang tauo cun paputiin and maytim? Ang maytim naman ay paputiin niya?... Tapat bagang ypara ang mora sa mahal? Ang Demo sa Dios?

Cun baga lalo ang D.s at mahal sa lahat, anot di niyo mahal, at ybiguin, at di sintahing lalo sa lahat?

Ang Demonio, ang Anito, cun para mora sa lahat, masamang anyo, masamang loob, opasalain sa caniyang Dios, anot di morahin sa lahat, di calupitan, at di limutin ang walang baet sang saga;

precious and that which is worthless, or that which is worthless with that which is precious? Would not the person be blind if he treats that which is black as if it were white, and that which is white as if it were black?... Is it correct to treat the cheap and the costly as if they were equal? The devil and God?

If God is greater and most precious of all, why do you not esteem and love and cherish him above all?

The Devil, the *anito*, if the most worthless, ugly, evil-minded, a murmurer against his God, why is he not treated as the most worthless of all, why not shown cruelty, why not forgotten as worth nothing?³⁵

Evident in the passage, the words *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* are exemplified by the use of commandment of love by God.

This sense of value is then inherent in human beings, insofar as his perception of value is exemplified through his subjectivity; whereas a piece of silver does not possess inherent value; rather its value is assigned by the person who receives and acknowledges it. Such separation of value is a form of violence against the being's subjectivity.³⁶ The measure of one's value is, thus, in being, that is, words *mahal* and *mura* are in regard to the human being that attempts to quantify its level of worth insofar that it has also become the measure of one being against another being. Consequently, the understanding of *pagmamahal* reflects the being's disposition to another being, which expresses their degree of value; whereas *pagmumura*, on the other hand, represents a person's inclination to consider another as valueless or cheap.³⁷

Its phenomenological aspects entail how *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* are expressed evidently. Hornedo cites different empirical notions of how both *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura*, as an act towards other people. He firstly reemphasizes that something is considered *mahal* because it is *mahalaga*; therefore, when one obtains or earns something that is valuable like jewelry, he is likely to take care of it so that its value may never be tarnished. Thus, the act of *pagmamahal* and the act of *pagpapahalaga* have a certain connection: the person who loves recognizes the worth or *halaga* of something, in which *pagpapahalaga* is bound to an act of preserving and maintaining the value of such. *Pagmumura*, on the other hand, according to the text of the *Declaracion*, is an act of demeaning a person's value, either through words by slander or deeds. Hornedo stresses on deeds by an example of a parent that loves his children but treats his servants with abuse demonstrates a form of hypocrisy in the act *pagmamahal*, which entails injustice. Thus, *pagmamahal* is closely tied to justice, as one should be able to distribute and provide access to such resources with equity.³⁸

³⁵ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 148-149.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 150.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 152-154.

Katapatan, pagkamagalang, pagkamaalabananin, pagkamapagbigay, pagkabukas-palad, pagka-mapagkalinga, and pagkamalambing are among the virtues Hornedo associates with *pagmamahal* in the light of Filipino culture.

Katapatan is defined as *tapat* or uprightness, expressing loyalty and single-mindedness. Sincerity, as another definition, is said to will one thing, as *katapatan* is a form of purity of heart;³⁹ therefore, *matapat na pagmamahal* is one's act of loving without ulterior motives and whose sole end is to value the beloved. *Pagkamagalang* entails the recognition of the value-in-itself of the person being respected and to honor their liberty. *Pagkamaalabananin* is described through the example of *pasalubong*, that is, the manifestation of the one who acknowledges the habitual presence of another in one's consciousness. It involves a capacity to provide for the needs of the loved one and a thoughtful anticipation of the person. *Pagkamapagbigay* is a form of tolerance that endures and continually understands the person's behavior, even if it that can be peculiar or ordinarily unacceptable. *Pagkabukas-palad* is a form of generosity. It is giving while one has the capacity to do, even to the extent of being left with nothing—a deed that can be deemed heroic. *Pagkamapagkalinga* is related to being "solicitous," which means taking care of anyone who is needy.⁴⁰ *Pagkamalambing* is a form of *pagmamahal* expressed bodily through delicate and gentle gestures that do not harm.⁴¹

Hornedo, then, recognizes how *pagmamahal* is devoid of the sexual expression of *eros*, which is contrasted to the physical expression of *lambing*, which is delicate and gentle. He refers to Buenaventura's *Vocabulario*, noting that such words would have the translation into love but not necessarily into *eros*.⁴²

Giliu	– <i>aficion</i> (fond, inclination) – <i>amar</i> (to love) – <i>querer</i> (to want, to wish, to love, to be fond of)
Hilig	– <i>trama</i> (plot, scheme)
Hirang	– <i>escoger</i> (to select, to choose) – <i>entresacar</i> (to pick out, to cull)
Ibig	– <i>amar</i> – <i>charidad</i> (plot, scheme) – <i>antojo</i> (whim, caprice, fancy) – <i>apetecer</i> (to crave, to desire) – <i>querer</i>
Nasa	– <i>codiciar</i> (to covet) – <i>Desear</i> (to desire, to want, to wish, to crave) – <i>Deseo</i> (desire, wish)
Sinta	– <i>amar</i> – <i>Aficion</i> – <i>deseo</i>

³⁹ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 155. Hornedo alludes to Soren Kierkegaard's Purity of Heart as "to will one thing" in line with *Katapatan*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 156. Hornedo cited other Filipino words compatible with Solicitude such as *aruga, kandili, ingat, inwi* etc. These words as Hornedo would be related to Solicitude that his definition of such principle that is to be moved, disturbed, anxious, careful over something.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 154-157.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 158.

Hornedo examines words such as *hilig*, *ibig*, *sinta*, *gilin*, *hirang* and re-evaluates its definitions. These words are evident in Filipino literature and music. Some words, such as *hirang*, indicate selectiveness. For example, Hornedo uses the phrase “*nabirang na president*,” which would mean a president who is chosen rather than loved. Hornedo returns to the definition of *ibig* that can be univocal to charity, citing Father Oliver’s treatise on the Ten Commandments: “*ybigin mo ang Dios (nang) lalo sa labat*.” In examining this document, he contrasts *ibig* with *mahal*. The former is affective, while the latter is cognitive, as *mahal* in regard to one’s value. Meanwhile, *hilig* and *nasa* convey a tendency or propensity, suggesting a selfish quality of it, and such definition may also include a plot or scheme one has a desire to obtain something. *Nasa* by itself signifies desire in the sense of greed, a character which can be associated with *eros*.⁴³

To sum up this discussion, *pagmamahal* is the act of recognizing the value of someone and promoting its value in growth by preserving its value. It is an act performed by the *nagmamahal* (the loving subject) toward the *minamahal* (the beloved) with the sole purpose of elevating their value, making them to be *mabalaga* and more worthy of *pagmamahal*. *Pagmumura*, however, is the demeaning of the value of the person that he either takes it away or destroys the value that the person possesses.

It is indeed that Hornedo’s intellectual background as a historian, a literary artist, and a philosopher in the humanities that have contributed to the understanding of his essay. He interweaves these three different disciplines to create an understanding of the words *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* through historical documents and philosophical analysis that aid the interpretation of the facts and data these documents provide. It is the humanity of Florentino Hornedo that is evident in the article, as he provides a new perspective on human nature in the light of Filipino culture and its exemplification.

Responsibility and *Pagmamahal*

The concepts aforementioned above shall be connected in two ways. First, through the notion of the subject in terms of his capability of self-becoming. Second, through the applicative notion of how the concepts play a role in the encounter with other people. This will be the grounds of the relation that would make the connection possible.

Levinas’ self-becoming explains how the I create itself through its transcendence. His transcendence exists since the idea of the Infinity that he possesses describes the radical dynamism of his being that cannot be totalized. The subject that undergoes the process of Separation creates his own identity that he continually escapes the terror of anonymity through hypostasis and the assimilation of the things he enjoys in the world that creates a distance from the I to the Other in which transcendence is possible to avoid being reduced to the same. His self-becoming is made possible by the *Jonissance* that he enjoys things from the world and the Separation of himself towards the Other, which creates his own alterity, his form of self-identification. Totality would mean that the subject is comprehended by knowledge, enclosed with a concept that objectifies him and removes him from his alterity. This is the reason why Levinas emphasizes a movement out of being, because being can be comprehended, enclosing him within ontological totality, where he is unable to create his way of existing.

⁴³ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 157-160.

For Hornedo, *mahal* would define the subject due to his worth and his capability of self-building because of the freedom he possesses that empowers him. This self-becoming is due to the fact that the Subject is a creative project that expresses one's value through work that gives an exposition of the self of what he can do or what he can offer. This is realized in the freedom that empowers him to do so within himself and for others.⁴⁴ Thus, in relating to *mahal*, the subject is a meaningful project that expresses value of himself making him *mahalaga*. However, when the quantified value is measured against another, to compare against another as something that is cheap and valueless, that will be as Hornedo describes as *mura*.

What we can notice in the concepts explained, Infinity and *mahal*, is that they both signify the self-becoming of a person. Infinity is the idea of transcendence that allows the subject to continually create himself and his way of existing. *Mahal*, on the other hand, expresses his value through his freedom, which empowers him to deem himself as *mahalaga*, insofar as he considers himself as a meaningful and creative project. *Pagmamahal* is an act of preserving and further enhancing the value upward of what he expresses. Totality, in the form of grasping the Other in knowledge, would mean he would enclose the being into a concept that would soon be a form of violence that strips him out of his possibility of transcendence, the idea of Infinity within him. For Hornedo, *mura* describes a person that is lowly and cheap, which defames the value of the subject.

In relating this to the applicative notion, we connect Levinas' concepts of his ethical relation towards the Other as Responsibility to *pagmamahal* and *pagmumura* as an act towards people. As one can see, the subject, who is a host for the Other, surprises himself by being responsible. His responsibility always involves The Face that pleads to him to not kill it. The act of murder towards the Other, in Levinas, would presuppose how one's disposition towards the Other involved the factor of knowledge. In this case, he avoids such responsibility insofar as the factors, including who the person is, involve knowledge, thus deviating away from the responsibility since the person who seeks him is known to the subject through knowledge. It would indeed be a disrespect towards the Infinity of the Other, as he is totalized within a concept that made him disregard the responsibility. To respect the Infinity of the Other, therefore, is the disposition of the I that respects the Other's capability of self-becoming due to his transcendence and to avoid totalization, an avoidance of murder. To totalize would be the opening of the graver forms of violence, where one kills or inflicts suffering on a person due to the knowledge towards one has of them.

Hornedo's *pagmamahal* involves acknowledging the value of the person as something highly as it enhances his value. His value, which he expresses due to the freedom that empowers him to continually build himself as self-project through work, should always be deemed something as *mahalaga*. *Pagmamahal*, therefore, as an act towards other people, is a disposition of recognition of his value that he expresses through his work in the intention to raise such value, higher. This act is done by the *nagmamahal* towards the *minamahal*, who deems the person as *mahalaga* and worthy of *Pagmamahal*. *Pagmumura*, however, is the defamation or the destruction of the value of the person he possesses that deems him being valueless or cheap.

What we can synthesize in both theories is how the disposition of the subject is always in respect of the self-becoming of the other person. If one respects the Infinity of the Other it is because the Other has a characteristic of something great due to his transcendence, which should be respected,

⁴⁴ Altez-Albela, *Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought*, 64.

to do otherwise is to totalize the Other into a concept. *Pagmamahal* recognizes the value of the person highly due to his self-becoming from his freedom. *Pagmumura*, however, is to treat his value as cheap and valueless. Totality, as a form of violence, is also capable of treating someone as lowly insofar as he encloses the Other to a concept, grasping and wielding power over him. Here, we can see a connection in regard to the disposition of the subject to the Other, which aims to foster self-becoming.

One could notice that Responsibility as Substitution means acting towards the Other regardless of who the person is, to act that is void of knowledge of the Other. This would imply how the I or the subject is responsible despite the identity of the Other. *Pagmamahal*, on the other hand, has a notion of justice that one should always show an act of *pagmamahal* to all people regardless of who they are. This is illustrated by Hornedo's example of a person loving their children yet despising servants.⁴⁵ This similarity invokes the disposition of the I to treat the Other with goodness regardless of who they are.

Other concepts related to *pagmamahal* can be related to Levinas, such as *katapatan*, *pagkamagalang* and *pagkamapagkalinga*. *Matapat na pagmamahal* or *katapatan*, in Hornedo, can be related to Levinas' theory on grounds that *katapatan* is void of any end of the act of *pagmamahal*, just as Responsibility is pre-rational, void of any knowledge. Thus, the notion of being responsible to the Other or to act towards the Other is something done naturally. *Pagkamagalang*, or respect, as mentioned earlier, is to let the other person "be", thus his subjectivity and recognizes his value-in-itself of the person and his liberty. *Pagkamapagkalinga* can also be a form of putting oneself into the suffering of the Other in Substitution. In regard to the Face having an essential poverty and destituteness, a person who possesses solicitude can take on the responsibility towards the Other, to take care of him. Solicitude will also mean how the person is disturbed and anxious so that, in relation to Levinas, he is moved by the plea of the Face, he is disturbed by the happenings surrounding him that make him responsible. Thus, what we can conclude in here is that some concepts related to *pagmamahal* can be compatible in Levinas' theory.

Levinas' concept of Fecundity can also be related to *pagmamahal* in Hornedo as to contributes how one to help increase oneself becoming in the terms of the Father and child relation. Paul Marcus comments on how Paternity resembles the relationship of the I to the Other with a parental attitude with the Other that Fecundity allows such parent-child relation to be because one's capability of offspring. Such an attitude allows the child to be transcendent and the relation with the child is not factored with the aspects of biology and time.⁴⁶ The Paternal attitude is how Father is to create possibilities for the child to create his own possibilities that does not necessarily control the child but to realize his capabilities to see such possibilities for himself.⁴⁷

Hornedo emphasizes in his article how he actively promotes the child's growth into mature individuals by providing them with food, shelter, and education. Hornedo realizes that the paternal relation is only a factor, however important. He gives an example of how the child enters school at the age of seven until he graduates from medical school. During the duration of those years spent on learning and working, he underwent existential growth that expresses his personhood. His value then

⁴⁵ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 152-154.

⁴⁶ Marcus, *Being for the Other*, 142. Levinas does not use the usual definition of time. He explains the relation in terms of "Infinite Time" that one exists without the limits of mortality that allows all kinds of possibilities to happen. Perhaps an opening to transcendence, unto goodness.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 142-146.

is the fulfillment of the other investments in his value that because of his parents that values him, they indeed increased the value of the child.⁴⁸ Thus, the analogy with the Father-child relationship from both philosophers depict how one is meant to let be of the Other and to treat him in a way that allows for his possibility of self-becoming—a point that stresses its importance.

Conclusion: Possibility of *Pagmamahal* to the Other

If the relation of the concepts may be compatible, one can, therefore, imply that *pagmamahal* can indeed be an act towards the Other. While Levinas and Hornedo can agree in terms of allowing the Other to continuously self-create or enable him of self-becoming, their ethical notions can give us an understanding on the human disposition towards the Other. Their ethical notions explained earlier give us a guide in understanding knowing the importance of one's capability of self-becoming and to do otherwise, to speak, to disrespect such is a form of violence towards him. The other concepts related to *pagmamahal* exhibit different ways of interaction towards the other that can be compatible as how the I interact with the Other in his responsibility. This analogy will give a contribution to philosophy in terms of how one can understand Levinas in the light of Hornedo and how *pagmamahal* is grounded on an ethical notion that is towards the Other. By synthesizing their accounts on ethics, they would conclude their humanistic approach in philosophy.

⁴⁸ Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*, 152.

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