

an

Journal

undergraduate

Journal

TALISIK

journal

Journal

of

Philosophy

philosophy

TALISIK

An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

Volume 5, Number 1

August 2018


ISSN 2362-9452



Concilium Philosophiae
Faculty of Arts and Letters
University of Santo Tomas



COPYRIGHTS



All the research articles published by TALISIK are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution - Commercial 4.0 International License.

TALISIK supports the Open Access Movement. Those who intend to copy and redistribute the articles published by the journal are free upon the condition that they cite the journal article or acknowledge the author.

Articles in the journal are not eligible for commercial purposes.

© Copyright TALISIK | ISSN 2362-9452 | talisik.journal@gmail.com | www.talisik.org

ABOUT THE COVER

TALISIK: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy, 5:1 (August 2018)

Layout by Gerard Matthew R. Arcamo and Anton Heinrich L. Rennesland

ABOUT THE JOURNAL

In accordance with the mission and vision of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas, i.e. cultivating a research oriented culture, the Concilium Philosophiae, the official organization of the undergraduate students of philosophy of the UST Faculty of Arts and Letters, established **TALISIK**: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy in order to foster a research mentality among the undergraduate students of philosophy. As a research platform primarily for undergraduate philosophy students in the Philippines, the journal seeks to publish articles across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- The history of philosophy (East and West)
- The branches of philosophy, such as, logic, metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology, ethics
- Philosophical schools, such as, rationalism, empiricism, phenomenology, existentialism
- Contemporary philosophical issues and trends

TALISIK is a Filipino word. It is a contraction of “Talas” [Keeness] and “Saliksik” [Search]. **TALISIK** then means “Katalasan ng isip na umunawa ng anuman” [Keeness of the mind to understand anything] and “Malaliman at matalinong pagdalumat sa kahulugan ng anuman” [In-depth and intelligent search for the meaning of anything]. Based from the definition of **TALISIK**, the Concilium Philosophiae intends to demonstrate the acumen of undergraduate students of philosophy through their research undertakings. The journal primarily caters to the works of the UST undergraduate students of philosophy, but also welcomes contributions from other fields and institutions.

TALISIK publishes issues annually.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief

Ms. Maria Georgina T. Silva | University of Santo Tomas

Managing Editor

Mr. Patrick Andre C. Mencias | University of Santo Tomas

Associate Editors

Ms. Rya Joyce C. Catabas | University of Santo Tomas

Ms. Christelle N. Lee | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Ralph Janssen Purugganan | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Christian R. Ramos | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Anton Heinrich L. Rennesland | University of Santo Tomas

Ms. Arvhie S. Santos | University of Santo Tomas

Ms. Amabel R. Sumabat | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Johnel R. Viste | University of Santo Tomas

Layout Editors

Mr. Patrick Andre C. Mencias | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Anton Heinrich L. Rennesland | University of Santo Tomas

ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Romualdo Abulad | University of Santo Tomas

Mr. Ranier Abengaña | University of Santo Tomas

Dr. Jove Jim Aguas | University of Santo Tomas

Dr. Fleurdeliz Altez - Albela | University of Santo Tomas

Dr. Paolo Bolaños | University of Santo Tomas

Dr. Jovito Cariño | University of Santo Tomas

Dr. Roland Theuas Pada | University of Santo Tomas

LETTER FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

“[P]raxis also entails the philosopher’s task of linguistic reconfiguration, based not only on what he inherits from the philosophical tradition itself, but from historical contingencies as well. In other words, praxis should open itself to the non-identical and should refuse any ontologization or reification of the non-identical.”¹

Philosophical praxis entails linguistic configuration. The language of the philosopher must constantly check itself lest it be reified. This demands critique and a sublation as the differences are amalgamated. What must remain clear in the mind of philosophers is that there is no singular way of doing philosophy; it is a discipline, an academic chastisement of thinking critically and refusing any ontologization of concepts, lest these be more real than nature and reality. For this reason, it is but fitting for students of philosophy to put to writing theories learned in class. Moreover, presenting these ideas and receiving critiques that challenge one’s thought saves nature from concept’s ontologization. This is the praxis of philosophy: how thought refuses stagnation; instead it is a dynamic plasticity.

The selection of articles for this volume of TALISIK was difficult as it went under the auspices of determining academic excellence in philosophical discipline and of showcasing the success of those who venture to put philosophy to practice. Rather than merely being a journal for students of philosophy or publishing articles in relation to philosophy, the Editorial Board deliberated and crafted this volume to become an avenue to present the *produce* of philosophy, of a critical stance against the reification of concepts. The articles contained herein were previously presented at the Second Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference of the De La Salle University, Manila last July 2017, and were subject to rigorous questions and comments—thus shaping their outcome. The authors took to writing once more, this time taking into consideration what was raised during the conference. By this method, it is observable how thought corrects itself to save it from a reified notion of philosophy, of the method of doing philosophy, or of engagement with philosophy.

¹ Paolo Bolaños, “The Promise of the Non-Identical: Adorno’s Reevaluation of the Language of Philosophy,” *Discipline Filosofiche* 26, no. 2 (University of Bologna, 2016): 164.

We, the Editorial Board of TALISIK 2017-2018, present this fifth volume of the journal in hope to continue this flame of thinking critically. The dynamicity of our thoughts would not be possible without the people behind this publication. We extend our sincerest gratitude and congratulations to our contributors for this volume. Their passion in doing philosophy is a benchmark, not of our success as a department of a university, but of philosophy's importance in society. Furthermore, we thank Prof. Dr. Paolo Bolaños for his unwavering support and guidance, for pushing his students to engage better in philosophical praxis, and for trying to uplift the quality of research and thinking. We also thank Mr. Ranier Abengaña for his direct management and provisions on this volume, and for the numerous comments and suggestions that made this volume what it is.

To save concepts from reification, this task of critically engaging with society must be carried out. Philosophy's importance – along with the rest of the humanities – continually challenges us to rethink our concepts. Publishing these articles is just part of the beginning of a different engagement with philosophy. We hope our readers further cultivate the practice of critique, of philosophy—and the contents of these may serve well as the starting point! Once again, we thank and hope our readers enjoy engaging with philosophy as they read these articles.

The Editorial Board
2017-2018

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

BLESSIE KLARRIZ C. BUNGAY graduated Bachelor of Arts major in Philosophy from the University of Santo Tomas last June 2018. During her undergraduate years, she presented in two different conferences: the Second Annual De La Salle University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference (2017) and the 1st Critical Thinking and Values Education National Conference (2017). She is the former Committee Head for Community Development of the Concilium Philosophiae. Her research interests are Philosophy of Education, Existentialism and Philosophy for Children.

CHARLES JASON P. CAHILIG obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in the University of Santo Tomas majoring in Philosophy. He has presented in two conferences namely: the 1st PUP Philosophy Conference: *Philosophy and its Prometheus Task* at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines where he presented his paper entitled, “**Aquinas on Human Head Transplant,**” last February 2018 and at the De La Salle Undergraduate Research Symposium 2017, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines, where he presented his paper entitled, “**Social Constructivism: An Approach to Mathematical Knowledge,**” last July 2017. His research interests are Analytical Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Epistemology, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, Imre Lakatos, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, Alain Badiou

ARVIN JOSHUA S. DIAZ is a graduate of Bachelor of Arts major in Philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas last June 04, 2018 and is currently working as Grade 11 teacher in CEU Manila. His paper presentations include, “**A Dialogue Between Paul Ricoeur and Ernst Bloch's Notions of Utopia and Future of Humanity**”, presented at the Second Annual De Las Salle University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference last 2017, “**Isang Paglalahad sa Pananaw ni Paulo Freire sa "Kultura ng Pananahimik"**”, presented at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines Philosophy Conference: A Promethean Task last February 15, 2018, and “**John Locke and Imam Ali Zaynul Abidin on the Universality of Human Rights**”, presented at the Third Annual De La Salle University Philosophy Undergraduate Conference last July 28, 2018. His research interests include: Hegelian Dialectics, Critical Pedagogy, Marxism, Philosophy of History, Socio-Political Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy.

PATRICK ANDRE C. MENCIAS is an undergraduate student from the University of Santo Tomas majoring in Philosophy. He has presented papers during International Conference in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in 2017, the Second Annual De La Salle Undergraduate Philosophy Conference in 2017, and the Second International Conference for Philippine and Asian Studies in 2018. His research interests involve Phenomenology, and in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, and Florentino Hornedo.

MARIA NOELLE V. MOTRIL is a graduate of Bachelor of Arts major in Communication Arts from the University of Santo Tomas. Upon coming across Foucault: Key Concepts edited by Diana Taylor, she has devoted her time reading and writing on philosophy, despite no formal classes. She continues to pursue this by aide of supervision and comments from philosophy majors. Her paper entitled, “**Michel Foucault’s Gaze and Panopticism on Facebook-Shaming Posts**”, is her first academic publication and paper presentation in the Third Annual De La Salle University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference 2018. She is currently working on another academic paper and will be pursuing a Master’s Degree in Philosophy. Her research interests include Michel Foucault, Paulo Freire, Roland Barthes, Postmodernism, Post-/structuralism, Marxism, Continental Philosophy, and Critical Theory.

RALPH JANSSEN PURUGGANAN is a graduating student of philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas. He is the current president of the Concilium Philosophiae this academic year 2018-2019 and is a member of the Faculty of Arts and Letters’ Debate Team. He presented his paper entitled, “**The Paradox of God’s Divinity in the Context of Jean-Luc Marion and Thomas Aquinas,**” at the Second Annual De La Salle University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference last 2017. His research interest involve Jean-Luc Marion and existentialism, particularly that of Jean-Paul Sarte and Albert Camus.

CHRISTIAN R. RAMOS is currently an undergraduate student of philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas. He is Concilium Philosophiae’s Committee Head for Community Development this academic year 2018-2019 and is also a member of the Young Thomasian Professionals (Dominican Laity). During 2017, he presented his paper entitled, “**The Contemplative Life and its Practice According to Aquinas,**” at the Second Annual De La Salle University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference. His research interests include Philosophy of Religion and Postmodernism.

ANTON HEINRICH L. RENNESLAND obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas, and is currently undertaking his master’s studies at the same university. He has presented in various philosophical conferences and has published an article at *Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines*. His essay “**5 Assumptions on the Illusion ‘Filipino Philosophy’ (A Prelude to Cultural Critique)**” won top prize at the *Don Isabelo de los Reyes Philosophical Essay Writing Contest*, sponsored by the Philosophical Association of the Philippines, on new themes for Filipino Philosophy. His research interests include Aesthetics, Languages, Socio-political Philosophy, Critical Theory, Nietzsche, Adorno, Marx, and Foucault.

TALISIK: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

Volume 5, Number 1 August 2018

Articles

- 12 BLESSIE KLARRIZ C. BUNGAY
Experience as a Teacher:
On John Dewey's *Experience and Education*
- 21 CHARLES JASON P. CAHILIG
Mathematics in Dialectics:
Inquiries on Mathematical Process through Hegel, Marx and Lakatos
- 49 ARVIN JOSHUA S. DIAZ
A Dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Ernst Bloch
on Utopia and the Future of Humanity
- 65 PATRICK ANDRE C. MENCIAS
Ang Penomenolohiya ng Taong Nagmamahal
sa Pilosopiya ni Florentino Hornedo
- 77 MARIA NOELLE V. MOTRIL
Michel Foucault's Gaze and Panopticism
on Facebook-Shaming Posts
- 97 RALPH JANSSEN PURUGGANAN
The Paradox of God's Divinity
in the Context of Jean-Luc Marion and Thomas Aquinas
- 105 CHRISTIAN R. RAMOS
The Contemplative Life and its Practice According to Aquinas
- 113 ANTON HEINRICH L. RENNESLAND
Afterimages: ~~Liberation~~ Ideology in the Culture Industry

Experience as a Teacher: On John Dewey's *Experience and Education*

Blessie Klarriz C. Bungay

University of Santo Tomas | xblessieklarriz@gmail.com

Abstract: When we speak of education today, we always view it as a spoon-feeding system. Teachers must give instruction to their students for them to learn and develop. Without a teacher, a child cannot perform well without them being supervised through the commands of a teacher. Most of the time, we perceive schools as an institution where a child will be developed through their teacher's instructions as they are labelled as the agents of the knowledge. With this kind of pedagogy, most of the students today became dependent with their teacher's knowledge as it only revolves to what they have learned inside their schoolroom. One must recognize that a child should learn and develop himself more through his own special ways, by believing in his instinct and impulse. They should discover things beyond what is being told by their teachers inside a traditional schoolroom.

In this work, I will further elaborate and expose the Deweyan approach on education through his work and illustrate how it may help to develop child's way of learning. This research aims to prove that *experiential* education may help every child's development and it is more effective than the traditional way of education.

Keywords: Child Development, Experiential, Traditional, Progressive

Education is one of the fundamental rights of being a human. Every man has the right to be educated through educational institutions such as academies, day care centers (for children aged 3 to 6 years old), and universities or even through the help of their parents, which can help in shaping and nurturing one's development through teaching them in different ways, as long as one can finally learn and develop his/her self through

the acquired knowledge given through educational institutions. In shaping one's character, development and knowledge of a child, we cannot deny the fact that these kinds of institutions are one of the biggest factors that we always consider. Through educational institutions, children have the access to skills

that will further prepare them for the future.¹ Also, “schooling has direct effects on children's educational achievement, their acquisition of literacy, numeracy and scientific knowledge.”² Students usually learn objectives for a day, such as basic or introductory lectures about certain subjects in school. In this manner, teachers only discuss lessons that are merely book-based and after several days, child tends to forget what he/she learned for a day and does not recognize what he/she acquired from the teacher. As teachers play the biggest role of every child's development through the provided knowledge that has been given based on the stated right and wrong scheme that a kid should first recognize, a child may easily forget it as most of the imparted knowledge may not be significant to them as some may have experienced it, some may not.

At this point, there are several innovative institutions that offer different methods in developing a child. There are different institutions that will suit for different needs and wants based on the standards of the parents on where they want to enrol their child. But despite its varieties, most of them opt to follow the traditional one to maintain the authority of the teacher. As most of the educational institutions rely to the traditional, institutions today became one of the hindrances in every child's development. It

limit their students on what they should only be knowledgeable about. Most of the instructors up to date discuss textbook-based lessons curated by the so-called curriculum, as they believe that best education can be grasped through the knowledge of the books. In this case, child's development became limited.

Traditional schoolroom, according to Dewey, should also have interactions, incorporating real-life experiences, and make its students more engaged in learning. Despite the fact that traditional education offers a wide range of examples in accordance to experience, yet “traditional schoolroom was not a place in which pupils had experiences.”³ According to Dewey, every human experience can influence one's capacity to learn; education is a mere social process, growth, and not a preparation for life; education is life itself.⁴

With that being said, I would like to focus on the following questions: (1) What are the arising issues that a traditional schoolroom is currently facing? (2) How do experiences contribute to one's development? Lastly, (3) Is there a possibility to incorporate experiential education in today's institutions instead of using the traditional way? These questions will be answered through John Dewey's

¹ "The Right to Education." *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*. n.d. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/right-to-education/> (accessed March 15, 2017).

² Sylva, Kathy. "School Influences on Children's Development." *Association for Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 1994: 135.

³ Dewey, John. *Experience and Education*. New York: Kappa Delta Pi, 1938: 26.

⁴ Spanella, Theresa. "John Dewey on Education: Theory & Philosophy." *Study.com*. n.d. <http://study.com/academy/lesson/john-dewey-on-education-theory-philosophy-quiz.html> (accessed March 15, 2017).

Philosophy of Education, specifically, *Experience and Education*.⁵

THE TRADITIONAL SCHOOLROOM AND ITS ISSUES

Traditional schoolroom is problematic for some as there are several issues concerning it. With this, I would like to state some of the rampant issues that were also stated by other articles and based on my observations.

Manalang stated, "Education presents not only a tremendous quantitative problem, but its qualitative problems are probably even more difficult to resolve... There are too many demands on schools,"⁶ which makes it difficult for the students to expand their learning outside their schoolroom. Uniformed process of education became the usual and efficient (for some) type of education scheme to implement in a schoolroom up to date. Structure of the schools is one of the biggest reasons why it became problematic. The structure includes the curriculum of the schools, wherein there should be fixed flows of activities and lesson plans that will sustain one's education as long as these teachers deliver the said lessons for a day. Like for instance, if the curriculum states that in day three, the educator must explain such definitions of a certain topic and the student are required to answer an examination after the discussion. In the said structure, it also includes activities to test the capacities of a student,

such as objective exams for them to see if the student understood the said lessons that were delivered in a short span of time. With the said dilemma, students are restricted to what should they learn, which may lead to student's loss of interests for this kind of matter.

It was also stated by de Mesa and de Guzman, that traditional schoolrooms are still evident, most especially in the Philippines. It was stated that most high schools are still into the traditional education as these institutions still rely on lecture-based education system. As stated by de Mesa and de Guzman:

In many high schools, lectures continue to be the main method of instruction, and the overhead projector is often the most advanced technology used. Students remark that school is a dull, non-engaging environment that is much less interesting than the outside world.⁷

Due to this problem, it was stated by some students that this type of education is not student-friendly. Lecture-based education is too static for the learners as they are only to swallow all the lectures given by their teachers and it is non-engaging. Teachers discuss facts and students should grasp it accordingly. For the students, to hear repetitive facts are indeed dull and boring. Through school, what they

⁵ Dewey, John. *Experience and Education*. New York: Kappa Delta Pi, 1938.

⁶ Manalang, Priscilla S. "Issues in Philippine Education." *Philippine Sociological Review* (Philippine Sociological Review), 1977: 65.

⁷ Mesa, Amelia P. de, and Allan B. de Guzman. "Portrait of Filipino teachers' classroom practices: traditional or constructivist?" *Springer Science+Business Media*, 2006: 235.

need to know are merely fixed information which can be also seen in books.

Based on the observation made in this study, it was stated by de Mesa and de Guzman that in spite of the student-teacher engagements, student activities inside the schoolroom are still rotational and repetitive. Their everyday school life only consists of book-related activities, grasping static information, and taking exams after a topic or so. As stated by de Mesa and de Guzman:

Most of the time, the teacher is engaged in either frontal teaching, monitoring students' seatwork, or conducting quizzes of teaching and learning activity rarely engaged in by the students inside the classroom. Apparently, students working in smaller groups usually are doing the same things side by side, and these things tend to be determined by the teacher. Evidently, students' least engagement in classroom activities is a routine—listening to teachers, writing answer to questions, and taking tests and quizzes.⁸

Hence, de Mesa and de Guzman assumed that “generally, it appears that a large percentage of students are passively content with classroom life.”⁹ In a traditional schoolroom, as stated earlier, what a student usually does is repetitive and dull. In spite of which, most students

based on de Mesa and de Guzman's statements are fond and passively accepting this kind of education.

It was also stated that teachers are still cling to using traditional education in their respective schoolrooms. In spite of having a schoolroom with diverse students, some teachers still rely on the traditional. Most teachers believe that traditional method can cater every student's needs, whether it is a definition of a term or not. As stated:

The scenario of having a diverse classroom with diverse students is not new in Philippine education and it is always a problem on how to address the different learning preferences and styles of the students.¹⁰

But still, In spite of diversity inside the classroom, teachers still opt to do the easiest pedagogy to execute: traditional pedagogy. Aranda and Zamora stated:

It is observed in the Philippine classroom that most of the teachers are engaged in traditional instruction, in which one lesson is designed to meet the needs of all learners, and these teachers think they are using differentiation but actually not. Filipino subject like other academic subjects suffered much because students' diversity was not addressed.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁹ *Ibid.*


¹⁰ Aranda, Ma. Rita R., and Joel L. Zamora.

"Using Differentiated Instruction in Improving the

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452

 CC BY-NC

Academic Performance of Students in Filipino Language." *National University*, 2014: 35.

Learning preferences and styles were not given attention, thus, learning becomes difficult and boring.¹¹

In this case, some teachers do not pay attention in the other learning preferences to provide the needs of every student. For some, students see this as dull and boring as they cannot easily grasp the lessons. Some students cannot easily adapt the learning environment inside a traditional classroom.

Due to the aforementioned statements made, most students today lose their interests in learning. Some factors are: 1. Doing things for the sake of the requirements of the school, and the need to comply with it if they are eager and serious about their grades; 2. Viewing this kind of education as boring as they are only bombarded with information that teachers think that can only suffice to their learning; 3. Students are constrained to do something whether they are interested or not; 4. Students lose their interest in studying as they feel that they cannot grasp it anymore and feel uninterested with what they are studying. With this, some of them are not usually prepared for the modern workplace as they are only told on what to do, not how to do it. Schools also does not teach students to collaborate as it punishes them for the wrong lesson for future success. Their focus is set in the wrong direction, as they are dictated by their former educators; and lastly, the school, including the educators, did not consider the other factors in creating an experience. At some point, they are trapped in a room full of terms that are required to

memorize yet does know its essence. Students are deprived from their own interests since in a traditional schoolroom, all we need to do is to follow what is asked. Students attend their classes only to listen what is only told, instead of exploring things around them.

ON JOHN DEWEY'S *EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION*

Let us now analyse and solve the aforementioned issues using John Dewey's theory on education using his work, *Experience and Education*. Let us first differentiate the two ideas that Dewey focused on and stated: Traditional and Progressive. According to Dewey, Traditional Education usually delivers ready-made and finished information, which will be transmitted to the new generations of kids. As traditional education has their pattern of organization, where they rely for its aims, methods of instructions, and discipline, through the help of the bodies of information, there are agents that will guide the students. These information, transmitted by the so-called agents are static, hence, finished products of the knowledge that has been also transmitted to them by the past generation. With this, students became passive to what they should do or even learn based from their sources. According to Dewey:

Books, especially textbooks, are the chief representatives of the lore and wisdom of the past, while teachers are the organs through which pupils are brought into effective connection with the material. Teachers are the

¹¹ Ibid., 35-36.

agents through which knowledge and skills are communicated and rules of conduct enforced.¹²

Learning, hence, became the “acquisition of what is already incorporated in books and in the heads of the elders,”¹³ as they are for the discipline, aims and method of instruction, the elders or the mature (as how Dewey called it), are the ones who are capable of transmitting it to the new generation, hence, the pupils. In this case, “the chief business of the school is to transmit them to the new generation,”¹⁴ as it forms a cycle for traditional education. Knowledge imposed is based on their acquired knowledge from the past educators and passed it onto the next generation of pupils and most students will benefit from the said discussion/s made by their teachers. Learning in this kind of method may be limited as students only rely on their resources (such as books and especially, their teachers) and most chose to be passive instead of being active for them to learn more. As Dewey have stated:

The older education imposed the knowledge, methods, and the rules of conduct of the mature person upon the young, it doesn't follow, except upon the basis of the extreme Either-Or philosophy, that the knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive value for the experience of the immature.¹⁵

On the other hand, Dewey stated that “there is an intimate and necessary relation between the processes of actual experience and education.”¹⁶ In this case, the progressive or the new education is a product of discontent with traditional education as it appears to be a too static for the students. As the opposite of the former, the progressive education believes that experiences have significant effects to one's everyday learning as it offers a new kind of education, which focuses on the individuality of oneself. Furthermore, social environment is a living factor for the students for them to learn and experience more than what is imposed. As everyone is exposed to the environment, one has the freedom to experiment to what they usually perceive through the environment itself. With this kind of matter, students are the ones who are in control of doing and learn things out of their own curiosity about a certain matter. They experiment, experience and do things from their own convenience and self-interest. It hones the interest of a student to a certain thing that will have him/her develop based on his/her learning through the environment. According to Dewey:

Basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and consequently

¹² Dewey, *Experience and Education*, 18.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

more, rather than less, guidance by others.¹⁷

Dewey also admits that the new “progressive” education also has its defects like the traditional. At some point, progressive education can be also dogmatic. It appears as too radical as it emphasizes on the freedom of the students. In his work, he also clarified the ideal experience and when can we consider it educative. Because of which, there are certain criteria that is proposed by Dewey himself in order to distinguish whether the said experiences are educative or not. These are the principle of continuity and the principle of interaction, which are inseparable from each other. Principle of Continuity or Experiential Continuum, according to Dewey, is a kind of experience that we cannot rid of, while on the other hand, the Principle of Interaction explains that it is a situational influence on one’s experience and also, implies how significant our past experiences are with the present situations that we are currently facing. With this, Dewey stated that as long as we are into democracy, we can easily adapt the progressive one. But, as reiterated by Dewey, “we should support progressive education that applies the principle of continuity as a criterion, allows interaction and teach students in a manner consistent with their becoming positively interactive, democratic, and dynamic learners.”¹⁸

With educative experience, Dewey explained that it is still in need of a social control. This kind of education does not mean that a student must be solely independent and he/she must do all things on his/her own, Dewey argues that an educator must also be part of the social group, as the educator is the mature one and all he/she needs to do is to guide his/her students in order for the immature or the students to be trained as matures in the future and realize what appropriate experiences that are worth learning and the ideal usage of freedom in accordance to his/her education. The educator's role in this group is to facilitate, and each of them must emphasize student's growth and develop them through their experiences.

ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT

At this point, based on the previously stated issues, I would like to illustrate the effects of incorporating educative experience in a schoolroom, which in this case would emphasize what Ime Morales have encountered with her son. In an article by Morales,¹⁹ a mother of an eight-year-old explained how she came up with a decision to enter her son to a non-traditional school, in spite of her good experiences in a traditional school during her school days. She weighs down some factors in order for her to decide the best for her son. One of the factors considered by Morales is time. Since today’s generation is known for technology, Morales

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁸ Eldeeb, Rasha. "Review and Critique of the book "Education and Experience" by John Dewey." *IOSR Journal of Research & Method in Education*, 2013: 45.

¹⁹ Morales, Imee. "Why I chose a non-trad school for my child." *Rappler*. 2013. Rappler.com: <https://www.rappler.com/life-and-style/27060-i-chose-non-trad-school-for-my-child> (accessed August 1, 2017).

worries about the possible effects of technology as they will be so-called slaves of the technology. She wants her son to be developed through creative thoughts and ideas without being confined to media and entertainment. As early as two and half years old, her son is exposed to nature, and activities such as baking, childhood chores and others, rather than iPads that a usual kid today has. With this kind of teaching for her child, Morales saw the effectiveness of this method of learning to her son as he became confident and exposed to the reality rather than being exposed to the convenience of the technology. In this kind of schoolroom, he experienced things physically with the help of his facilitators and things around him. He learned how to do such things that more than an 8-year-old kid barely does in this age. Hence, he learned things more than what is expected in school, which makes Morales feel that she made a right choice. With this kind of approach that were stated by Morales, we can say that with this kind of education, with the help of experiences, helps to develop a child and retain more things because of what he experienced, rather than what he only listened through a teacher. With this testimonial given by Morales, it gives an impression of how experiences can greatly affect a child's development.

CONCLUSION

Experiences are one of the factors that any educational institutions must consider in order to have a better and effective schoolroom, other than the traditional. In this case, it does not mean that a traditional education is ineffective, but rather, education per se must also present experiences as part of it. In spite of the problems raised, there are ways that we can reconsider traditional education. As suggested by Dewey, reformation of education can be reconsidered to cater the needs of every student by simply equipping experiences in a traditional schoolroom as experiences affect one's daily lives that can give daily lessons which will retain for more than what is expected. It does not matter whether it is considered as a new education or not, but rather, experiences must be included to have a fruitful education for kids, and further nurture a child. As it appears to be helpful, one must still be mindful about the criteria of experiences as there are experiences that may mislead a child towards learning. What education needs today is a balanced kind of education and applying the philosophy of experience.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aranda, Ma. Rita R., and Joel L. Zamora. "Using Differentiated Instruction in Improving the Academic Performance of Students in Filipino Language." *National University*, 2014: 34-44.
- Dewey, John. *Experience and Education*. New York: Kappa Delta Pi, 1938.
- Eldeeb, Rasha. "Review and Critique of the book "Education and Experience" by John Dewey." *IOSR Journal of Research & Method in Education*, 2013: 44-47.
- Manalang, Priscilla S. "Issues in Philippine Education." *Philippine Sociological Review* (Philippine Sociological Review), 1977: 63-68.
- Mesa, Amelia P. de, and Allan B. de Guzman. "Portrait of Filipino teachers' classroom practices: traditional or constructivist?" *Springer Science+Business Media*, 2006: 235-253.
- Morales, Imee. "Why I chose a non-trad school for my child." *Rappler*. 2013. Rappler.com: <https://www.rappler.com/life-and-style/27060-i-chose-non-trad-school-for-my-child> (accessed August 1, 2017).
- Spanella, Theresa. "John Dewey on Education: Theory & Philosophy." *Study.com*. n.d. <http://study.com/academy/lesson/john-dewey-on-education-theory-philosophy-quiz.html> (accessed March 15, 2017).
- Sylva, Kathy. "School Influences on Children's Development." *Association for Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 1994: 135-170.
- "The Right to Education." *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*. n.d. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/right-to-education/> (accessed March 15, 2017).

Mathematics in Dialectics: Inquiries on Mathematical Process through Hegel, Marx and Lakatos

Charles Jason P. Cahilig

University of Santo Tomas | charlesjasonc@gmail.com

Abstract: It is arguable to conclude that mathematics is really consistent and adheres to a coherent system. This paper studies the extent of the dialectical process on the progress of mathematical knowledge. Individuals particularly mathematicians involved in an exchange and agreement of conceptual objectives require attention and recognition in the developmental process of mathematical notions. It is substantial to the approach of mathematicians and educators in mathematics to know what really their subject matter is. This paper aims to answer these questions: does the dialectical method a part of the nature of mathematics? If it does, what does it imply on the mathematical discoveries? Considering the dialectical process in mathematics, this aims to consider the rationale behind mathematical discoveries. The dialectical process provides a heuristic procedure that brings to the fundamentals of a proof in a theorem. The paper uses an archival approach to disclose the historical data needed for the dialectical nature of mathematics; the discussion among mathematicians through history provides significant indications on the growth of mathematical knowledge. The production of mathematical discoveries is a result of interactions of the mathematicians throughout history. The paper adopts Imre Lakatos' method of proofs and refutations and methodology of scientific research programmes to present the growth of mathematical discoveries with Hegel's and Marx's dialectics to support the foundation on the nature of mathematics as a dialectical. This paper will add to the answers on what mathematics is, what really its foundation and what is behind the certitude of mathematics. It can be used for future references to disclose theorems for the development on the discourse of mathematics.

Keywords: Lakatos, Mathematics, Dialectics, Marx, Hegel

Mathematics has a very significant role in justifying knowledge by providing a constructed model. It is in mathematics that the foundation of science

is established; through the models, science is able to create statements from the truth that is

claimed to be true.¹ The selection of model to affirm appropriately a scientific phenomenon render credits to mathematics in presenting models to be used. The rational systems and models presented by mathematics derived either from a heuristic process or by inductive or deductive reasoning. Through the collaboration of the inseparable qualities of science and mathematics led to knowledge or discoveries.

In every fortified system, there are foundations that support the structure. These foundations are the underlying elements which sustain the system. Foundations are the pillars which keep the erection of the structure. There is a careful statement of the fundamental generalities was given by Padoa in a paper before the Paris Congress of Philosophy, 1900:

We have as a basal science logic, and as depending upon it the special deductive sciences which involve undefined symbols and whose propositions are not all capable of proof. The symbols denote either classes of 'elements or relations amongst elements. In any such science one may choose in various ways the system of un-defined symbols and the system of undemonstrated or primitive

propositions, or postulates. Every proposition follows from the postulates by a finite number of logical steps.²

Relating it to mathematics thus it is founded by undefined symbols which represent abstract objects and by primitive propositions.³ As Padoa stated, symbols denote elements that signifies descriptions to ensure the comprehension of the abstract entities of mathematics. Before a theorem was created, there are certain propositions that support a conclusion. These conclusions are accepted as true and precise because of its logical basis. Obtaining a definite system of undefined symbols and a definite system of postulates, it is necessary that it has a notion of the compatibility of these postulates.⁴ Thus, it is subject to assessment; that is, that it is impossible to prove by a finite number of logical steps the simultaneous validity of a statement and its contradictory statement and Padoa introduces the idea of the irreducibility of the system of undefined symbols.⁵ The idea of Padoa precludes reducing the primitive proposition into another proposition to retain its statement.

Mathematics is composed of proofs, conjectures and concepts which are elements of informal mathematics.⁶ Yet these

¹ McClimans, Micah, *What is the difference between mathematics and science?* (February 3, 2015) <https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mathematics-and-science>, retrieved: April 25, 2017

² Moore, Eliakim Hastings. *On the Foundations of Mathematics*, "Science, New Series" Vol. 17, No. 428 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1903), p. 402.

³ Mathematics is related to science. From the point of view of the scientist, mathematics is a tool of

science; from the point of view of mathematicians, science is a field for the application of mathematical truth. For further readings, see Comstock, Clarence E., *Correlation of Mathematics and Science* "The Elementary School Teacher" Vol. 6, No. 2, 82 – 96.

⁴ Moore, "On the Foundations of Mathematics," 402.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 402.

⁶ Bart Van Kerkhove, "Aspects of Informal Mathematics: Towards a New Epistemology of

foundations was questioned by Lakatos and created a method to improve the mathematical knowledge. Concepts, conjectures and proofs develop as time passes by through continuous discussion for the sake of mathematical discovery. By the interactions of different mathematicians, they could discover or create a new idea which includes the methods of surrender, monster-barring, exception-barring, monster-adjusting, lemma-incorporation, and proofs and refutations.⁷

GIST OF DIALECTICS IN MATHEMATICS

Axioms provide structural models – formal and informal mathematics – that can be applied to problems within mathematics as well as outside mathematics i.e. by application to architectural problems. However, dialectics argues that “none of these two fundamental positions alone can explain the nature of mathematics.”⁸ Models and structures do not consider the producing subjects as well as the concrete objects of production in a mathematical process.

The producing subjects or the mathematicians are responsible for the development of mathematics. They have the capacity to arrange, manipulate and create structures. Since they possess such capabilities, they are free to shape mathematics in any preference.

Mathematicians are free to choose any consistent set of axioms they please. Since consistency is the only constraint, the choice must be a matter of subjective preference and is therefore philosophically uninteresting. [...] They do not feel themselves to be constrained by consistency alone. When they evaluate a piece of research they are not satisfied with the information that all the theorems have been validly deduced from consistent premises. Some work is judged important, some trivial, some promising, some not, and so forth.⁹

Hence, mathematical process and development depends on the influence of the mathematicians. Consistency and accuracy are significant to mathematicians since it provides a firm structure or model that gives satisfaction to a rigorous development of mathematics; selective recognition and identification is the operation used to supply the necessary bits of information to the process.

The dialectical philosophy perceives human minds, however fallible, to be the only accessible and feasible medium for the greater rationality of mathematics.¹⁰ The subject’s rationale is the faculty of cognitive process that it possesses; the subject provides productivity and efficiency to constitute a structured model.

Mathematics,” GAP.6-workshop, 14-16 September 2006, 4.

⁷ Lakatos introduced these methods in his book *Proofs and Refutations: A Logic of Mathematical Discovery* whereas in an imaginary classroom setting, there are students conversing and arguing the definition of a complex polyhedron. For further readings about a computational model of Lakatos’ theory, read Pease, Smail, Colton, Lee. *Bridging the gap between argumentation*

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



theory and the philosophy of mathematics (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2008), 5-6.

⁸ Uwe V. Riss, “Objects and Processes in Mathematical Practice,” *Foundations of science* 16, no. 4 (2011): 341.

⁹ Brendan Larvor, “What is dialectical philosophy of mathematics?,” *Philosophia Mathematica* 9, no. 2 (2001): 213.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 214.

The dialectical nature of mathematics penetrates the reality or the principle behind the systematic structure of axioms. Considering dialectics as the nature of mathematics, Riss' states that: "Dialectics regards both subjective and objective capacities as inseparable moments of the mathematical development process. Each discovery depends on the subject's effort and capacity to find the solution as a moment of development; each invention also includes the aspect of *tripping over* the solution as a moment of discovery. The inventive character also comes to the fore in the fact that mathematicians often find several independent solutions to the same problem."¹¹

DIALECTICAL FRAMEWORK OF MATHEMATICS

Considering the history of mathematics, the notion of dialectics in the mathematical process is conducive for locating the changes in mathematical concepts. The development of mathematics, in a dialectical sense, offers contrasting concepts to engage in a discourse. The dispute between contrasting concepts will eventually be reconciled when the subjects arrive to a satisfactory conclusion. Moreover, dialectics and history are two sides of the same coin that are inseparable to each other.

The objectivity of historical laws comes from the objectivity of human historical activity. Set apart from the objectivity of human historical activity – practice, the objectivity of historical laws would become a

mystical force in control of human historical activity. Hegel's dialectics that "converges" with metaphysics describes the objectivity of law as the self-movement of "impersonal reason" and does not therefore mean an end to metaphysics but only its completion. Marx's dialectics that puts an end to metaphysics describes historical laws as "real people and their historical development" and does not therefore mean a convergence with metaphysics but an end to it.¹²

Hegel proposes a dialectical idealism however Marx, adopting Hegel's and modifying it in a material framework, introduces dialectical materialism. Hegel does not abandon metaphysics in his philosophy of history rather, his dialectics emphasizes the 'impersonal reason'. On the other hand, Marx deals with the real people who engage themselves to a discourse.

Sun made an evaluation of the contemporary significance of Hegel's dialectical metaphysics and he presents these four questions: "first, evaluation of the "history of metaphysics"; second, evaluation of Hegel's dialectics as the logic of the movement of human thought; third, evaluation of Hegel's dialectics as the logic of modernity; fourth, evaluation of the "true significance" of Hegel's dialectics for Marx's dialectics."¹³ The historical significance of metaphysics portrays the development of a metaphysical thought. As the

¹¹ Riss, *op. cit.*, 346.

¹² Zhengyu Sun, "Dialectics: Hegel, Marx and post-metaphysics," *Social Sciences in China* 29, no.4 (2008): 16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 13.

development of the metaphysical thought, it endures along with the movement of human thought through a dialectical logic. Marx adopts the dialectics of Hegel and he places it in a material conditions.

Moreover, in Hegel's words, he expresses that "the reals¹⁴ themselves can be considered as examples of quantity but only as pure quantity. It may be interesting to remark that here, Hegel foreshadows the fact that if one generalizes (as Cantor did) the quantity of natural numbers as the cardinality of finite sets to the cardinality of the reals, one obtains a new concept not useful for measurement."¹⁵ Real numbers were only deliberately argued and explained in the early 1860s, Hegel did not reach those years thus he uses neither that terminology nor particular mathematical designs and notation that were developed later. "But Hegel's 'quantity' and its associated logical categories represent another terminology for describing many of the mathematical features that since the 1860s have been taken to be essential to analysis and number theory and to the theory of the reals in particular."¹⁶

Thus, Hegel's new argument here is not just that what mathematicians now call the real numbers are best understood against the background of our use of them in practices of measurement but rather that they can themselves be understood as

measures, which is made explicit in the following section. That in terms of which we measure can be thought of as the relevant quality, even if that measure can itself be given a numerical form.¹⁷

On the other hand, Imre Lakatos who unconsciously followed Hegel's idea develop his historical observation into the historical conjecture that mathematical criticism was the motive behind the growth of mathematical knowledge during the nineteenth century. "More than thus, the philosophy of mathematics represented by P&R¹⁸ also presents a rich analysis of how mathematics can be thought of as an essentially historical discipline, primarily through Lakatos' thoroughly brilliant and original historiography."¹⁹ Kadvany argues that "somehow Lakatos has wedded his historicized philosophy of mathematics to Popper's falsificationist philosophy of "conjectures and refutations," after which P&R is self-consciously titled, but in spite of Popper's primary use of history as illustrative of methodological issues and not as a fundamental dimension of his logic of scientific discovery."²⁰ The dialectics is indeed present in the history of mathematics whereas conflicting ideas contend with each other.

In brief, Lakatos argues that the usual formulation of refutation - the production of a counterexample to a

¹⁴ Kaufmann and Yeomans refer it to mathematical objects i.e. rational or irrational numbers, geometrical figures, mathematical signs and symbols etc.

¹⁵ Ralph Kaufmann and Christopher Yeomans, "Math by Pure Thinking: R First and the Divergence of Measures in Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics," *European Journal of Philosophy* (2017): 5, doi:10.1111/ejop.12258.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸ Lakatos' *Method of Proofs and Refutations*

¹⁹ John Kadvany, "A Mathematical Bildungsroman," *History and Theory* 28, no. 1 (1989): 25.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

theorem with respect to a fixed domain of mathematical objects -is insufficient to explain critical periods in the historical development of mathematics. The dialogue shows that in the creation of a mathematical falsification, counterexamples often become refutations only when accompanied by the informal expansion, or concept-stretching, of the concepts involved defining the theorem's domain. The counterexamples are formal, logical refutations in the expanded domain, perhaps also with an implied expansion to a new theoretical language, but the process of expansion itself is not part of the straightforward Popperian notion of falsification, which essentially depends only on classical logical contradiction.²¹

For both Hegel and Lakatos, knowledge reveals a certain improvement only if one's epistemic domain alters along with the criterion of truth. In Lakatos' case, Kadvany states: "the criterion is the proof, as it shows why the theorem is true, and his historical point about the method of proofs and refutations is that this pattern in the growth of mathematical knowledge is a relatively recent innovation. Lakatos, remarkably, has translated Hegel's phenomenological method not just into an account of nineteenth-century mathematics, but into a feature of mathematical criticism itself."²²

Returning to Hegel, according to Sun, he included "the logical pre-existence of the identity of thought and being and the endogenous emergence of the difference between thought and being as a dual premise and attributed the possibility of cognition to the dialectical movement of concepts, that is, the unity of thought and being displayed as a process of the movement of concepts from abstract identity to concrete identity. [...] the process of the identification of individual reason with universal reason is both a process of cognition from abstract identity to concrete identity and a process of freedom from abstract universality to concrete universality."²³

"History" as "the activity of man" is the form of men's being. The essential difference between man and animals is that man is a "historical" being. As "the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals," Marx "set out from real, active men," from "the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life." He said, "The existence of the human race is the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through. Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached. But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is *pre-condition* only as his own product and result." Man himself acts as the "precondition" and "result" of

²¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

²² *Ibid.*, 38.

²³ Sun, *op. cit.*, 7.

history, and makes his “history” with his own activities and his “existence” with his own history. Without man’s “history,” man’s “existence” and the relationship between man and the world would be abstract. The existence of the human race is the “actual life-process” of man; and the foundation of man’s “actual life” is the production of means of material subsistence – labor. “Labor” is the “existence” of the human race.²⁴

In his efforts to transform metaphysics through dialectics, Hegel, through his critique of the “abstract reason” that made up the old metaphysics, used the dialectical movement of concepts to realize a metaphysics in which thought defined concepts, unifying “total freedom” with the “necessity of links,” and then reconstructed metaphysics into a dialectics in which ontology, epistemology and logic formed a unified whole.²⁵ The structure of this “union” is the arrangement of the important principles of the ultimate cause through the differences, inconsistencies and contradictions in concepts themselves from “abstract identity” (abstract universality) to “concrete identity” (concrete universality).

THE *GEIST* AND MATHEMATICS

The dialectical scheme of Hegel is a necessary part of Lakatos’s central thesis on mathematics. Though Hegel did not mention or disclose thoughts about mathematics in dialectics, it is evident however in his *The Science of Logic*, wherein he considers science following

the dialectical process toward the *Geist*. However, Pinkard modified and reshaped Hegel’s thoughts and established a philosophy of mathematics of Hegel. Pinkard observes that concepts are similar to chess pieces that imply normative character:

Concepts may be thought of as such normative kinds. Their 'logical meaning' is that set of rules which constitute them, which in their case would be inference rules. The movement of concepts may be thus conceived in analogy to a game. The game analogy somewhat breaks down, however, when one asks what is moving. What moves in Hegel's theory would not really be the pieces, i.e., the concepts themselves, but thought itself. That is (to take the game analogy a bit further), each concept is a position in the game, and thought moves from one position to another. The meaning of all the particular concepts lies thus in where they are in the game.²⁶

Furthermore, Hegel clarifies reason as negative and dialectical, “since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive, since it generates the universal, and comprehends the particular therein. Just as the understanding is usually taken as something separate from reason in general, so also dialectical reason is taken as something separate from positive reason. In its truth reason is however spirit, which is higher than both reason bound to the understanding

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶ Pinkard, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 41, no.4 (1981): 455.

and understanding bound to reason. It is the negative, that which constitutes the quality of both the dialectical reason and the understanding: it negates the simple, thereby posits the determinate difference of the understanding; but it equally dissolves this difference, and so it is dialectical.”²⁷ It exhibits an internal revolution as the reason justifies it concurrently negates. Thus, there is an occurrence of construction of contradictions and adheres to the dialectical process.

In Hegel’s view, inherent criticism and analysis delve into contradictions. It offers to disclose and dismiss the conflict between reality and its true essence. “So understood, however, immanent critique does not attend merely to discrepancies between reality and common conceptions concerning its essence. Its chief focus is not a tension between a thing and what conventionally passes as its true nature rather, its immanent critique examines essential contradictions, oppositions between a state of affairs and its true nature or essence.”²⁸ In Hegel’s terms, immanent critique recognizes self-contradictory, that which affirms then negates the affirmation i.e. contradicts its true being. A critique absorbing anything but essential self-contradiction does not analyze or consider the real in terms of its intrinsic logic but rather, purely abstract. It suggests an 'empty' notion; it expresses only the concept of an abstract *y* which is self-identical or a self-affirmation. Having laid this groundwork, Pinkard says that “Hegel goes on to speak of a plurality of such empty, self-identical units. He

does not argue specifically for this move but justifies it by appeal to an earlier figure in the *Wissenschaft de Logik*, viz., the move from the concept of a determinate being to that of determinate beings. That transition was justified (roughly) by the claim that to say of anything that it is something or another is to contrast it with other different things.”²⁹ Having done that Hegel continue to bring up by what means with the one is identical with the many, yet is not the same with the many.

Hegel attempts both to alter the way in which the objectivity of the results of “Spirit’s experience to itself” is assessed and to defend such a newly defined objectivity. Pinkard asserts that “he (Hegel) tries to account for such things as how and why a subject would find its views of *another subject* “opposed” by such a subject; how social subjects, groups, or classes find their desires, and especially their view of their own desires, opposed and negated by other social subjects, groups, or classes; how political subjects with certain notions about political life would (and did) find themselves in sometimes “tragic” opposition; in what way laboring or even worshipping subjects find their experience if their own activity “in opposition with itself”; and so forth.”³⁰ It stresses the manner of the subject that thinks of another subject as an opposing factor thus a self-contradictory illustration of the subject.

Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness

²⁷ Hegel, G.W.F., *The Science of Logic*, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.

²⁸ Andrew Buchwalter, *Dialectics, Politics, and the Contemporary Value of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 47.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



²⁹ Pinkard, *op. cit.*, 457.

³⁰ Robert Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 101.

exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called *experience* [*Erfahrung*]. In this connection there is a moment in the process just mentioned which must be brought out more clearly, for through it a new light will be thrown on the exposition which follows. Consciousness knows *something*; this object is the essence or the *in-itself*; but it is also for consciousness the *in-itself*. This is where the ambiguity of this truth enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects: one is the first *in-itself*; the second is the *being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*. The latter appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, i.e. what consciousness has in mind is not an object, but only its knowledge of that first object. But, as was shown previously, the first object, in being known, is altered for consciousness; it ceases to be the *in-itself*, and becomes something that is the *in-itself only for consciousness*. And this then is the True: the *being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*. Or, in other words, this is the *essence*, or the *object* of consciousness. This new object contains the nothingness of the first, it is what experience has made of it.³¹

In Hegel's excerpt above in *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, he recognizes the dialectical method of the subject's inquiry on knowledge and its object of experience. He

even expresses two objects of consciousness: *in-itself*, and the *being-for-consciousness*. "Experienced objects are always objects of judgments for Hegel, and although in successful knowledge such objects turn out to be "in themselves" as they are characterized "for consciousness," they are still taken to be so identical, in a mediated sense, as a result of the subject's establishing that this is so."³²

The progress made thus far in the dialectic of self-consciousness yields not just insight into the kind of object a subject must relate to in order to achieve satisfaction but also a conceptual revision of the ideal the subject aspires to realize. A crucial lesson that desire's experience has taught us is that true self-sufficiency for a subject – self-sufficiency that affords full and stable satisfaction – does not consist in absolute independence from everything other but involves instead dependence on other (numerically distinct) subjects that one also recognizes as in some sense oneself. In other words, the quest for recognition counts as a step forward for self-consciousness only if one assumes a corresponding revision in its understanding of what a subject's claim to be self-sufficient requires: a subject's dependence on another is compatible with a kind of self-sufficiency as long as that subject can see the being it depends on as sufficiently like itself (as of the same exalted type – subject rather than

³¹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, 55.

³² Pippin, *op. cit.*, 114.

mere thing – that it takes itself to be).³³

Neuhouser affirms that dialectical process is a progression of the self-consciousness toward satisfaction. He exposes that Hegel extends the question of a historically proportionate or developmental assessment of the very basic principles to a “knowledge community” in which the subject comes to understand itself and the world. The subject’s reliance on another thoroughly confirms or affirms the conscious subject’s knowledge of the world. Hegel clears that “the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its experience and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history. That is why the natural consciousness, too, is always reaching this result, learning from experience what is true in it; but equally it is always forgetting it and starting the movement all over again.”³⁴ The self-affirmation and self-certainty of the subject is just but a historical process that persists to attain the end of the history.

The dialectic according to Hegel in his *The Science of Logic* states that “once considered a separate part of logic and, one may say, entirely misunderstood so far as its purpose and standpoint are concerned, and thereby assumes a totally different position.”³⁵ In the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, he affirms that “the singular being of sense does indeed vanish in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and becomes universality, but it is only a *sensuous universality*. My 'meaning' has

vanished, and perception takes the object as it is *in itself*, or as a universal as such. Singular being therefore emerges in the object as true singleness, as the in-itself of the One, or as a reflectedness-into-self.”³⁶ As the dialectical process persists, the subject’s own understanding disappears and shifts into the universal understanding.

Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external and negative activity which does not belong to the fact itself but is rooted in mere conceit, in a subjective obsession for subverting and bringing to naught everything firm and true, or at least as in resulting in nothing but the vanity of the subject matter subjected to dialectical treatment. [...] Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practicing deceptions and producing illusions, it was straight away assumed that it plays a false game; that its whole power rests solely on hiding its deception; that its results are only deviously obtained, a subjective shine. [...] It is in this dialectic as understood here and hence in grasping opposites in their unity, or the positive in the negative, that the speculative consists.³⁷

Hegel never mentioned the “antithesis” rather he affirms that dialectic may appear and move into a negative one. “Dialectic as a negative movement, just as it immediately *is*, at first appears to consciousness

³³ Frederick Neuhouser, “Desire, Recognition, and the Relation between Bondsman,” in *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. Kenneth Westphal, 37 – 54 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009), 46.

³⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, 64.

³⁵ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 34.

³⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, 77.

³⁷ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 35.

as something which has it at its mercy, and which does not have its source in consciousness itself. [...]Through this self-conscious negation it procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom, generates the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to truth.”³⁸ As the negative movement of dialectic goes up against the opposites, it will eventually arrive to the truth, a “synthesis”. Westphal contends that Hegel’s notion of the dialectical contradictions or the negative movement of dialectics “neither denies nor violates the law of non-contradiction. Instead, Hegel holds that certain important truths can only (or at least can best) be expressed by using what appears to be a formal contradiction.”³⁹

According to Hegel, The *Geist* or the Thing itself unifies the opposites as the dialectic shift occurs. “By a new shift in the dialectic it is made plain that, if the Thing is conceived as absolutely One, it will be no longer possible to distinguish it from other things: all will be wholly blank unities and indistinguishable. A Thing must be what it is only by having its own properties, those proper and peculiar to itself. Since each of these properties has its own separate being, the Thing again becomes a loose association of properties: it is A and also B and also C, etc.”⁴⁰ The Thing’s properties either affirm or negate but what is definite and distinct constitute the totality of the Thing.

An idealism which merely asserts this certainty (All the world is my idea) without going through the relevant

dialectical preparation can neither explain nor understand itself. Its certainty always stands over against other certainties that the dialectical journey abolishes. The certainty of my rational ego always stands over against the certainty of something else existing alongside myself. The dialectical preparation establishes idealism as the only truth, but only in a general, abstract form which will have to be given concreteness in various actual sorts of confrontation.⁴¹

In *The Science of Logic*, Hegel adds that “the concept in its formal abstraction reveals itself to be incomplete and through a dialectic immanently grounded in it passes over into reality: it passes over into it, however, as into something which it generates out of itself, not as if it were falling back again onto a ready-made reality which it finds opposite it, or as if it were taking refuge, because it sought for something better but found none, into something that has already been proven to be the unessential element of appearance.”⁴² An abstracted concept is insufficient to reveal the truth rather it is necessary to undergo a dialectical process to disclose itself to the reality and to at least prove the unnecessary elements.

The shape of the immediate concept constitutes the standpoint that makes of the concept a subjective thinking, a reflection external to the

³⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, 124.

³⁹ Kenneth Westphal, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method and Analysis of Consciousness,” in *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. by

Kenneth Westphal, 1 – 36 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009), 14.

⁴⁰ Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, 511.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 528.

⁴² Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 522.

subject matter. This stage constitutes, therefore, subjectivity, or the formal concept. Its externality is manifested in the fixed being of its determinations that makes them come up each by itself, isolated and qualitative, and each only externally referred to the other. But the identity of the concept, which is precisely their inner or subjective essence, sets them in dialectical movement, and through this movement their singleness is sublated and with it also the separation of the concept from the subject matter, and what emerges as their truth is the totality which is the objective concept.⁴³

Hegel, as influenced by Kant's noumenon and phenomenon, as stated from above, distinguishes the knowledge internal and external to the object. But he affirms that intrinsic to the object is what is set to a dialectical movement. Essentially, the truth that emanates from the separation of the concept from the subject matter is the entirety which is, according to Hegel, the objective concept. "This no less synthetic than analytic moment of the judgment through which the initial universal determines itself from within itself as the other of itself is to be called the dialectical moment. Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been the most misjudged in the metaphysics of the moderns and in general also by popular philosophy, both ancient and recent. [...]Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as if it rested on a

subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the concept."⁴⁴

The fundamental prejudice here is that dialectic has only a negative result – a point about which more in a moment. First, regarding the said form in which dialectic usually makes its appearance, it is to be observed that according to that form the dialectic and its result affect a subject matter which is previously assumed or also the subjective cognition of it, and declare either the latter or the subject matter to be null and void, while, on the contrary, no attention is given to the determinations which are exhibited in the subject matter as in a third thing and presupposed as valid for themselves. [...]In fact, therefore, everything rests on these determinations; they are the true subject matter and content of reason, and anything else that might be understood by subject matter and content in distinction from them has meaning only through them and in them. It must not therefore be taken as the fault of a subject matter or of the cognition that these determinations, because of what they are and the way they are externally joined, prove to be dialectical.⁴⁵

Placing Hegel's dialectics in a mathematical setting, Sommers-Hall does it in calculus: "The dialectical approach to the calculus did not merely allow Hegel to propose a resolution to the problems of the calculus,

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 527.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 741.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 743.

but also allowed Hegel to provide further support for his own dialectical method.”⁴⁶ He adds: “The calculus allows us to characterize the relations between quantities whose ratios to one another vary. Although it can relate any variables, I will mostly refer to the relation between time and distance travelled by a hypothetical body.”⁴⁷ Calculus simply deals with velocity; however, its approach extends to relations between quantities and ratios.

The basic function of the differential calculus is to find the gradient of a curve at a particular point. The difficulty with a curve is that as the gradient varies, we need to find the gradient of a point. Gradient, however, seems to involve a difference. For Leibniz, at least in his informal account, the solution was to resort to the notion of the infinitesimal, as an infinitely small difference between two points, dy . As this difference was infinitely small, it could be discounted for the purposes of calculation, but, as it retained a magnitude relative to dx , it could be used to form a ratio, dy/dx which had a determinate value. [...]Hegel rejects this Leibnizian approach since the idea of neglecting infinitesimal values, whilst it may lead us to the correct results, does not give us the rigour essential to a proper mathematical proof.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Sommers-Hall continues that Newton’s understanding of the calculus is integrated into Hegel’s dialectic, as well as why Hegel thought a call for a dialectical foundation, “the idea of the ratio as it occurs in Hegel’s remarks on the mathematical infinite in order to trace the genetic development of Hegel’s own understanding of the ultimate ratio.”⁴⁹ He states the in the differential relation, “we therefore have a situation whereby both the ratio itself as well as the terms can only be understood as a totality. For Hegel, this represents the true dialectical relation of the quantum and the infinite. In the differential ratio, each of the quanta can only exist in relation to the other. That is, the dy and dx only have meaning through their reciprocal relation.”⁵⁰

The program involves a reconstruction according to this set of basic principles of the concepts of everyday experience (i.e., of the basic notions of those things with which we have an 'acquaintance,' *Bekanntschaft*),⁵ of the concepts of natural science,⁶ and of past philosophical theories. One of the basic aims in Hegel's program (although certainly not the only one) was the construction of what could be called a thoroughgoing compatibilist philosophy. That is, a basic tenet of Hegelianism (at least as Hegel saw it) was that many apparent contradictions in our categorical framework or many apparent

⁴⁶ Henry Somers-Hall, “Hegel and Deleuze on the metaphysical interpretation of the calculus,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 42, no.4 (2010): 557.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 557

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 560.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 562.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 563.

incompatibilities between competing categorical frameworks were only that: apparent and not real contradictions and incompatibilities. They could be 'overcome' (aufgehoben) if the conceptual framework was sufficiently expanded and ordered correctly.⁵¹

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND MATHEMATICS

Assuming that Hegel's conceptual dialectics is "full", "perfect", or "complete" metaphysics and the foundation for the idea of "truth" are and will continually be of self-sufficient and exceptional value and important in contemporary and future philosophical research and progress. Sun presents four questions that evaluates the contemporary significance of Hegel's dialectical metaphysics, "first, evaluation of the 'history of metaphysics'; second, evaluation of Hegel's dialectics as the logic of the movement of human thought; third, evaluation of Hegel's dialectics as the logic of modernity; fourth, evaluation of the 'true significance' of Hegel's dialectics for Marx's dialectics."⁵²

Adopting and modifying Hegel's notion of the dialectical idealism, for Marx, according to Wood, "the dialectical structure of the world is a complex empirical fact about the nature of material reality. [...] dialectical thinking only reflects the dialectical structure of the world which is thought about. If they

think in terms of universal concepts, that is because it is the nature of thinking to abstract from particulars, and grasp their common properties."⁵³ He adds that: "Yet when Marx praises Hegel in such ways, he never fails to attack the 'mysticism' of Hegel's method or to emphasize that the Hegelian dialectic is not satisfactory as it is. [...] Hegel's dialectic is, on the one hand, enclosed or shrouded in 'mysticism'. It must be 'stripped of' this false form, 'to discover the rational kernel in the mystical shell'. On the other hand, with Hegel the dialectic is 'standing on its head'.⁵⁴

In contrast with Hegel, Marx contends with idealism, rather, he deals with the materialism which reflects the structure of the world. Marx states that "The premises from which we start are not arbitrary; they are no dogmas but rather actual premises from which abstraction can be made only in imagination. They are the real individuals, their actions, and their material conditions of life, those which they find existing as well as those which they produce through their actions."⁵⁵

Marx's dialectics that contradicts metaphysics portrays history as "real people and their historical development" and does not therefore convey a concurrence with metaphysics but a close encounter to it.

The fact is, then, that definite individuals who are productively active in a specific way enter into these definite social and political relations. In each particular instance,

⁵¹ Pinkard, *op cit.*, 453 – 454.

⁵² Zhengyu Sun, "Dialectics: Hegel, Marx and post-metaphysics," *Social Sciences in China* 29, no. 4 (2008): 13.

⁵³ Allen Wood, *The Arguments of the Philosophers: Karl Marx* (London: Routledge, 1981), 209.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁵⁵ Karl Marx, "German Ideology," in *Karl Marx: Selected Readings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 107.

empirical observation must show empirically, without any mystification or speculation, the connection of social and political structure with production. The social structure and the state continually evolve out of life-process of definite individuals not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination but rather as they *really* are, that is, as they work, produce materially, and act under definite material limitations, presuppositions, and conditions independent of their will.⁵⁶

Sun affirms that Marx's dialectics is "by no means a dialectics that criticizes only "abstract reason," but also one that criticizes "abstract being" (capital), a dialectics whose criticism turns the independence and personality of capital into the independence and personality of man."⁵⁷

"Dialectic is not a method in the sense of a set of rules or procedures for inquiry, or a general prolegomenon to science of the Baconian or Cartesian kind, which tries to prescribe the right way to employ our cognitive faculties irrespective of the way the objects of our knowledge may be constituted."⁵⁸ But dialectic does involve some recommendations about how science should approach the world, what sort of order to look for in it, what sorts of explanations to employ, even a theoretical program to be followed.

Marx states that in general view of the people "all collisions in history have their own origin in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of interaction."⁵⁹ The origin of those contradictions varies from a particular historical setting. For Marx, according to Wood, "essential contradiction does not denote the discrepancy between an entity and a germinally present, albeit unrealized, conception of rationality; it designates the wholesale falsity of the real. This is the principle of negativity appropriate for a social theory determined to expose the falsity of a society based on the forcible exclusion of the producers from the means of production."⁶⁰ The contradictions alleviate the current paradigm for an improved model to conform to the changes. Marx sees the actual falsity of the society in which he realizes a need for reformation, a paradigm shift rather, to emancipate the oppressive system in the society.

The dialectics cannot be separated from a historical standpoint. It serves as the logic of history.

(Marx) his dialectics was a dialectics concerned with "historical law." With Marx, "dialectics" does not negate "law," but is itself "law," or the "intensional logic of history" where ontology, epistemology and dialectics are unified with history as their common content. It is this dialectics that forms *Capital*, the "capitalized logic." In the sense that

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵⁷ Zhongyu Sun, *op. cit.*, 11.

⁵⁸ Wood, *op. cit.*, 211.

⁵⁹ Marx, *German Ideology*, 142.

⁶⁰ Andrew Buchwalter, *Dialectics, Politics, and the Contemporary Value of Hegel's Practical Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2012), 52.

Marx's dialectics is affirmed as the "intensional logic of history," "post-metaphysics" that "calls in question" the logic of truth-law-objectivity poses a challenge not only to Hegel's dialectics as the "intensional logic of thought," but also (or even more) to Marx's dialectics as the "intensional logic of history."⁶¹

Sun adds:

The essential difference between the dialectics of Marx and that of Hegel lies in the question of whether real activities form laws or preexisting laws control activities. In essence, the "convergence" Hegel's dialectics that "converges" with metaphysics turns "laws" into a mystical force with "logical preexistence" and deduces history to be the self-fulfillment of logic. In contrast, Marx's dialectics that puts an end to metaphysics proceeds from human historical activity and not only "exposes the self-estrangement of human beings in their holy image," but also "exposes the self-estrangement of human beings in their unholy image," i.e., the self-estrangement of human beings in "capital," thus unifying human historical activity with historical laws. Therefore, the key to responding to the challenge posed by "post-metaphysics" to dialectics is to

understand historical laws through human historical activity.⁶²

Marx obtains Hegel's principle of the homogeneity of reason and reality when writing his own narrative of normative theory. "For Marx, Hegel's conjunction of thought and being furnishes the methodological parameters for a concept of social criticism that eschews the dichotomy of descriptive and prescriptive analysis. Marx calls this immanent critique."⁶³ Marx indicts Hegel's eradication of the line between the descriptive and prescriptive in social criticism thus it appears to have an endless critique which is inherently engraved in the methodological model.

Considering the philosophy of Marx, science was an empirical and theoretical activity conducted by a community of human inquirers. Observing it in a social setting, intersubjective collection of thoughts were gathered to create a particular affair of ideas, in other words, it supplies facts that, at various stages of scientific investigation through the cooperation of the scientific inquirers.⁶⁴ But Marx believed that progression in science is influenced by proliferation of theories, not merely by accumulation of facts. He also believed, according to Farr, "that the most important terms in theories could not be reduced to observational terms. Rather, they referred to entities, processes, or relations that were real causal agents in the world, the discovery and specification of which

⁶¹ Sun, *op. cit.*, 16.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 16.

⁶³ Buchwalter, *op. cit.*, 41.

⁶⁴ James Farr, "Science: Realism, criticism, history," in *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 109.

comprised the heart of the theoretical enterprise.”⁶⁵

[...] immanent critique evaluates reality not with alien principles of rationality but those intrinsic to reality itself. An immanent approach to social criticism exposes the way reality conflicts not with some “transcendent” concept of rationality but with its own avowed norms. In Hegelian speculation, Marx finds the rudiments of an objective or “scientific” approach to critical theory, one in which reality is challenged not with arbitrary constructions but with norms whose acknowledged validity is part and parcel of social reality itself.⁶⁶

Through concrete activity and processing, the action goal of the subject is realized; “they must grasp, transform, and combine the selected objects. In this way they transcend the consideration of isolated objects and include the opposition that the setting activity has set aside. The concrete act actualizes the subjective as well as the objective capacities.”⁶⁷ In other words, the accomplishment of the action can only assume its success if the subject possesses the requisite capabilities and the objects possess the appropriate properties.

According to Riss, dialectics “regards both subjective and objective capacities as inseparable moments of the mathematical

development process. Each discovery depends on the subject’s effort and capacity to find the solution as a moment of development; each invention also includes the aspect of *tripping over* the solution as a moment of discovery.”⁶⁸ The innovative character also reaches the fact that mathematicians generally get several individual solutions to the same problem.

In the philosophy of mathematics, one would find the question of the nature of the existence of mathematical entities; whether it exists inside or outside the mind. Considering the realism of mathematical objects, acquiring the knowledge of them comes into place or rather they are invented or discovered and how do they grow and develop. Mathematics is known for its consistency and precision for truth and validity; thus mathematicians try to avoid contradiction that will affect the credibility of mathematics. Though getting not much attention from most of the people that Marx showed an interest to mathematics, the *Mathematical Manuscript* contains Marx’s analysis on the foundation of calculus emphasizing the differential calculus. The aim of Marx is to expose the underlying reality behind the emergence of mathematical knowledge. Karl Marx proposes the dialectics of mathematics; dialectics, according to Blunden, is a science of contradiction which is being applied to mathematics to show its development. He adds that dialectics is also dialectic logic, a guide which indicates a path for the deduction of new, more concrete, truths.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶⁶ Buchwalter, *op. cit.*, 42.

⁶⁷ Uwe V. Riss, “Objects and Processes in Mathematical Practice,” *Foundations of Science* 16, no. 4 (2011):342.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 346.

⁶⁹ Cf. Andy Blunden, “Dialectics and Mathematics,” *Labour Review* (1984), http://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Dialectics_Mathematics.pdf

The central topic of Carchedi's argument revolves on the comparison of Marx's method of finding the derivative of a simple algebraic function with an older, Leibniz-like method for finding the derivative of the same function.⁷⁰ Carchedi uses an example, the function $y = x^3$. The method of Leibniz on finding the derivative of this function, it starts with $dx = x_1 - x$ and $dy = y_1 - y$. That is, (x_1, y_1) is a point of the function some distance from an arbitrary point (x, y) and dx are the distances in the x and y directions, respectively, between x and x_1 , and between y and y_1 , respectively. It results that $x_1 = x + dx$ and $y_1 = y + dy$. Marx felt that a more principled method for finding derivatives should be developed. For Marx, differential calculus can be used to compute the instantaneous rate of change in the profit rate. Marx's method of differentiation provides key insights into what was Marx's dialectical view of reality. Marx's method of differentiation reflects "a process that is real, temporal, in which something (a real number for example) cannot be at the same time also something else (zero) and in which movement affects the whole rather than only a part of it and is the result of the interplay of potentials and realized."⁷¹

Mathematics must be allowed to speak to us through its history and not act as a screen on which to project our philosophical or sociological fantasies.⁷² This is what Lakatos proposed in a mathematical process. Returning

to the history of mathematics, it enables to observe the feasible needs for clarification and verification of such discoveries whether it is still accepted for the time being. History can show the origin of the established characteristics of mathematics and analyzes its foundations. According to Dusek, Lakatos and Marx share the same thought:

Lakatos' use of rational reconstruction in his account of history has a strong resemblance to that of Marx's treatment of economic history. Marx presents an account of economic development, but it is not a simple narration of history. Rather Marx has a schematic model, which does not fit exactly all the vagaries of history. He then adds successive complications, particularly in volume III of *Capital* (Marx 1967), which brings the model closer to the actual structure of capitalism. Nevertheless, the resulting corrected model remains a model, not a literal, detailed historical description capitalism. Lakatos, in his rational reconstructions, similarly does not simply present historical narration. Similarly Lakatos claims that his concept of the mathematician as imperfect personification of mathematics is "closely analogous to Marx's concept of the capitalist as the

⁷⁰ Russell Dale, "Guglielmo Carchedi on Marx, Calculus, Time and Dialectics," *Science & Society* 75, no. 4 (2011): 556.

⁷¹ Guglielmo Carchedi, "Dialectics and Temporality in Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts," *Science & Society* 72, no. 4 (2008): 424.

⁷² David Corfield, "Argumentation and the Mathematical Process," in *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, eds. George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 130.

imperfect personification of Capital”
(Lakatos 1976, 189n1).⁷³

Marx’s materialistic history pervades the reconstruction of the society by emancipation from the oppression of the structure. Lakatos, on the other hand, is reinterpreted in the context of mathematics. Time will tell if a particular theorem is refuted and needed to be reconstructed. Moreover, Lakatos claims that the relation between historical theses and historical texts in mathematics is detailed and shows the relation between physical theories and their empirical evidence.⁷⁴ On this evidence it would appear that Lakatos’ mathematical dialectic is purely epistemological. For him, mathematical knowledge grows and reinvents itself in order to improve our apprehension of a fixed mathematical reality.

As the result of the process, new objects come into being. In materialistic dialectics the term *sublation* describes the negation of objectivity of the original objects in the processing activity that is followed by the negation of this process in re-establishing objectivity in its results. [...]The particularly materialistic aspect in this consideration is the idea that sublation is not a mere intellectual act but concretized in material transformation.⁷⁵

Marx asserts that the theoretical notion of the relationship of reason and reality hinders Hegel from extricating existence and actuality in an adversely significant way. “Actualization denotes not the process in which rationality only implicitly present in existing reality attains true being, but that through which a metaphysical concept of reason finds the external expression required for its complete realization.”⁷⁶ Thus, the progression from partial to complete reality only expresses the absolute movement of a materialized subject, a process that leaves existing reality intact.

CONCLUSION: LAKATOS’ DIALECTICS IN MATHEMATICS

Hegel considers the goal of philosophy as directing the "rule of Reason" in the "unfolding of Spirit" through world history. Hegel's logic can thus well be corrupted or rather manipulated to justify anything that happens in history. Motterlini states that the adverse indication is that “whatever has been successful is thereby also somehow "right" and superior to what has been unsuccessful. The dangers of the dialectical approach lie obviously in the *authoritarian* attitude and in the *inexorability* of the process as formulated by Hegel first and then by Marx. [...]In sum, Lakatos made use of Popper's fallibilism to wring authoritarianism out from Hegel's dialectical process and made use of the Hegelian idea of a dynamically unfolding rationality underlying the growth of knowledge to reject the alleged irrationality of the context of discovery.”⁷⁷Lakatos made use of dialectics

⁷³ Val Dusek, “Lakatos between Marxism and the Hungarian heuristic tradition,” *Stud East Eur Thought* 67 (2015): 64.

⁷⁴ Brendan Larvor, “Lakatos as Historian of Mathematics,” *Philosophia Mathematica* 3, no.3 (1997): 60

⁷⁵ Riss, *op. cit.*, 343.

⁷⁶ Buchwalter, *op. cit.*, 44.

⁷⁷ Matteo Motterlini, “Professor Lakatos Between the Hegelian Devil and the Popperian Deep Blue Sea,” in *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology*

to suffice the constant discovery of new programmes.

Besides from Popperian falsification to explain the rationality of scientific discovery, Lakatos adopts the Kuhnian paradigm and modifies it; he called it research programme.

For in large research programmes there are always known anomalies: normally the researcher puts them aside and follows the positive heuristic of the programme.' In general he rivets his attention on the positive heuristic rather than on the distracting anomalies, and hopes that the 'recalcitrant instances' will be turned into confirming instances as the programme progresses. On Popper's terms the greatest scientists in these situations used forbidden gambits, *ad hoc* stratagems: instead of regarding Mercury's anomalous perihelion as a falsification of the Newtonian theory of our planetary system and thus as a reason for its rejection, most physicists shelved it as a problematic instance to be solved at some later stage - or offered *ad hoc* solutions. This methodological attitude of treating as (mere) anomalies what Popper would regard as (dramatic) counterexamples is commonly accepted by the best scientists. Some of the research programmes now held in highest esteem by the scientific community progressed in an ocean of anomalies.

That in their choice of problems the greatest scientists 'uncritically' ignore anomalies (and that they isolate them with the help of *ad hoc* stratagems) offers, at least on our meta-criterion, a further falsification of Popper's methodology.⁷⁸

Before dealing with the philosophy of mathematics of Lakatos, it is advantageously start with the methodology of scientific research programme. Paradigm of Kuhn and the programme share the same characteristic; they are both disturbed by anomalies. By means of anomalies, rational reconstructions occur to repair the vulnerable points of the paradigm. However, in research programme, the protective belt is the part being falsified; the hard core remains. All the rational reconstructions of history force history of science to embrace hypocritical morality, thus creating complicated histories, which depend on mythical 'inductive bases ', ' valid inductive generalizations ', 'crucial experiments ', 'great revolutionary simplifications' *et. al.*

While maintaining that a theory of rationality has to try to organize basic value judgments in universal, coherent frameworks, we do not have to reject such a framework immediately merely because of some anomalies or other inconsistencies. We should, of course, insist that a good rationality theory must anticipate further basic value judgments unexpected in the light of

and the Man, ed. George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, and Michael Stöltzner (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2002), 29.

⁷⁸ Imre Lakatos, *Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1*, ed. John Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 126.

its predecessors or that it must even lead to the revision of previously held basic value judgments.' We then reject a rationality theory only for a better one, for one which, in this 'quasi-empirical' sense, represents a progressive *shift* in the sequence of research programmes of rational reconstructions. Thus this new - more lenient - meta-criterion enables us to compare rival logics of discovery and discern growth in 'meta-scientific' - methodological - knowledge.⁷⁹

Paradigm is immediately denied and overthrown as soon as anomalies display the loop holes or the crisis in the current paradigm; thus new and modified paradigm emerges. In contrast with Kuhn's paradigm, Lakatos's research programme is not rejected instantly because of inconsistencies or anomalies. Methodology of Scientific Research Programme identifies anomalies in the framework of research programme; it appears that it follows an empirical approach in accomplishing a shift from the inadequate programme to a new one. However, the protective belt is where the falsification happens. The hard core retains the identity and contains the fundamental postulates of the programme; they are retained during the program's lifetime. However, protective belt is the modification of the programme.

Indeed, this methodology confidently predicts that where the falsificationist sees the instant defeat of a theory through a simple battle with some fact, the historian will

detect a complicated war of attrition, starting long before, and ending after, the alleged 'brucial experiment'; and where the falsificationist sees consistent and unrefuted theories, it predicts the existence of hordes of known anomalies in research programmes progressing on possibly inconsistent foundations. Where the conventionalist sees the clue to the victory of a theory over its predecessor in the former's intuitive simplicity, this methodology predicts that it will be found that victory was due to empirical degeneration in the old and empirical progress in the new programmes. [...] Thus *progress in the theory of scientific rationality is marked by discoveries of novel historical facts, by the reconstruction of a growing bulk of value-impregnated history as rational.*⁸⁰

Through discoveries of factual narratives which were believed and fortified by history, scientific rationality is justified.

On the other hand, Lakatos's philosophy of mathematics progressively separates *reliability* from *certainty* in mathematics. Assuming the proof of a theorem in a given axiomatic-formal system; "if it is accepted that the latter is consistent, it could thereby exclude the possibility of formalizing any counter-example in terms of the given system. But mathematics in the *making*, mathematics in its *growing process*, rarely expresses itself in axiomatic-formal theories; instead, mathematicians too make progress through conjectures, *experiments* and refutations. [...] Lakatos considers *informal proof*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

as just another name for *thought experiment*. [...] so in *mathematics* we have to analyse "proof-thought experiments" in order to find the hidden assumption from which a paradoxical result or contradiction follows."⁸¹ It is not always simple to attend to an anomaly of a scientific theory; likewise, it is not always simple to attend to a counterexample in mathematics. The proof-thought experiment is the outset to prove the conjecture, however, it does not prove rather it falsifies.

Method of Proofs and Refutations has character of a heuristic, therefore it concerns with the autonomous dialectic of mathematics. Furthermore, for Lakatos, Euclidianism and formalism support a fixed conception of rationality. Heuristic, on the contrary, relates to the dynamic movement of concepts. Motterlini illustrates the Hegelian dialectical triad lurks behind the historical reconstruction of Euler's theorem.⁸²

THESIS: Primitive conjecture

ANTITHESIS: Counterexample

SYNTHESIS: Theorem and proof generated concept (+ lemma incorporation)


The heuristic rules of *Proofs and Refutations*, on the other hand, belong to the realm of the objective growth of knowledge, in a Popperian terminology, in the sense of world 3 rather than to mathematicians' minds in the sense of world 2.

It remains valid for mathematics too that one should examine a series of

propositions rather than a single one. Motterlini explains in detailed the method of proofs and refutations:

Since 1961, Lakatos had claimed that when handling a counter-example to the initial conjecture ("global counter-example") or to any of the lemmas ("local counter-examples") one has to *choose* between various lines of behaviour each characterised by promises and risks peculiar to itself. The main case study of *Proofs and Refutations* illustrates the different possible strategies available in dealing with polyhedra that are exceptions to Euler's conjecture. A possible choice involves "eliminating monstrosities" by refining the concept of polyhedron; another consists in "surrendering to the counterexamples" thereby declaring the conjecture to be false; yet another in making certain "hidden lemmas" from background knowledge explicit and inserting them into the theorem enunciation, etc. The first kind of tactic reduces the content of Euler's conjecture and turns it into a "miserable convention." The second move is that of "naive" falsificationism in mathematics. The point is, of course, that one must recognise the element inherent of decision both in *restricting* the meaning of basic terms (such as polyhedron, vertex, edge, face etc.)

⁸¹ Matteo Motterlini, "Professor Lakatos Between the Hegelian Devil and the Popperian Deep Blue Sea," in *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, ed. George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, and © TALISIK



Michael Stöltzner (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2002), 27.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 28.

and in *extending* it. There is growth of mathematical knowledge in those same "adjustments" which allow what in the empirical sciences is an increase in (corroborated) content. I.e. those "stratagems" which allow one to invent/discover new problems, solve some of them and give a more elegant formulation of a simple conjunction of restrictive clauses. Only this third way corresponds to the "sophisticated falsificationism" in the empirical sciences.⁸³

Given the illustration above, it may assume that mathematics is a product of human activity that 'alienates itself,' it is autonomous and objective. Thus the intention of heuristic methodology is to accept the logic of the development of mathematics, the dialectical method of growth, the incomplete rationality of mathematics.⁸⁴ "From this point of view, the heuristic-methodology looks *backward* to identify the rules that made such a growth possible in the past, and at the same time it looks *forward* to advice on how to obtain progress in the future. "Heuristic-methodology, although fallible, is both evaluative and normative. Generally speaking, from the Hegelian-Marxist view the aim of philosophy is not a contemplation of eternal truths, but rather an effort to interpret the present in the light of the past with a view to shaping the present for a better (utopian) future. Thus, for the Hegelian philosopher of

mathematics, methodology, heuristic and logic of discovery are synonymous."⁸⁵ As assumed, Lakatos is inclined with Hegelian-Marxist methodology evident in his method of proofs and refutations. Heuristic concerns the set of rules and strategies to be adopted in the context of discovery but heuristic principles are not objective and autonomous.

Returning from Lakatos' philosophy of science, the basic unit of scientific progress is the "research program." Science is considered to be an ongoing contest among research programs. "The anatomy of a research program is characterized by two elements, namely, its "hard core" and its "positive heuristic". The positive heuristic spells out guidelines for the program's future theoretical development. It singles out significant problems, and sketches pathways to their solution. Thus, it directs scientists through the maze of confusing difficulties by giving them an idea where to drive at. The positive heuristic draws a picture of the program's "better self." One of Lakatos' historical assertions is that the development of a qualified program is determined by its heuristic."⁸⁶

Kuhn's claims with respect to paradigm immunity and paradigm substitution are leveled as descriptive objections at methodological requirements inspired by Popper. Carrier states that:

They are advanced as historical counterexamples to Popper's demands. It is true: a historical description cannot refute a

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁸⁶ Martin Carrier, "Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account of Kuhnian

Patterns of Theory Change." In *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, ed. George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2002), 60.

methodological norm. But Popper and Kuhn share the commitment that historical theory change, at least concerning its fundamental and long-term aspects, is rationally justified and constitutes growth of knowledge. In light of this commitment, historical arguments cannot be dismissed offhand. Within the framework of Lakatos' methodology, by contrast, the two features of immunity and substitution constitute theorems rather than objections. They follow from Lakatos' conception of how theories are to be evaluated. The important result is that if theory change occurs the way Kuhn says, it does not violate methodological rules but, rather, conforms to such rules. Lakatos' conception is thus able to provide a methodological explanation of these Kuhnian characteristics of scientific change.⁸⁷

Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos share similarities in their scientific inquiries about the growth of scientific knowledge. Popper introduces the theory of falsification i.e. theories are falsified by counterexamples precisely to 'prove', in a way, the conjecture. Kuhn proposes to look at the behavior of the scientific community. Social behavior of the scientific community affects the movement of paradigm in the context of normal science. Lakatos improves them; Popper denies the inductive reasoning through sense-experience and Kuhn's rejection of a methodological process of accumulation

of scientific knowledge. Lakatos reconcile the two whereas anomalies happen, that cannot be denied, and in time of crisis, that is inadequate to Kuhn, falsification is expressed to improve the protective belt.

Dialectics (in its explicit form, as we encounter it in Hegel or Marxism, as well as in its implicit form, as it is present in the work of Lakatos or Popper) has a tendency to interpret the evolution of concepts, or of knowledge in general, as a process which is logical in nature. It is not by chance that Hegel called dialectics a *science of logic*, and it is not by chance that Popper speaks about the *logic of scientific discovery*. According to dialecticians, knowledge is logical in nature. A necessary consequence of this is that the evolution of knowledge comes into conflict with logic.⁸⁸


It is undeniable to claim that dialectics is present in Lakatosian philosophy of mathematics supported by Popper and Kuhn. The fact that Lakatos did not reconstruct any deeper conceptual change in history of mathematics or physics is not by chance. "As a dialectician, he conceived evolution to be in conflict with logic, but as Popper's disciple he was not prepared to give up logic. Thus he omitted some of the most interesting moments in the history of mathematics. If he had tried to reconstruct them, he would have been forced to violate logic. Therefore he

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁸⁸ Ladislav Kvasz, "Lakatos' Methodology Between Logic and Dialectic," in *Appraising Lakatos*: © TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



Mathematics, Methodology and the Man, ed. George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2002), 229.

reconstructed only those changes, in which relatively small conceptual changes occur.”⁸⁹

That is to say, history is the court in which philosophical accounts of mathematics are to be judged. This is not simply a question of laying a philosophically-generated narrative alongside a body of incorrigible historical evidence, just as the appraisal of a physical theory is not a matter of comparing it with an incorrigible empirical given. Indeed, we should expect a truly excellent philosophy of mathematics to change our view of the history of mathematics.⁹⁰ Larvor, indeed, affirms the dialectics in Lakatosian method. He adds that Lakatos “distinguishes between 'logical'

refutations (where a theory is confronted by a piece of evidence with which it is strictly inconsistent) and 'heuristic' refutations. In a heuristic refutation, a theory is shown to be insufficiently general, or degenerative, or unable to survive translation into a vocabulary with greater explanatory power.”⁹¹ Recalling Lakatos's fallibilism aggregates the claim in which explanatory theories in mathematics discards the rational grounds in favor of their rivals. Thus, various interpretations and explanations are open for rationalization which could be rigorously selected by consensus.


⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 229.

⁹⁰ Brendan P. Larvor, “Lakatos as historian of mathematics,” *Philosophia Mathematica* 5, no.1 (1997): 42.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Books

Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

_____. *The Science of Logic*. Edited by George di Giovanni. Translated by George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

_____. *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume: Philosophical Papers Volume 1*. Edited by John Worrall and Gregory Currie. Vol. I. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Marx, Karl. "German Ideology." In *Karl Marx: Selected Readings*, edited by Lawrence H. Simon. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Buchwalter, Andrew. *Dialectics, Politics, and the Contemporary Value of Hegel's Practical Philosophy*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Pippin, Robert. *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Wood, Allen. *The Arguments of the Philosophers: Karl Marx*. London: Routledge, 1981.

Journal Articles

Carchedi, Guglielmo. "Dialectics and Temporality in Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts." *Science and Society*, 2008: 415-426.

Comstock, Clarence E. "Correlation of Mathematics and Science." *The Elementary School Teacher* (The University of Chicago Press) 6, no. 2 (1905): 82-96.

Dale, Russell. "Guglielmo Carchedi on Marx, Calculus, Time and Dialectics." *Science & Society* 75, no. 4 (2011): 555-566.

Dusek, Val. "Lakatos between Marxism and the Hungarian heuristic tradition." *Studies in East European* 67, no. 1-2 (2015): 61-73.

Kadvany, John. "A Mathematical Bildungsroman." *History and Theory* 28, no. 1 (1989): 25-42.

Kaufmann, Ralph, and Christopher Yeomans. "Math by Pure Thinking: R First and the Divergence of Measures in Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics." *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2017: 1-36.

- Larvor, Brendan P. "Lakatos as historian of mathematics." *Philosophia Mathematica* 5, no. 1 (1997): 42-64.
- Moore, Eliakim Hastings. "On The Foundations of Mathematics." *Science* (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 17, no. 428 (1903): 401-416.
- Pease, Alison, Alan Smaill, Simon Colton, and John Lee. "Bridging the gap between argumentation theory and the philosophy of mathematics." *Foundations of Science* 14, no. 1-2 (2009): 111-135.
- Pinkard, Terry. "Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 41, no. 4 (1981): 452-464.
- Riss, Uwe V. "Objects and Processes in Mathematical Practice." *Foundations of science* 16, no. 4 (2011): 337-351.
- Sommers-Hall, Henry. "Hegel and Deleuze on the metaphysical interpretation of the calculus." *Continental Philosophical Review* 42, no. 4 (2010): 555-572.
- Sun, Zhengyu. "Dialectics: Hegel, Marx and post-metaphysics." *Social Sciences in China* 29, no. 4 (2008): 5-18.
- Van Kerkhove, Bart. "Aspects of Informal Mathematics: Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics," GAP.6-workshop, 14-16 September 2006.

Essays In A Book

- Corfield, David. "Argumentation and the Mathematical Process." In *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, edited by George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner, 115 - 138. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 2002.
- Farr, James. "Science: Realism, criticism, history." In *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*, edited by Terrell Carver, 106-123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Kvasz, Ladislav. "Lakatos' Methodology Between Logic and Dialectic." In *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, edited by George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner, 211-242. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 2002.
- Motterlini, Matteo. "Professor Lakatos Between the Hegelian Devil and the Popperian Deep Blue Sea." In *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man*, edited by George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz and Michael Stöltzner, 23-52. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 2002.
- Westphal, Kenneth. "Hegel's Phenomenological Method and Analysis of Consciousness." In *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, edited by Kenneth Westphal, 1-36. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009.

Online Sources

McClimans, Micah. *What is the difference between mathematics and science?* February 3, 2015.
<https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mathematics-and-science>
(accessed April 25, 2017).

A Dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Ernst Bloch on Utopia and the Future of Humanity

Arvin Joshua S. Diaz

University of Santo Tomas | arvinus71@gmail.com

Abstract: This research will examine the similarities between Paul Ricoeur’s and Ernst Bloch’s notions of utopia. Aside from experiencing sufferings and despair, there is such a thing we all commonly share: “The hope for a perfect world where the struggles end and the end of human sufferings have been realized.” This is what we called as the vision of “utopia”. Utopia is a place or a world that is perfect which most of the people believed that it does not and will never exist. Common visionaries and philosophers have many ideas on what society or the world we should have in the future. That’s why utopia reveals itself in music, arts, literature and even in religion, myths, philosophies, socio-political views and theories. Every culture has an ideal society which they wish to attain.

The theoretical framework will be used in this research are Hermeneutic phenomenology and Marxist Hermeneutics. This comparative approach between Ricoeur and Bloch’s notions on utopia will be tackled based on these themes: a.) Critique of past utopian ideas before Marx; b.) Marxist idea on utopian society; c.) Critique of Hegel’s “end of history”; d.) Idea of the ending of human sufferings and e.) Their interpretations with what will they offer for humanity’s hope. The conclusion of this paper is that the phenomenon of desire for the utopia is part of our experience that arises from the hope amidst the experience of human suffering in dialogue between these two thinkers.

Keywords: Utopia, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Suffering, History

According to Lyman Tower Sargent, *utopia* is defined as a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space.¹ The word utopia came from Modern Latin from Greek “ou” which means not and “topos”, place. It came from “Utopia” by work of Sir Thomas More (1516), describing an island in which such conditions existed.²

In various religions, myths and philosophical expositions and also secular and scientific fictions, utopia has been the common theme of these views. Every religion and faith have their versions of utopia in their theologies and this is what we called “eschatology”.³

From the perspective of philosophy, scholars believed that Plato’s idea of government and society in his work *The Republic* was the start of the notions of utopia in Western philosophy.⁴ Hegel also had his notion of utopia through his notion of history as unfolding into man’s freedom. Being free, for him is the self-actualization of man’s rationality. First, he considered that the people of Orient viewed that one is only free which is

the Emperor. Next, the Greco-Roman people viewed that only some are free and others are not. Judeo-Christian civilization came and maximized the notion of freedom of man which the Greco-Roman civilization never had. Lastly, the Prussian Empire viewed that all is Free. For him, the German civilization is the model of a free society. At the end of history, all men will be able to realize their freedom by being self-conscious about the Absolute.⁵

Marx critiqued the idealism of Hegelian dialectics and his (Hegel) end of history. Instead, he viewed that history reveals itself in the contradictions between the ruling class and the oppressed class on the basis of material security of each class. For him, the end of history is communism where the stateless and classless society will be fully realized.⁶ Due to the notions of utopia in the past ages in the history of philosophy in the West, as well as in the East, Theodor W. Adorno had criticized the notion of “end of history” in the book he wrote entitled “Negative Dialectics” which deals with the notion that history is cyclical yet progressing with the new idea or kind of

¹ Lyman Tower Sargent, “What is a Utopia?” in *Morus: Utopia and Renaissance*, Accessed on: June 15, 2018. Retrieved from: <http://revistamorus.com.br/index.php/morus/article/viewFile/139/119>, 154.

² *Ibid.*,

³ Eschatology is the branch of theology which deals with the “last things” as the literal meaning of this word describes. It tackles about the nature of death and the ultimate destiny of man like the “end of the world” or what commonly called as “The Judgment Day”. See from: New Advent. “Catholic Encyclopedia: Eschatology-New Advent” in *New Advent*, Accessed on: July 14, 2018, Retrieved from: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05528b.htm>.

⁴ Dr. Alfred Geier. (2008). “Plato’s Republic: A Utopia for the Individual” in *Philosophy Now: A Magazine*

of Ideas, Issue 118, Accessed on: January 28, 2017, Retrieved from: https://philosophynow.org/issues/70/Platos_Republic_A_Utopia_For_The_Individual.

⁵ Joseph McCarney. (2000). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook: Hegel on History*. London New York: Routledge, Chapter 9, 137-139.

⁶ Karl Marx & Frederick Engels. (1969). “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, Translated by Samuel Moore in cooperation with Frederick Engels in *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, Vol. One. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 98-137.

⁷ Theodor W. Adorno (2004). *Negative Dialectics*, Edited by Taylor and Francis Group, Translated by E.B. Ashton. London York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 358-361.

progress that negates the former idea and sees progress as relative.⁷

The desire for utopia is almost seen in the literary and philosophical genres of most of the cultures of this world. It is because of the desire to have the sense of perfection in the imperfection of man's condition. Utopia can only be realized if we can understand on how every men and women dreams for it, by which it manifests in our subconscious drives called "hope". This study will try to understand on how Paul Ricoeur's and Ernst Bloch's notions of utopia in the light of hermeneutical phenomenology and how this desire to be realized can be considered as part of human experience. I will delve on why "hope", as a subconscious drive, rather than a virtue. It is also a principle that drives man to reach the possibility of attaining this "vision of perfect world".

The theoretical framework follows the historical approach of the development of philosophies of Paul Ricoeur and Ernst Bloch. Paul Ricoeur made a contributions to the Contemporary Western Philosophy using Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Marxist Hermeneutics from Ernst Bloch's notion of utopia. This study follows Hermeneutic phenomenology because this will have to understand the phenomena of utopia and why it is deeply manifested in the actions and symbols of cultural and literary expression of human desire for emancipation from sufferings. It also follows the Marxist Hermeneutics, because it seems fit for the need

for integration of Marxist utopic vision of communist society as foundation for Ernst Bloch's notion of hope as interpretation for human desire for the attainment of this "dream".

PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR

Hermeneutic phenomenology has its origins from Martin Heidegger. Accordingly, hermeneutic phenomenology "is an attempt to unveil the world as experienced by the subject through their life world stories."⁸ This means is that whatever we want to know the world, we describe it through interpretations. There are five considerations in the historical development of hermeneutics as a philosophy. In a first and traditional sense, Ricoeur viewed before Husserl's phenomenology, it limits itself only to the exegesis. In the second consideration, hermeneutics is considered as a science of linguistic understanding. This means hermeneutics deals with understanding the text in its proper context. Third consideration is it is considered as methodological basis for *Geisteswissenschaften* (Sciences of the Spirit) by Wilhelm Dilthey. By this, he considered hermeneutics deals with not only with the text, but also as the foundations of all disciplines both from natural and social sciences. Fourth consideration is to consider the notion of *Dasein* and understanding of it. Heidegger considered that the role of philosophy is understanding of phenomenology of human existence. Fifth consideration, by which Paul Ricoeur contributed, hermeneutics is considered as a process that interprets an

⁸ Narayan Prasad Kafle. "Hermeneutic phenomenological research method simplified" in *Bodhi: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 5, 2011, ISSN: 2091-0479, © TALISIK

explicit or hidden context in meaning. It goes back to the understanding of text through the symbolism in society.⁹

His kind of hermeneutics is through dialogue with other disciplines. This can be done through the dialectics between explanation and understanding mediated through interpretation.¹⁰ For him, Hermeneutics is understanding the dimensions of human being in its totality.¹¹ This means, it is necessary that the human will, which is the basis for human action and facticity, must have its explanation and understanding for his or her existence in the limits of historical and social conditions.¹² He also posited that there are many meanings on the limits of symbols and languages which we call *polysemy*. In this kind of thought, he posited that there are many meanings that are latent in the human behaviour. Language and the role of aesthetic experience are necessary in understanding human existence phenomenologically.

What made Ricoeur revolutionary in the history of Western philosophy was his view of the role of hermeneutics deals not only with the repetition of what it means through interpretation; but also it must creatively discover and interpret the hidden meanings of every language, art, and sciences or any aspects of human civilization through the context of human symbols in behaviour.

PAUL RICOEUR ON LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

Paul Ricoeur's *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* is a collection of his lectures that deals with the problem of ideology and utopia as two different phenomena. He considers that these two must be treated separately. For him, his hypothesis of these two opposite sides can function as what we call the social and cultural imagination.¹³

In his view, both of these phenomena have ambivalent characters. They can be used for building a "new world" or destroying the world. For him, he defined ideology based on how Marx viewed with these two phenomena, first is that this is the representation of ideas that is contrary or related to the material productions of the society and second is that these are the ideas that usually reflect the different groups of people from different epochs (i.e., the ideas of ruling class).¹⁴

Aligning itself with the second representation of ideology, it is considered as not an individual stance, but a stance of someone else which is not always a revolutionary one; because it has the tendency to maintain and reinforce the status quo. Utopia, on the other hand, is always advocated by authors who have their own specific genre which are sometimes subversive against the

⁹ Marlene Gomes Terra, Lucia Hisako Take Gonçalves, Evangelist Kotzias Altherino dos Santos, Alacoque Lourenzini Erdmann. (2009). *The Use of Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutic-Phenomenology philosophy as a methodological framework to guide an educational nursing research in Meanings of sensibility the professor-nurse-being in teaching and learning to be and practice nursing from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology*. 93-94.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹² *Ibid.*,

¹³ Paul Ricoeur. (1976). "Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination" in *Philosophic Exchange Number 1 Volume 7*. New York: Digital Commons @Brockport, 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 17-19.

ruling order or system in the society.¹⁵ The negative connotation of ideology came from Napoleon and he designed those philosophers and thinkers who opposed his grand project of French Empire as *ideologues*.¹⁶

Although, most people have a notion that utopia as an ideology, he considered that “utopia knows itself as a utopia and claims to be a utopia.” “Utopia is a very personal and idiosyncratic work, the distinctive creation of its author”.¹⁷ An author can have a notion of utopia without the use of ideology. For most of cultures, this is an “ideal” for their respective societies. Ricoeur noted the difference between these two; ideology merely wishes itself to integrate within the social reality even if it has an inverted view towards this “reality”. Sometimes this has the tendency to reinforce the ruling social system, while utopia offers the imaginative alternative constructs towards the society and this ideal becomes subversive to any social structures.¹⁸

He explained the notion of utopia with these three persons: Manheim, Saint-Simon and Fourier. But I will only focus on Manheim because this paper will focus on Marxist Hermeneutics on utopia. Manheim was influenced by the Marxist strain of utopia.¹⁹ He (Ricoeur) saw that there is a lack of parallelism between ideology and utopia on how Manheim viewed it. Manheim had reconciled the opposite natures between ideology and utopia with each other and at the same time reserved their differences.²⁰ The similarity between these phenomena is that these two realize in the

processes of history which they both called their non-congruence, or a deviation. What he meant is that both ideology and utopia are contraries of the reality which we want to realize in the society. The difference between these two is that utopia transcends the reality while ideology cannot. The first characteristic between the differences of these two phenomena is utopia transcends the reality of the present conditions of man and the second characteristic is that if it could be realized, it will shatter our common prejudice that utopia is merely just a dream. In other words, utopia is a process that is still actualizing.

Because of the transcendence of utopia, Ricoeur gave Manheim’s views on utopia some new perspectives. First, he explained, that, although we may have the notion of utopia as something a “golden age of the past” or “restoration of the lost paradise”, Manheim’s notion of utopia is but the realization of utopia that is within our potentialities, not on restoring the “lost perfection”. Secondly, utopia are one of the alternative possibilities for a better world and perfect human condition of the oppressed strata of the society. To explain further, utopia, especially in a Marxist and socialist sense, has the capacity to shatter any ruling social order or systems that oppresses any man and woman. Another perspective, is that the past notions of utopia have been fully synthesized in Marxist utopian vision. Because, even though communism is still remote, Marx had noted that only by a mature and enlightened proletarian revolution will realize it. In order to understand on how it will be realized, we must

¹⁵ Paul Ricoeur. *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 15-16.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Introductory Notes, 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Part 2 Chapter 16, 269.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 272.

understand that the present understanding of utopia is that it is latent in the potencies of revolutionaries in the history of human race. So in this sense, Ricoeur's rereading of Manheim's Marxist utopic vision view that history is still in the process of utopia but can only be realized because of the drive for its realization.²¹

ERNST' BLOCH MAIN IDEAS AND NOTIONS OF UTOPIA

Leszek Kolakowski compiled most of the philosophers and thinkers whom Marx influenced. One of these thinkers was Ernst Bloch. He made a philosophy of utopia through the synthesis of metaphysics, cosmology, and speculative cosmogony in a gnostic and apocalyptic way which were inspired from its varied sources.²² In the first volume of *The Principle of Hope*, Bloch tends to see that there is some part of us that drives us to act directing towards the future. This is what he called "hope". In most of his notions of utopia, he viewed that Marxist end of history is the right and only valid utopia. Because he saw that this is the synthesis of all the past notions of utopia. In order to actualize this future, man must discover his or her potential perfection which is latent upon his or her "being."²³ This tends towards the actualization of the perfection in future which does not need to be realized by returning to any "golden ages of the past". What we need, according to him, is the strong will that could lead to his or her

salvation through the perfection of humanity or destruction by which the end of all human existence.

In the second volume of the same book, he discussed that past notions of utopia before Marx called for the return of the "lost paradise" which according to him, is illusory. Because it did not bring us to the "end of history" or building of a "new world". But what he admired among these past notions of utopia is the Stoic's ideal society called *cosmopolitan*. It is known that he admired the global community that already achieved the universal brotherhood of mankind as a utopic vision of the Stoics and he considered it as almost near to Marx's vision of utopia.²⁴ The Medieval Age, especially the eschatological views of Abrahamic faiths in their sacred literatures, viewed that all men and women will become equal when the "kingdom of God" comes, since they viewed that it was lost by our "first parents". For those who lived in the Age of Enlightenment, there were some particular tendencies for men of this time to chide away from the past and also gave birth to the alternative notions of utopia towards the future by conceiving the notion of human rights as necessary for the progress of humanity. But even it seems it has an emancipatory view, he also exposed the failed promise of the Age of Enlightenment, especially the French Revolution. Because for him, it is only the revolution of the bourgeoisie class.²⁵

²¹ *Ibid.*, 276-282.

²² Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution*, Vol. III The Breakdown, Translated from Polish by P.S. Falla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), XII, 421.

²³ Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, Volume I, Translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul

Night, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, Part 2, 284-285.

²⁴ Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, Volume II, Translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Night, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, Part 2, 491.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 541-559.

In the third volume, he extensively discussed the notions of utopia which for Bloch came from what we call “hope” as a subconscious drive. What made Ernst Bloch differ from the psychoanalytic thinkers is that he views the subconscious as only a temporary condition. For him, we should always view it as “not-yet-conscious.” Likewise, in this work, he believed that the individual and the community have shared their roles in changing social structures in the history of human race because of “hope”. Past revolutionaries and thinkers had dwelt on the hope that man must be liberated from the shackles that enchained him or her from reaching his or her possibilities to live a perfect life. So the individual and the community must help each other that they may change the society instead of alienating from each other.²⁶ He also explained the causes of man’s fear of death. Fear of death came because man knows that he will become non-existent someday. So peoples of all faiths have speculated what life will be after death.²⁷ In most of human history, he viewed that it seems normal for all people to become more cynical because of the difficult social conditions and always thought that whether we could also have a brighter tomorrow without resorting to any action that will liberate them. So he had narrated the past notions of afterlife from the religious perspectives on how do we overcome the fear of death.²⁸ According to him, they needed to have a notion of God as something perfect from our fallibility to overcome the “fear of death”. But in the near future, he said that “God” would be realized in us. That’s why

in the ancient times, pagans had viewed God as far from us and not one of us. But in the near future, he said that “God” would be realized in us. It was due to these three monotheistic religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam that helped us to break the conception of many gods from the people whom they spread their religion.²⁹ But in his view of Feuberbach’s notion of God, “God” is considered as the fulfilment of man’s desires and wishes in a materialist sense.³⁰

In conclusion, Bloch supported Marx’s vision of humanity. For him, hope must not be confined within the limits of wishful thinking.³¹ Man’s role in struggling against bourgeois domination is the most liberating thing to do. The Marxist end of history is the synthesis of all struggles and also the hope that drives us to full humanization and destruction of his alienation not only from his “species-being” but also realizing his potential perfection in the near future.

COMPARATIVE THOUGHTS ON RICOEUR AND BLOCH’S NOTIONS OF UTOPIA

1. Critique of Past Ideas of Utopia Before Marx

In order to understand the past notions of utopia before Marx, we must consider why both of Ricoeur and Bloch explained it as a pure abstraction and considered creating a “new world” out of these man’s potentiality for

²⁶ Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, Volume III, Translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Night, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, Part 5, 973.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1105

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1215-77.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1284-85.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1286-87.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Part 5, 1354-1355.

perfection. First, in ancient and medieval times, the notions of utopia had the idea restoration of the lost “paradise” due to man’s fall which have already been part of sacred and literary texts in every cultures.³² Most of these past ideas of utopia that advocates the return of “lost paradise” are pure abstraction for them.³³

Ricoeur, in his explanation of Manheim’s interpretation of Marxist utopian society view that non-Marxist utopias are counter-utopias because it highly advocates the return of the “golden age” and also some of utopias had been used by the ruling class or groups of people to make the ruling system dominant and not to break away from it.³⁴ Although, some of those who promised utopias were revolutionaries of their time, they have betrayed the hopes of the masses; because they hid their self-interests behind their good motives.³⁵ In this case, both Ricoeur and Bloch criticized the utopic narratives of Age of Enlightenment which had influenced French Revolution because they did not represent the will of the people. Instead, only the will of the middle class (*bourgeois*) as what both of these two philosophers viewed it. In this sense, they believed that although the Age of Enlightenment and modernity brought man almost near in realizing his or her potential perfection and also realizing his or her liberation in the end, it also brought forth the dominance of the *bourgeois* which supports unbridled capitalism that made man victims of the new oppression.

I view that these two philosophers had critiqued past notions of utopias. Although, some of the revolutionaries of the past were inspired by their utopic vision, there are tendencies of past notions of utopia by which it becomes the “only narrative” of certain groups of people and certain ideologies which I thought betrays the Marxist utopian society. And also, these certain groups of people and their ideologies also betray the revolutionary tendencies of the oppressed which those who fought for it only retain the status quo if they become the ruling class.

2. Marx’s Idea on Utopian Society

Like in what I have stated earlier, every culture, society and philosophy has their own versions of utopia. From the ideas of the Contemporary Western Philosophy, Marx’s communist vision of the society is one of its example. Learning the context of his own time, we saw the Industrialization of Europe. It was at this time that science and industry would lead to humanity for progress because machines have already helped men to produce products and commodities faster. Yet, even he did see these advances and progress, it had also mired with dehumanization of labourers, accumulation of too much wealth and profit, degradation of environment and the accumulation of too much wealth for a few and privileged people which made the laborers oppressed.³⁶

³² Ze’ev Levy. (1990). “Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch” in *Utopian Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 2. March/April Issue. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 9.

³³ *Ibid.*,

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Ricoeur, Part 2 Chapter 16, 285.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 2 Chapter 17, 285-286.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Stumpf, *Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy*, Part 4 Ch. 17, 348-349.

Because of this experiences, he wrote many works that critique the dehumanizing conditions of the capitalism of his own time. His idea of human activity in history must be resolved in order for the actual human freedom, as he sees it, will be realized.³⁷ Freedom for Marx is economic in approach. He saw in capitalist society that man is commodified and objectified because it did not make man free to actualize the individuality and possibility in his own self. So capitalism deprives man not only of his choice of labor, but of doing what his nature wishes him to do. In his ideal society, man are free to do his or her nature because the work is now his or her own.³⁸

Paul Ricoeur, in his explanation of Manheim's interpretation of Marxist Utopia states that there are instance wherein, Marx wishes that his idea of utopia needs to be done in praxis. Utopia although, it may be abstract, is useless if it will not reach to its point to become real. He stated that sacrifices of revolutionaries in order for these to happen and those who hope for this advent in the present has already gained utopia in the present while gaining the future even more when he or she is in that future vision of utopia. In Ricoeur's view of Marxist utopia, the "Truth" needs to be practiced and near to human sentiments; not merely ideology alone, but the synthesis of all the forces of human desires to be liberated which does not need ideology, but rather the will to be free.³⁹ On the other hand, Bloch argued that Marxist utopia is a possibility not within only in the present but also in the near future and it must break from pre-Marxist

notions of utopia and traditional Marxist version of utopia.⁴⁰ Like Marx's notion of freedom, he also added another aspect of freedom in Marxist utopic vision and that is "freedom from" and "freedom to": "Freedom from oppression and also freedom to develop our individuality without restraints which was hindered by oppressive forces of dominant social forces".⁴¹

Both of these philosophers interpreted Marx's ideal society as somehow faithful to his communist vision of society which I thought that Soviet and China did not achieved. It was because of over-emphasis to the collectivism of Soviet and China-style Marxist society which hindered man to develop his or her individuality. I think the more "orthodox" in Marx's ideal society are Ricoeur and Bloch. Ricoeur explained that the Marxist notion of utopia came from making the "utopia" not just as a "literary device" but also from the human sentiments which hopes for the brighter future. Bloch, on the other hand, this drive (hope) "utopia" is possible and with this drive, we have to actualize "utopia".

Because of this comparison, Marxist utopia is considered as synthesis of all the revolutionary forces in the world; because it wishes to liberate man from anything that hinders his capacity to develop and also liberates him to make him more and more human being through the actions which came from his nature. Freedom is not only a choice, but it is also a capacity to become what I will be and not only what I am now.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 355-356.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 357.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Ricoeur, Part 2 Ch. 17, 296.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Levy, 7-8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*,

3. Critique of Hegel's End of History

Karl Marx, in the view of these two philosophers, thoroughly mentioned their views with regards to their criticism on Hegel's "end of history". Ricoeur, on his view of Marx's Critique of Hegelian end of history based on the opposition between practice and ideology.⁴² This means that, Hegelian end of history is an ideology, but that it has its lack of praxis to attain it. But what is the most striking thread in his view is that the realization that our consciousness defines our own humanity which differs from Hegel.⁴³ Like Marx, Ricoeur's reading of Hegel's end of history is that it is an idealistic notion of our humanity. Humanity is not considered to be something concrete in Hegel's lens and he did not see that man struggles against what hinders his freedom through its total material and spiritual aspects.⁴⁴

Therefore, in Ricoeur's view, Marx sees that the true historical and universal narrative of all classes that could implode a widespread revolution is the communist revolution which comes from its actual praxis of struggle.⁴⁵ He may have different notions of Hegelian end of history from Marx, but nevertheless, he shared his view that it is a positive possibility that can be viewed in the light of humanity's drive to act for its liberation.⁴⁶

Ernst Bloch's view of Hegelian end of history in Marx's critique shares Marx's criticism in his utopian vision. In order to understand his view, we must first understand

how does he shared his view of Hegelian notions of "object" and "subject". The first stance is that they viewed that there is a dichotomy between the "object" and "subject" and the final goal is that there must be the merging of the "object" and "subject" into one "being".⁴⁷ In this sense, he also believed that man is not an abstract entity but a concrete reality. The only end of history for Bloch is man's capacity to create will not be hindered by any forces.

In synthesis with these two philosophers, struggle could only be realized if man is both body and soul had gained the experience of being "oppressed". Marx is right when he critiqued Hegelian notion of attaining the end of history but what is lacking of Marx is the subjective aspect of our struggle which cannot be ignored. Because he viewed that our liberation in the sense only in economic liberation is too reductionist. I do view that man experiences oppression not only by material conditions, but also by these conditions, human being cannot actualize his or her "subjectivity". Due to the external factors man can contribute to his oppression or liberation. The "end of history" is possible only if man through individual and collective efforts has unitive factor of their struggle and that is more than just anger; but rather "hope" which is a drive towards freedom and embrace freedom in its entirety.

4. Idea of End of Human Suffering

⁴² *Ibid.*, Ricoeur, "Marx: The Critique of Hegel and the Manuscripts" in *Lectures of Ideology and Utopia*, Part 1 Chapter 2, 21.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Levy, "Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch", 3.

In line with “utopia” and its connection to our daily struggles, our notions of suffering came from the problem of evil which is a metaphysical problem in nature. In our daily struggles, we tend to hope that our sufferings will cease to exist. Paul Ricoeur and Ernst Bloch’s interpretations of utopia will be suspended for a while in this part of this paper and I will delve into what is their view of suffering and analyse and in the light of comparison and hermeneutics what will be the case find its interpretation on the end of our sufferings which are the part of this synthesis.

We should understand first Ricoeur’s notion of evil which he interpreted in the light of hermeneutic phenomenology. In Ricoeur’s work *The Symbolism of Evil*, we saw that how the myths of traditional Western Civilization (Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian) gave the narrative of problem of evil and suffering. So in his interpretation of these two traditions, he critiqued the notion of soul and body as opposite towards each other, but rather, he posited that the souls and body is undivided whole reality of man.⁴⁸ The notion of why there is suffering in different cultural myths is the belief in the “imprisonment” of the soul in the body.⁴⁹ But, he also interpreted the notion of “evil” in mythical representation in this four types which these two traditions in Western civilization viewed why there is suffering: origin of evil came from the things by which they created because they are not perfect; fall

of man after creation which he could only restore by salvation through opening another chapter in our history; in Greek tragedy where most of their myths ended with tragic because of their belief that every sin deserve punishment and it is irreversible which is in accordance on their belief in freedom and necessity and lastly is the notion of the exiled soul.⁵⁰

What is his idea on the end of suffering? He related this notion to the Biblical history of the people of Israel whom their forefathers had been given a promise towards their fulfilment of their hope which is based on their material prosperity.⁵¹ However as time passes by, they realized that the fulfilment of their received promises can only be done in the “mythologized” future.⁵² In this sense, Christianity would offer the Biblical prophecies that the Jews would understand literally in the light of metaphorical understanding of the Bible. He considered as well that suffering is a necessary step for the fulfilment of humanity which is the whole redemption of the whole Cosmos and that the body and soul will be saved (i.e., salvation cannot be realized if the body and soul are separated because these components of man are his totality).⁵³ In this understanding, man is both body and soul and it needed the cooperation of these two components that will give the realization of human will and desires. Man can only be

⁴⁸ Paul Ricoeur. (1967). “The Myth of The Exiled Soul and Salvation Through Knowledge” in *The Symbolism of Evil*, Translated by Emerson Buchanan. New York: Harper and Row, Part 2 Chapter 4, 280.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 283-289.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Ricoeur. “The Symbolic Function of Myths” in *The Symbolism of Evil*, Part II Introduction, 172-174.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, “The “Adamic” Myth and The “Eschatological” Vision of History” in *The Symbolism of Evil*, Part II Chapter 3, 263.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 277-78.

liberated if both of the body and soul would experience it.

Ernst Bloch also had notions of evil, suffering and the end of suffering which can be found in his work, *The Spirit of Utopia*. There is no doubt that Marx's ideal society had influenced Ernst Bloch's notion of utopia. In the last part of this book, he considered that in the order of evolution of organisms, it was man whom he considered the firstborn, yet the last to be developed because he broke the limits of his animal nature by the awareness of his creativity which can be the root cause of all the sufferings. Because he is aware also of the limits which is imposed by his nature not like the animals.⁵⁴ Yet, at the same time, man is creative. His death is shared by all the finitude of things which we can consider what we called death. But what differs us from the death of other creatures is that it can generate life itself which we can consider as "the immortality of the soul".⁵⁵ The notion of his death is similar to all the myths which have its notion of "souls" but differs from his notion of "soul" is that the subjectivity of man can bring a possibility of the "Kingdom of God" here on earth, in the sense there will be the end of suffering and even death.⁵⁶

In comparison with these two philosophers, evil, suffering and death came from not only of the awareness of man's finitude. But because of his subjectivity, he or she experiences these negative forces because of the notion that we are still in the making of our own existence. What they meant is that it is still a possibility. That's why the notions of

utopia had pervaded in the myths of different cultures and civilizations in order not only to give them the understanding of the problem of evil. But also to understand that there will be a new beginning, a new chapter for each one of us. Myths of liberation and salvation had inclined man to make sense of the goal of our suffering. Since both of these philosophers were also influenced by the Judeo-Christian belief that man will be resurrected from the dead at the time when the history will brought to its end, it is a possibility that the liberation of the soul is not only possible but also liberation of the body because it is part of a concrete reality of man. Man who is a body and soul at the same time makes him not only a creature but a creature that can only manifest his or her possibilities if both of them are intertwined. Amidst all the sufferings and hopes man seeks to find consolation, and it is always directed to the future. Many cultures have resorted to myths to explain the problem of evil and why there is suffering and also by these myths, these cultures tried to re-awaken the sense of "hope" in every person and in turn directed their actions towards the utopia. The concrete origins of suffering is still a mystery. Yet, when we try to make what console us is not only its end; but rather the fulfilment of the end of our human limitations.

5. Interpretations to Offer for Humanity's Hope

Paul Ricoeur's *The Fallible Man* presents an argument that man's fall have been narrated in many mythologies and also how this fall related to the connection of our human

⁵⁴ Ernst Bloch. (2008). "The Lower Life" in *The Spirit of Utopia*, Translated by Anthony A. Nassar. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 233.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 259.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 267.

freedom.⁵⁷ Like his works about the problem of evil, he clearly stated that the myths of fall from all cultures gave us the understanding of the fallibility of man which can only be understood by man's feeling of weakness because of our freedom.⁵⁸

What is his concept of fallibility? For him, there are two kinds. First, is that it came from human weaknesses and also came from the realization that man is capable of weakness, yet he has full of possibilities.⁵⁹ Second, that there is an opposition between the extremes of good and evil which is heavily seen in the dualisms of Western notions of ethics.⁶⁰ He also considers that fallibility is only the possibility of evil which is external and at the same time the capability of weakness and failing.⁶¹

His concept of fallibility helped us understand the sense of weakness in us, fallibility or anything we can associate as evil are not the real hindrances in fulfilling the "utopia". Even though, we seem to be hindered by the external and internal fallibility, man learns to discover what his future will become. That's why people use symbols and myths for us to understand our hopes and dreams of utopia.

Ernst Bloch view that men have dreams for a better and brighter world: a world where there is no struggle and suffering which can be revealed in the contexts of individual

aspirations and also revolutionary utopias.⁶² He considered that all civilizations expressed "petty utopias" but not the "full utopia (Marxist utopia)".⁶³ The nature of man is utopian and that sometimes he does not act upon it because he is prevented by any dominant social system. He viewed as well, that from the pure fantasy of all religions it is possible that we can create the "kingdom of God" as which we can say utopia which is Communism (sharing Marx's aspirations).⁶⁴

The different notions of utopia is inherent in cultures, music, art, religion, myths and anything that are great expression of human civilization. Although, being "fallible" is part of our human nature, it does not mean that it is one of the great hindrances in attaining "utopia". But rather, it is a necessary step for it. This vision of an ideal society had been already there for thousands of years in different forms which inspired many revolutionaries to make some changes for their respective societies in different times. So by that, we can say every person has the potentiality to realize this vision of utopia, even there are hindrances from external and internal factors.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The topic of this research is the dialogue between Paul Ricoeur's notion of utopia together with Ernst Bloch's notion of utopia (resonating Marx's ideal society) which has its best understanding on why it is in the

⁵⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, Revised Translation by Charles A. Kelbey, Introduction by Walter J. Lowe (New York: Fordham University, 1986), Preface, xlii-xliii.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 141-142.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*,

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, 429.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 429.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 429-438.

human nature that man seeks, fights and build a just and humane society. Utopia became part of literary expressions from every culture, philosophy and religion. As what we saw earlier, this came from the desire of “sense of perfection” in the midst of human sufferings. Bloch considered it as possible. Because he has this notion this is within us which is what we call “hope”. “Hope” is a subconscious drive that is driving towards the positive future.

Hermeneutic phenomenology has reshaped our understanding of philosophy as “interpretation” in this contemporary times. Because it interprets human acts behind the human will. In this sense, we can see that hermeneutic phenomenology is a philosophy of “being human” that gives the human subjectivity a sense of being interpretative amidst the complexities of reality.

Ricoeur noted that both ideology and utopia are part of what he called “social and cultural imagination”. Both of these ideas are the contraries of social reality and wishes to liberate or destroy the “world”. What made them different from each other is that ideology wishes to integrate itself with the reality, no matter how it seems contrary towards social reality, while utopia, on the other hand, it wishes itself to be subversive. He considered

that utopia is a literary genre and gave a new perspective of it as an idea or a dream that can shatter any ruling social system.

Ernst Bloch inherited the Marxist vision of society. But he claimed it as different from past notions of utopia. Because he considered that this “vision” has the capability of making a “new world”. He considered that “hope” drives us towards this future. He also considered that perfection of our nature is possible because it is inherent in us. So utopia is possible for him.

With the synthesis of the thoughts of these philosophers, I have three concluding statements. These are: **1.) The ideal society is not only a possibility, but rather can be actualized because of the human will and drive; 2.) Past utopian ideas had reshaped and gave us the notion of ideal society amidst the struggles in human history; and that, 3.) Marx’s ideal society culminated these past utopians which I can affirm is the future stage of humanity.** This vision had inspired past revolutionaries and cultural and literary expressions of many civilizations. Therefore, we could agree that utopic vision is part of our human experience which arises from “hope” amidst human sufferings and inspires us to make this world a better place

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Bloch, Ernst. (1986). *The Principle of Hope*, Volumes I, II & III, Translated by: Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press.

_____. (2000). *The Spirit of Utopia*, Translated by Anthony A. Nassar. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Ricoeur, Paul. (1985). *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Edited and Translated by George H. Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. (1976). "Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination" in *Philosophic Exchange*, Vol. 7: No. 1, Art. 5. Accessed on: February 17, 2017. Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol7/iss1/5,17-28.

_____. (1986). *The Fallible Man*. Revised Translation by: Charles A. Kelbley; Introduction by: Walter J. Jove. New York: Fordham University Press.

_____. (1967). *The Symbolism of Evil*, Translated by Emerson Buchanan. New York: Harper and Row.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Adorno, Theodor W. (2004). *Negative Dialectics*, Edited by Taylor and Francis Group, Translated by E.B. Ashton. London York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Kolakowski, Leszek. (1985). *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution*, Vol. III The Breakdown, Translated from Polish by P.S. Falla. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 421-449.

Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederick. (1969). "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Translated by Samuel Moore in cooperation with Frederick Engels in *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, Vol. One. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 98-137.

McCarney, Joseph. (2000). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook: Hegel on History*. London New York: Routledge.

Terra, Marlene Gomes, Gomçalves, Lucia Hisako Takase, Dos Santos, Evangelia Kotzias Altherino, Erdmann, Alacoque Lourenzini. (2009). "The use of Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutic phenomenology philosophy as a methodological framework to guide an educational nursing research" in *Meanings of sensibility for the professor- nurse- being in teaching and learning to be and practice nursing from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology*, A doctoral thesis presented to the Santa Catarina Federal University- UFSC- Nursing Doctoral Program, with a grant from the MEC/CAPES (Brazilian Ministry of Education/Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel), city of Florianopolis, state of Santa Catarina, Brazil, 93-99.

Research Articles

Kafle, Narayan Prasad. "Hermeneutic phenomenological research method simplified" in *Bodhi: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 5, 2011, ISSN: 2091-0479, Accessed on: July 14, 2018, Retrieved from: http://kucc.ku.edu.np/bodhi/vol5_no1/11.%20Narayan%20Kafle%20Hermeneutic%20Phenomenological%20Research%20Method.pdf, 181-200.

Levy, Ze'ev. (1990). "Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch" in *Utopian Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 2. March/April Issue. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 3-12.

Sargent, Lyman Tower. "What is a Utopia?" in *Morus: Utopia and Renaissance*, Accessed on: June 15, 2018, Redirected from: <http://revistamorus.com.br/index.php/morus/article/view/File/139/119>, 153-160.

Online Resources

Geier, Dr. Alfred. (2008). "Plato's Republic: A Utopia for The Individual" in *Philosophy Now: a Magazine of Ideas* Issue 118 November/December Issue. Accessed on: January 28, 2017. Retrieved from: https://philosophynow.org/issues/70/Platos_Republic_A_Utopia_For_The_Individual.

New Advent. "Catholic Encyclopedia: Eschatology-New Advent" in *New Advent*. Accessed on: July 14, 2018. Retrieved from: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05528b.htm>.

Ang Penomenolohiya ng Taong Nagmamahal sa Pilosopiya ni Florentino Hornedo*

Patrick Andre C. Mencias

University of Santo Tomas | andre.mencias@gmail.com

Abstract: Ang layunin ng papel na ito ay maipasiwalat ang teorya ng *Pagpapakatao* ni Florentino Hornedo na kaniyang sanaysay sa kaniyang mga naunang akda na *The Power to Be: The Phenomenology of Freedom at Pagmamahal at Pagmumura*. Si Hornedo bilang iskolar ng iba't ibang larangan ng agham pantao ay lubos niyang pinapaalala na ang mga disiplinang ito ay nararapat na maglahad ng kasagutan sa kung ano ang kahulugan ng pagiging tao. Ang Pagpapakatao kay Hornedo ay ang kaniyang paglalahad ng teorya sa kayarian na binubuo ng katawan at kamalayan. Kung saan ang kamalayan ay hindi lang kamalayang pansarili kundi kamalayang may namamalayan. Ang mga implikasyon ng pagkakaroon ng kamalayan na ang tao bilang may kamalayan sa sarili ay may kakayang ilahad ang kaniyang sarili sa kapwa ng masining na paraan sa pamamagitan ng trabaho o “*work*”. Kasunod nito ang kaniyang libro naisulat na *The Power to Be* ay ang kaniyang panayam ukol sa kahulugan ng Freedom bilang Strength o lakas ng tao na pinapapalakas ang sarili at ang ibang tao. Ang Pagmamahal at Pagmumura naman ay ang kaniyang pagbigay ng kahulugan sa mga salita ng Pagmamahal at Pagmumura bilang isang gawa na ng pagtingin sa mga bagay na mataas o mababa at isa ring etikal na gawain kung saan ang tao ay nakapagpapataas, o nakapagpapababa ng halaga o “*value*” sa ibang tao. Bilang paraan ng paglahad ng papel na ito ay ang pagtatagpi ng tatlong gawa ni Hornedo at pagbibigay ng manunulat ng isang paraan sa pag unawa sa kaniyang pilosopiya na isang pagkilos sa pagpapaalala sa proyekto ng agham pantao bilang pag-aaral sa pilosopiya ng tao at ang kaniyang pagkontribusiyon sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino.

Keywords: Pagpakatao, Pagmamahal, Pagmumura, Kalayaan

Isa sa mga laganap na tema sa mga sulat ni Florentino Hornedo ang pagbibigay kahulugan sa pagpapakatao ng tao. Sa unti-unti paglaganap ng modernong uri

teknolohiya ngayon ay mapapatanong ang isa patungkol kaniyang saysay bilang isang tao sa mundong kinalulugaran niya. Samakatuwid, ang paghahanap ng sa kahulugan sa isang tao

ay siyang nagging sentro ng pag-iisip ni Hornedo sa larangan ng agham pantao na siya ay binansagang “*Renaissance Man*.”

Bago pa lamang siya ay mabansagan ng ganiyang titulo ay nagsimula si Hornedo bilang studyante katulad ng karamihan sa atin. Si Hornedo ay tubong Sabtang, Batanes na pinalad magbigyan ng oportunidad makapag-aral sa Manila. Noong dumating ang panahong siya ay pipili ng kaniyang aaralin pagkatapos ng high school ay una niyang piniling pag-aralan ang Biolohiya dahil sa kaniyang pagmamahal sa buhay ng hayop, ngunit sa kadahilanang ekonomikal at ang takot na makasira ng iba’t ibang kagamitang laboratoryo, hindi niya tinahak ang landas na ito at napag-isipang mag aral ng edukasyon sa University of Santo Tomas ng 1957 na nagbukas sa kaniya ng pinto sa pag-aaral ng agham pantao.

Lalong nabigyan ng mas malalim na kahulugan ang kaniyang titulo nang siya ay nakapag-aral ng iba’t ibang disiplina sa agham pantao. Ayon kay Roland Theuas Pada, inilarawan si Hornedo bilang isang “*an intellectual tangled with a caboodle of disciplines in the humanities*” o sa simpleng salita, isang taong tinahak ang iba’t ibang landas sa kaniyang paghanap ng kahulugan sa pagpapakatao ng isang tao.¹ Pinag-aralan niya ang kasaysayan, antropolohiya, panitikan at pilosopiya at naging maestro sa mga disiplinang ito. Isa sa naghubog kay Hornedo na paigtingin ang pag-aaral sa

agham pantao ay dahil sa kaniyang dissertation na *Laji: An Ivatan Folk Tradition* ay ukol sa pagpapanatili ng kultura ng mga Ivatan dahil sa paglaganap ng modernisasyon sa Batanes.² Bagkus, sa buhay na tinahak ni Hornedo ay lalong mauunawaan ang pilosopikal na pananaw bilang makataong pananaw.

Samakatuwid, ang layunin ng papel na ito ay maipapasiwalat ang makataong pananaw ni Hornedo sa kaniyang mga naisulat ukol sa pilosopiya. Itatalakay ng pagsusuring ito mga isinulat ni Hornedo na ang *Power to Be: The Phenomenology of Freedom, Pagmamahal at Pagpapakatao* na ipagtatagpi-tagpi ang mga gawa na ito upang magkaroon ng isang pagbubuo ukol sa konsepto ng tao.

KALAYAANG NAGPAPALAKAS

Sinulat ni Hornedo ang kaniyang Master’s Thesis patungkol sa pagtatalas sa Freedom na nailathala ng 1972. Unang binigyan ni Hornedo ang pamagat na “The Philosophy of Freedom” ngunit nagkaroon ito ng hindi magandang pagtingin ng iba’t ibang iskolar³ kaya’t ito ay pinalitan bilang “The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom” dahil ito ay malapit sa layunin ng libro na maipakita ang diskurso sa pagtatalas sa kung ano nga ba ang ibig sabihin ng pagiging malaya.⁴ Ang libro ay inilathala muli ng taong 2000 ng UST Publishing House.⁵

* This paper has been presented during the Second International Conference for Philippine and Asian Studies last May 3-4, 2018 in Visayas State University, Baybay City, Leyte.

¹ Roland Theuas DS. Pada, *The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities*, Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, No.2 (December 2015), 1.

² Pada, *The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities*, 2-3.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



³ Fleurdeliz Altez- Albela, *Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought: Florentino H. Hornedo’s Philosophical Anthropology*, Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 2016), 62.

⁴ Florentino Hornedo, Preface to the New Edition of *The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom* (2000, UST Publishing House, Manila), ix.

⁵ Maliban sa hindi magandang pagtingin sa pamagat, ang pagkalathala rin ng libro ay nasa bungad ng

Tinukoy ni Hornedo ang Freedom bilang importanteng aspeto sa pagbuo ng sarili bilang tao.⁶ Sinulat niya ang paksa patungkol sa Freedom ay sa kadahilanang may kakulangan sa pagtukoy sa kabuluhan nito kaya't nagkaroon ng maraming iba't ibang pananaw patungkol sa pakasang ito.⁷ Bagkus, ginawang layunin ni Hornedo na tukuyin ang Freedom bilang tinuturing metapisikal na uri ng lakas na “*autonomous energy for being*.”

Dahil nabanggit ang kakulangan sa pagtukoy ng kahulugan nito, binalikan ni Hornedo ang “stuff” ng Freedom. Pinapaliwanag ni Hornedo na ang Freedom bilang Stuff ay mayroong metapisikal at istorikal na phenomena na tinuturing na totoo at nagiging sanhi at bunga. Kung mayroong sanhi, mayroong “*agent*” ng sanhing ito, at kung mayroong bunga na siyang nagpapatunay nito. Ang Autonomy ay tumutukoy bilang “*being that is self-governing*”. May awtonomiya ang isang bagay kung ito ay kayang pamunuan ang kaniyang sarili na hindi lamang tumutukoy sa lakas at kapangyarihan, kundi ang bagay na ito ay hindi naaapektuhan ng panlabas na mga aspeto sa paggawa ng kaniyang sariling kagustuhan.⁸ Mula sa awtonomiya bilang na siyang nagiging tagapagpaganap sa sarili, ang “*Autonomous Energy*” samakatuwid ay ang napapatunay nito sa pamamagitan ng pagkilos. Ito ang prinsipyo ng kakayahan ng “*being*” kumilos o magtimpi ng naaayon sa karapat-

dapat na pagsagawa.⁹ Isang halimbawa ng pagkilos ang pagkakaroon ng kakayahang pumili na siyang nagpapatunay sa lakas ng Freedom bilang pagpapalakas sa tao.¹⁰


Ang salitang Being ay ginamit ni Hornedo upang tukuyin ang taong taglay ang Freedom na nagpapalakas. Ang Being ay nailalantad ang kaniyang sarili sa penomenolohikal na pamamaraan. Dahil sa pagkalantad nito, ang tao ay may kakayahang tukuyin ito sa kaniyang pagtagpo nito sa pagtatalas sa kahulugan ng Being. Bagkus, ang tao ay sinasabing makatagpo ng iba't ibang bagay na lumalantad sa kaniya sa mundo galing sa kaniyang pagtatalas sa kahulugan ng Being. Dahil ang Freedom ay tinuturi bilang isang “*being*”, ang pagkalantad nito ay sa pamamagitan ng tao na siyang kumikilos upang mailantad ang sarili niya. Ang taong nailantad ang kaniyang sarili ay siyang nakikita sa mundo upang magkaroon ng kahulugan. Bagkus, ang Freedom bilang lakas ng tao ay isang mahalagang aspeto para sa pagkalantad ng tao sa mundo.¹¹ Tila ginamit ni Hornedo rito ang Being ay parehas na nagmula sa iskolastik at kasalukuyang kahulugan na kaniyang hinabi parehas upang tukuyin na ang Freedom ay isang bagay na “*Stuff*” na naging “*Autonomous Energy for Being*” at ang pagkalantad nito sa pamamagitan ng tao bilang Being.

pagdeklara ng Batas Militar sa Pilipinas ng Setyembre 21, 1972 na naiwang hindi nabasa at tinago lamang sa panahon kung kalian mahalaga ang paksa patungkol sa kalayaan. Cf. Roland Theuas DS. Pada, *The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities*, 2.

⁶ Florentino Hornedo *The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom* (2000, UST Publishing House, Manila), 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

© TALISIK
Volume V, Issue no.1
ISSN 2362-9452



⁸ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹¹ Ginamit ni Hornedo ang pagtatalas ni Heidegger ukol sa Being sa the Question of the Meaning of Being upang mailahad ang kalaayang nailalantad sa pamamagitan ng tao. Florentino Hornedo *The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom*, 16, 92.

Ang Freedom ay hindi pag-aari ng sino man para sa kaniya lamang, bagkus, ito ay dahil ang Freedom ay para sa lahat ng nagnanais na lumago sa lakas na binibigay nito. Ang taong pinakamalaya ay ang pinakamalakas sa lahat at ito ay dahil sa patuloy na paglago ng iba't ibang kakayahan ng tao¹² mula sa puso, isip at katawan patungo sa Kalayaan. Ang paglago mula sa mga kakayahang ito ay mahalaga upang makamit ang kabuohan ng Kalayaan.

PAGMAMAHAL AT PAGMUMURA

Ipinaliwanag ni Hornedo sa sanaysay ng kaniyang pagkahiwatig ng halaga o “*values*” sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa ibig sabihin ng Pagmamahal at Pagmumura. Dito makikita ang pagiging iskolar ni Hornedo bilang pilosopo at istoryador sa pag unawa ng mga konseptong sa pamamagitan ng mga arkibos ng nakaraan at ang pag intindi nito sa pamamagitan ng Hermeneutics.

Nakita ni Hornedo na ang pinagmulan ng pagtingin sa halaga na nanggaling sa ugali ng mga tao mula sa pre-kolonyal na panahon dahil ang kanilang pagtingin sa mundo nahahati sa dalawang pwersa ng liwanag at dilim, “God and the Evil One” at mga bayani at mga kontrabida. Ang kanilang pag unawa nito sa mundo ay nagdulot ng mga myto and mga kwento na patungkol sa pakikibaka ng mga bida laban sa kabaliktaran nito.¹³ Bagkus, Nakita muli ni Hornedo na mayroong pagkakatulad ng ugali

ng pagtingin ng mga sinaunang tao patungkol sa halaga na makikita sa paggamit ng mga tao ng salitang “mahal” at “mura”.

Ang paggamit ng mga tao ang salitang “mahal” at “mura” ay dahil sa pagtingin ng tao sa realidad na naka-ayos ayon sa halaga na mataas o mababa. Ayon sa isang dokumento ni Padre Pedro de San Buenaventura ng Laguna ay pinakita ang kahulugan ng mga salitang mahal at mura sa kaniyang isinulat na *Vocabulario* ng 1613 at ito ay ihinambing ni Hornedo sa *Diksiyonaryo Tesouro* ni Jose Villa Panganiban ng 1973:

¹² Ang iba't ibang kakayahang tinutukoy dito ay ang Physical Strength, Psychological Strength, Intellectual Strength, Moral Strength, Cultural Strength, Social Strength, Political Strength, at Metaphysical Strength. *Ibid.*, 64.

¹³ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura: Essays* (1977, Office of Research and Publication, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City), 143.

| Fr. P. de San Buenaventura ¹⁴ | | Jose Villa Panganiban ¹⁵ | |
|--|--------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| <i>Mabal</i> | - <i>noble</i> | <i>Mabal</i> | - expensive |
| | - <i>enoblecer</i> | | - high-priced |
| | - <i>estima</i> | | - beloved |
| | - <i>preciado</i> | | - held highly in great esteem |
| | - <i>preciosa</i> | | - noble |
| | - <i>honroso</i> | | highly born |
| | - <i>grave</i> | <i>Mura</i> | - cheap |
| | - <i>tenerse</i> | | - inexpensive |
| | - <i>lactarse</i> | | - low-priced |
| | - <i>entonarse</i> | | - scolding |
| | - <i>valor</i> | | - reproach |
| <i>Mora</i> | - <i>afrenta</i> | | - young and unripe fruit, etc |
| | - <i>desbonra</i> | | - very young coconut fruit |
| | - <i>vituperio</i> | | - immature |
| | - <i>abaratar</i> | | - undeveloped |
| | - <i>barato</i> | | - fresh and young |
| | | | - light as in <i>asul na mura</i> (light blue) |

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 146- 147.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Makikita ang pagkakatulad ng mga kahulugan mula sa dalawang na patungkol sa halaga sa kabila ng agwat ng panahon. Bagkus, makikita rin dito ang pagtingin ng mga sinaunang tao sa realidad na nahahati sa dalawang bagay ay kaparehas sa pagtingin ng tao ng 1613 sa realidad bilang mahal at mura at ang mga tao ng kasalukuyan. Nagamit ang salitang mahal at mura sa pagtingin sa mga bagay-bagay sa realidad na mataas ang halaga o mababa ang halaga na dulot pa rin ng pagtingin sa mundo sa dalawang aspeto. Nang sinabi na halaga ang naging basehan ay tila tinuri din nilang mahal o mura ang mga bagay sa mundo katulad ng mga bagay na binibili nang dumating din sa punto kung itinuturi din nila ito sa pag uugali ng tao.¹⁶

Bilang salita na mula sa kasaysayan ay ipinamalas sa pamamagitan ng wika. Ang isang paraan ng pag unawa ng mga salita nito ay sa pamamagitan ng Hermeneutics ni Paul Ricoeur na “Ontology of Understanding”. Para kay Ricoeur, nauunawaan ng tao ang mga salita ng nakaraan sa kaniyang pakikibahagi sa salitang iyon nang maunawaan niya ang konteksto ng panahon ng salitang iyon. Bagkus, ang taong nang unawa ay lalong nalalapit sa teksto iyon na siya ay lumalaking na may mas malawak na pag-unawa sa mundo.¹⁷ Bilang taong may malawak na pag unawa sa salitang mahal at mura ay lalo niyang makikita ang paggamit nito sa kabila ng kaniyang kahulugan mula sa nakaraan. Bagkus, nagagamit niya pa rin ang salita sa kasalukuyang panahon.

Ang pag-unawa sa mga salitang iyon ay nagiging isang gawa na ipinapamalas sa iba, bagkus, Pagmamahal at Pagmumura. Sa isang

dokumento na ginamit muli ni Hornedo ay ang paggamit ng salitang ugat ng pagmamahal at pagmumura na “mahal” at “mura” sa isinulat ni Franciscan Venerable Juan de Oliver sa kaniyang isinulat sa Tagalog na “Declaracion de los Mandamientos de la Ley de Dios” sa gitna ng mga panahong 1585 at 1590. Ayon sa dokumento:

Ang tauong may baet, may vasto, ybinobocodniya sa caniyang loob, ang magaling sa masama, minamahal niya ang mahal at ang moray minomora rin, di may vasto pa ang tauo cun pauain niya ang labat, masaman man, magaling man, cun ybalimbawa ang mahal sa mora, at ang mora sa mahal, di bulag ang tauo cun paputiin and maytim? Ang maytim naman ay paputiin niya?... Tapat bagang ypara ang mora sa mahal? Ang Demo sa Dios?

Cun бага lalo ang D.s at mahal sa labat, anot di niyo mabalin, at ybiguin, at di sintabing lalo sa labat?

Ang Demonio, ang Anito, cun para mora sa labat, masamang anyo, masamang loob, opasalain sa caniyang Dios, anot di morabin sa labat, di calupitan, at di limutin ang walang baet sang saga;...¹⁸

The reasonable man, who has discernment, distinguishes within his heart what is good and what is evil; he esteems the precious and the worthless he treats as worthless. Would a man be considered right if he treats equally everything, both good and the evil as if they were the same, and if he regards as equal both that which is precious and that which is worthless, or that which is worthless with that which is precious? Would not the person be blind if he

¹⁶ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura: Essays*, 147-148.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 148-149.

treats that which is black as if it were white, and that which is white as if it were black?... Is it correct to treat the cheap and the costly as if they were equal? The devil and God?

If God is greater and most precious of all, why do you not esteem and love and cherish him above all?

The Devil, the *anito*, if the most worthless, ugly, evil-minded, a murmurer against his God, why is he not treated as the most worthless of all, why not shown cruelty, why not forgotten as worth nothing?

Makikita ng mga mababasa na ginamit ang mahal at mura bilang pagsalarawan ng halaga na patungkol sa pagmamahal sa Diyos at pagpapawalang halaga sa demonyo. samakatuwid, mauunawaan ng isa na ang pagmamahal sa Diyos ang pinakarurok ng Gawain ng isang tao na sumasalamin sa Utos ng Pagmamahal ng Diyos.

Ang pagkakaroon ng kaalaman ukol sa halaga ay nakapaloob sa taong tumitingin. Nakapaloob sa kaniya ang karanasang nagbibigay halaga at nabibigyan ng halaga. Katulad ng isang pilak na walang halaga hanggang ito'y mabigyan ng halaga ng tao. At dahil sa pag uugali ng tao na maglarawan ng mga bagay-bagay na mahal at mura ay dinala ni Hornedo ang pag ugaling paglarawan sa tao. Bagkus, mahal at mura ay nagiging basehan sa pagkumpara ng halaga ng tao kung saan ang mura ay naglalarawan na mababa ang halaga ng isang tao sa iba at mahal kung siya ay magkatulad ng hloga o mas mataas pa sa kaniya. Ang Pagmamahal sakamatuwid, ay isang pag

uugali ng tao sa iba na nagpapataas ng kaniyang halaga at pagmumura ay pagpapababa nito.¹⁹

Nauunawan ang paggawa ng pagmamahal na sinasabi ni Hornedo mula sa halimbawa ng pag iingat ng mga bagay-bagay. Ito ay ini-ingatan upang hindi mawalan ng halaga, bagkus katulad ng mga magulang nag napapalaki ng kanilang anak ay kanilang sinusuportahan nang sila ay lumalaki bilang mabuti tao. Sila ay pinapaaral at pinapakain upang magawa iyon at ang gawaing iyon ay sumasalamin sa pagmamahal na nagpapataas ng halaga at ini-ingatan na hindi mawalan ng halaga.

Ngunit ang pagmamahal ng magulang ay importanteng suporta lamang ng anak. Ang anak na siyang pinalaki ay nabigyan ng mga oportunidad ng kaniyang mga magulang upang lumago bilang tao at mula sa oportunidad nito ay siyang lumaki na nagpapahiwatig ng kaniyang pagkatao dulot ng kaniyang pagtra-trabaho mula sa mga oportunidad. Katulad ng isang anak na pinalaki na upang maging manggagamot ay siyang nagsikap upang maabot ang kaniyang pangarap.²⁰ Ang penomenolohikal na aspeto ng pagmamahal ay nakikita sa paggawa ng pagmamahal ng taong nagmamahal sa kaniyang minamahal nang dahil siya ay tinuturing na mahalaga. Dala ng pagmamahal niya sa kaniyang minamahal ay kaniyang pinapataas ang halaga niya at pinapanatili ang halaga nito.

Nilahad ni Hornedo na kung may pagpapataas ng halaga na pagmamahal ay mayroon ding kabaliktaran na kung saan ang halaga ay pinapababa o Pagmumura. Katulad ng paggamit ng salitang “Mora” na sinulat ni

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

Fray Oliver, ang pagmumura ay ginamit upang mai-pang walang halaga ang Diyos sa pag insulto sa Kaniya na tinuturing pinakamatinding kasalanan. Bagkus, ang Pagmumura sa kasalukuyan ay nakikita sa ugali ng mga taong minamaliit ang kaniyang kapwa sa pamamagitan ng mga insulto o kaya sa kanilang ginagawa sa kanila.²¹

Ihinambing din ni Hornedo ang Pagmamahal sa iba't ibang birtud na sumasalamin sa kultura ng Pilipino katulad ng Katapatan, Pagkamagalang, at iba pa.²² Tinukoy ni Hornedo ang Katapatan bilang *single-mindedness* na kung ito ay ihahambing sa etika ni Soren Kierkegaard na *Purity of Heart* na “*to will one thing*”, bagkus, ang layunin lamang ng matapat na pagmamahal ay ang pagpapahalaga sa minamahal at patuloy na pataasin ang halaga nito at wala itong bahid ng iba pang mga intensiyon sa paggawa ng pagmamahal sa kapwa. Ang Pagkamagalang na tinutukoy dito ang pagkakaroon ng pagkilala sa halaga ng kaniyang kapwa at ang pagbibigay ng kalayaan sa kaniya na maipahiwatig ang kaniyang pagkatao.²³

Samakatuwid, ang Pagmamahal ay ang pagkilala sa halaga ng kaniyang kapwa at ang pag uugali ng kaniyang patuloy na pagtaas sa halaga nito. Nakikita sa ang paggawa ng Pagmamahal sa pagkilala ng halaga ng kaniyang minamahal, ang pagtaas ng halaga ng kaniyang minamahal sa kadahilanang siya ay karapat-dapat sa pagtanggap ng pagmamahal. Ang Pagmumura naman ay ang kahit anong gawaing pagpapababa sa halaga ng kaniyang kapwa at

ang pagtanggap sa pagkilala at pagbigay ng galang sa halaga ng kaniyang kapwa.

PAGPAPAKATAO

Sa parte ng pagsusuri na ito ay ang paglalahad ng sanaysay ni Hornedo patungkol sa kaniyang teorya sa katauhan ng tao. Sa kaniyang isinulat na Pagpapakatao, nilahad niya ang duwalistang kabuohan ng tao na katawan at ispirito dulot ng pananaw ni Descartes.²⁴ Dito nilahad ni Hornedo ang kahalagahan ng katawan na sinasabing materyal na bagay na siyang sumasalamin sa realidad ng walang kahalagahan ng katawan na siyang pinagpapatawan ng karahasan. Sa kabila na ang katawan ay sinasabing nakakasagabal sa pag-iisip ng tao, kinakailangan ang ispiritu ng tao upang maisupil ito upang maipaunlad ang personalidad sa pagpapalago nito. Ang pagpapahalaga sa katawan na tinutukoy ni Hornedo ay ang wastong pagpapahalaga nito dahil ito ay tinuring kasangkapan sa pagkatao ng tao. Mapapansin na hindi madaling makapag-isip at gumawa ng kahit ano mang bagay kung ang katawan ay hindi naaalagaan, bagkus kung ang katawan ay hindi pinahalagahan ay siya ring sumasalamin sa kulang na pagpapahalaga sa pagkatao ng tao.²⁵

Mula sa duwalismo ni Descartes ay binigyan ng diin ni Hornedo ang ispirito sa pamamagitan ng pagkakaroon ng kamalayan ang tao. Ang Kamalayan na tinutukoy ni Hornedo dito ay ang kaniyang pag lalahad ng Penomenolohiya ni Husserl na “*Consciousness*” na kaniyang isinalin sa wikang Filipino. Ang

²¹ *Ibid.*, 153.

²² Pinili ng tagasuri na ipaliwanag ang ilang birtud na naaayon sa paksa ng papel.

²³ *Ibid.*, 155-157.

²⁴ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagpapakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas*, (2002, University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, Manila), 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

Kamalayan ay binubuo ng pagkakaroon ng Malay-tao at ang Nilalaman ng Malay-tao kung saan ipinapahiwatig ang realidad ng pagkakaroon ng kamalayan ng tao ay dahil mayroon siyang namamalayan. Tila, ito ay parang laro na walang kairalan kung walang naglalaro ayon kay Hornedo. Bagkus ang kamalayan ay siyang uhaw sa kaniyang namamalayan na kasing tulad ng taong uhaw din sa kaalaman. Bagkus, ang pagkakaroon ng kamalayan ay nagpapayaman sa kahulugan ng pagkatao ng tao.²⁶

Ang pagkakaroon ng Kamalayan ay mayroong dalawang antas na ang *kamalayang patungkol sa bagay* na sumasagot sa tanong na “ano?” at ang *kamalayan tungkol sa kabuluhan* sa tumutugon sa tanong na “sino ka?” at “Ano ka?” patungkol sa pagkatao o ang kabuluhan nito. Ang pagkakaroon ng katawan na sa kabila ng pagkakulang ng mga parte nito ay hindi nakakabawas sa personalidad ng tao. Ngunit, kung ang katawan ng tao ay iisa sa kaniyang personalidad, ang pagpapahalaga sa katawan ng ibang tao ay siya ring pagpapahalaga ng pagkatao nito. Bagkus, kung ang binastos ang katawan ng ibang tao ay siya ring kabastusan sa kaniyang pagkatao katulad na lamang ng panggagahasa na hindi lamang pagkakasala sa katawan ng kaniyang kapwa kundi pati ang kaniyang pagkatao. At dahil sa Kamalayan ay nag-iisa sa Katawan, ang Katawan ay tinuturing taga pamagitan ng kalooban ng isang tao patungo sa daigdig. Ang Katawan ay nagsisilbing isang materyal na bagay na namamalayan ng iba na nagpapatunay ng kaniyang presensiya at sa pamamagitan nito ay

nailalahad niya ang kaniyang mga saloobin at pagmamahal sa iba.²⁷

Dahil sa pagkakaroon ng katawan ng tao, may kakayahan siyang gumawa ng pagbabago sa kaniyang kapaligiran mula sa kaniyang kalooban. Dahil nabanggit ang duwalismong kabuohan ng tao, ginamit ni Hornedo ang Kalooban na bilang katumbas ng “*Subjectivity*” na kaniyang ipinaliwanag sa pamamagitan ng metapora ni Propesor Cuvar na “Palayok” kung saan mayroon labas at loob ang isang tao.²⁸ Ang kaniyang ginagawa na mula sa kaniyang kalooban ay nakapaloob sa panahon sa mundo na may simula, katapusan at may puno’t dulo. Bagkus, ang tao ay malikhain ng isang proyekto na naaayon sa kaniyang kalooban, may kakayahang lumikha ng kaniyang kasaysayan na bumubuo ng kahulugan. Dahil dito, mahalaga para sa tao ang paggawa o “*work*” na siyang lumilikha ng kaniyang kasaysayan na tumutugon sa kaniyang pangangailangan. Ang kaniyang paggawa ay sumasalamin sa kaniyang pagkatao na siyang katangiang kakaiba sa hayop dahil sa kakayahang makapagmuni-muni at makilala ang sarili sa paggawa.²⁹ Ayon kay Fleurdeliz Altez-Albela, nasa pamamagitan ng paggawa ay makikita ang halaga ng isang tao na kumikilala sa pagkatao niya at kaniyang pinapamalas sa iba.³⁰ Dahil sa halaga na mula sa paggawa, pumapasok ang Pagmamahal na siyang kumikilala sa halaga ng tao para sa patuloy na paglago ng kaniyang kahalagahan at pagkatao.

Mula sa Kamalayan ng tao na kaniyang ginagamit upang linangin ang kaniyang

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

²⁷ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagpapakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas* 3-4

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

³⁰ Fleurdeliz Altez-Albela, *Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought: Florentino H. Hornedo's Philosophical Anthropology*, 64.

kalayaan, at pagmamahal. Katulad ng kaniyang unang naisulat sa *The Power to Be*, ang Freedom na isinalin ni Hornedo bilang Kalayaan ay tinuturing nagpapalakas sa tao at ginagamit ito upang maipalakas ang iba, nagbibigay ng kakayahan. Ang pagpapalakas sa kaniyang kapawa ay kaniyang pakikiugnay (*relatedness*) sa iba sa kaniyang pagpapalaganap ng kaniyang Kalayaan.³¹ Ang Pagmamahal ay katulad rin ng kaniyang sinulat sa *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura* na gawaing nanggaling mula sa kalooban para sa ganap na ikabubuti niya na ang layunin ng pagmamahal ay ang pagkamit ng minamahal ang kaniyang mga pangarap at tagumpay sa buhay.³² Mula sa halimbawa ni Hornedo patungkol sa anak na sumikap bilang manggagamot dahil sa tulong ng kaniyang mga magulang ay pagpapakita ng kaniyang pagmamahal na nagpapalakas at para sa ganap na ikabubuti.³³ Ito rin ay pagbibigay galang ng mga magulang sa anak na siyang pumili ng landas na kaniyang tinahak.

Mayroong responsibilidad na binigyan diin ni Hornedo na tumutukoy sa sensibilidad ng tao na tumugon at makiramdam sa pangangailangan ng kapwa. Ang tao ay mayroong kamalayan patungkol sa kaniyang Kalayaan³⁴ at dahil dito, ang pagtugon nito ay nakabatay sa kaniyang Kalayaan na siyang may kakayahan upang pagtugunan ang kaniyang kapwa.³⁵ Ang *Personhood* mula sa Freedom ni Hornedo ay tumutukoy sa pagiging responsable sa kaniyang mga

gawain.³⁶ Samakatuwid, ang pagiging tao ay ang pagkakaroon ng kalayaang maging responsible sa kapwa.

KONKLUSIYON: ANG KAYARIAN NG TAONG NAGMAMAHAL

Bilang paglalagom ng papel na ito, mauunawaan ng mambabasa na ang kabuohan ng tao mula sa katawan at kamalayan. Kalakip ng kamalayan ang Kalayaan na kaniyang namamalayan ang pagkataglay ng nito na siyang nagpapalakas kaniya upang siya'y makagawa ng kaniyang pagkatao. Ang pagsaggawa ng Pagmamahal ay nakabatay sa Kalayaang nagpalakas sa tao at makikita lamang ang pagsaggawa nito kung ang tao ay mayroong katawang nakalantad sa mundo upang makisalamuha sa iba samakatuwid, nagiging ang Kalayaan ay nagiging etikal. Ang makataong responsibilidad ay maihahabi sa Pagmamahal na nagbibigay daan upang magkaroon ng ugnayan sa kaniyang kapwa na upang makilala ang kaniyang sa halaga upang maipataas ito. Ang kaniyang pagkatao ay siyang maglalantad ng kaniyang halaga sa pamamagitan ng kaniyang pagtrabaho. Nasa pamamagitan ng Pagmamahal ay mauunawaan ng tao ang kaniyang halaga at kaniya ring magagawang pataasin ang halaga ng pagkatao ng iba na sila ring nililina ang sarili. Bagkus, ang isa ay nagiging tao sa Pagmamahal at ang Pagmamahal ay nagpapakatao sa tao.

³¹ Florentino Hornedo, *Christian Education: Becoming Person-for-Others: Essays in Philosophy of Education* (1995, UST Publishing House, Manila). P. 35


³² Florentino Hornedo, *Pagpapakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas* P 6-8

³³ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura: Essays*, 152.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



³⁴ Ginamit ni Hornedo ang salitang “Kalayaan” bilang kaniyang pagsalin sa Freedom.

³⁵ Florentino Hornedo, *Pagpapakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas*, 7.

³⁶ Hornedo Florentino Hornedo *The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom*, 94.

Nasa pagtatagpi ng mga sinulat ni Hornedo makikita ang kaniyang patuloy na pagpapahalaga sa pagpapakatao ng tao. Ang isang katangi-tanging pananaw ni Hornedo patungkol sa paksa ng Filipino Philosophy ay hindi lamang siya nakasalalay sa pinagmulan ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino, kundi pinaghabi niya ang iba't ibang disiplina ng agham pantao at agham panlipunan upang mamilosopiya. Nasa pagsasalamin ng kultura, panitikan at

kasaysayan ay siyang nagpapatibay sa pilosopiya ni Hornedo sa kaniyang pagsusuri.³⁷ Ang istilo ni Hornedo patungkol sa Pilosopiya ay kaniyang pinapababa ang antas ng diskurso nito sa paguugnay nito sa ibang disiplina upang maunawaan ng karamihan na dapat maging layunin ng pilosopiya sa kasalukuyang panahon.

³⁷ Roland Theuas Pada, *The Methodological Problems of Filipino Philosophy*, Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 8, No.1 (June 2014) p 38

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Altez-Albela, Fleurdeliz. 2016. "Phenomenologizing Filipino Organic Thought: Florentino H. Hornedo's Philosophical Anthropology." *Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy* 61-67.
- Hornedo, Florentino. 1995. *Christian Education: Becoming Person-for-Others: Essays in Philosophy of Education*. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House.
- . 2002. *Pagkakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas*. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House.
- . 1977. *Pagmamahal at Pagmumura: Essays*. Quezon City: Office of Research and Publication, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University.
- . 2000. *The Power to Be: A Phenomenology of Freedom*. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House.
- Pada, Roland Theaus DS. 2015. "The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities." *Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy* 9 (2): 1-4.
- Pada, Roland Theaus DS. 2014. "The Methodological Problems of Filipino Philosophy." *Kritike Online Journal of Philosophy* 8 (1): 24-44.

Michel Foucault's Gaze and Panopticism on Facebook-Shaming Posts

Maria Noelle V. Motril

University of Santo Tomas | noellemotril@gmail.com

Abstract: The emergence of social media platforms has brought about various changes in humankind's lived worlds. These platforms have changed the ways we connect and interact with each other, and along with it, changes in the spread of information. The modern tangible world as we know it has become technologically dependent - breeding about new cultures and sub-cultures, trends, and even crimes and forms of punishments. In the Philippine context, Facebook has become a platform not only for reconnecting with friends or kin, or for sharing updates of one's life, but also as a form of surveillance "body" – the body of the condemned criminal. Cases of robbery and/or theft, sexual harassment, and boisterous arguments (among others) in public have been uploaded by various individuals who claim to be "performing their duties" to raise awareness as "concerned citizens." Regardless of whether the uploaded incident (that is the content of the shaming post) has been verified or taken out of context, the power relations between the offended party (original uploader of the shaming post) and the individual causing offense, however overlooked, is evident. These posts would become "viral" and reach thousands of audiences, and would sometimes even garner national attention. I argue that online shaming on Facebook has become a part of our lived worlds, because Facebook users encounter these shaming posts, or have even been uploaders of the said content, as well. This phenomenon of Facebook-shaming has become normalized. It is discernible in Facebook-shaming that postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault's (1926 - 1984) Gaze and Panopticism manifest in daily human life, whether individuals are aware of its manifestations or these manifestations are merely dismissed as normalcy. Although Foucault's application of Panopticism was for surveillance and for analyzing disciplinary power in prisons (among others), I argue that Panopticism has taken a new form – that of online shaming in social media. Hence the primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate - through an interview with a respondent - how Foucault's power relations transpire within the communicative space of the shaming posts, and the ways in which Panopticism on Facebook is reproduced.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, Facebook Shaming, The Gaze, Panopticism

“I don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning.” – *Michel Foucault*

This paper touches on two disciplines - Philosophy and Communication and Media Studies. It is interesting to note the ways in which people interact within the communicative sphere on Facebook. It is even more interesting when one analyzes Facebook’s communicative sphere under a philosophical lens. We shall first explore a brief history of online shaming, as well as backgrounds of social networking and social media.

Online shaming stems from the history of public shaming as a means of criminal punishment.¹ Public shaming was utilized as a popular means of punishment during the early and colonial periods of America. The popularity of public shaming as a criminal punishment contributed to its success and effectiveness as a means of criminal sanction. A factor that also contributed to its effectiveness is that societies from the said era were close-knit, making the spread of information easier. This resulted in the ridicule and/or alienation of the individual who has caused an offense or a crime. The criminal sanction was successful because public shaming has brought about exposure and community disapproval, stemming fear among individuals. Cost effectiveness is also taken into account, as it was more expensive to punish criminals by imprisonment than it is to publicly humiliate them. Lastly, the

amalgamation of religion and law in communities resulted in the negative views on criminals.

The impact of Social Networking websites has been influential in our life worlds. Individuals from different nations are now able to communicate with just one click of an application. The spread and exchange of information has become much easier, a feat and innovation that rattled the whole world with its convenience. However, with the birth of social media sites, new cultures and spaces have materialized. Individuals may now join online groups to connect with like-minded people who share the same interests; on an iniquitous utilization of the Internet, the “Deep Web” has brought about a “community” of smugglers, pedophiles, and has become a space for human trafficking; and Facebook’s advertising and marketing space has brought about profit and exchange, at the same time, theft and scam. Indeed, one may look at the dawn of the Social Media Era as a double – edged sword.

Facebook, being one of the most popular Social Networking sites, with a total of 1.86 billion active users as of recent,² has become a widely used platform for interaction with a broad array of audience. It is through these platforms that the use of public shaming has materialized, more commonly referred to as “online shaming.” The targets of this kind of punishment are not exclusively directed to criminals, but also to individuals who have violated another’s beliefs or who have deviated from societal norms. Oftentimes, the

¹ Lauren Goldman, “Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in Public Shaming Punishments,” *American Criminal Law Review*, 2015.

² Zephoria Digital Marketing. 2017. <https://zephoria.com/>.

individuals being shamed have no prior knowledge that his/her personal information is shared through social media platforms, as a means of punishing the individual for his/her actions of alleged wrongdoings. Regardless of whether the acts of the individual have been verified or not, Michel Foucault's Gaze/power relations and Panopticism is evident in the Facebook "community."³

I will be focusing on the manifestations of Panopticism between the offended party (the uploader of the Facebook-shaming post) and the individual who has caused offense (the subject of the shaming post). It should be noted that I would not include the operations of the Gaze/Power Relations and Panopticism on the audiences of the shaming post. While the discourse in the comments section of the shaming posts on Facebook would convey messages of sympathy for the offended party and even more chastising for the subject of the shaming post, focusing on the audiences'/commenters' reactions and comments on the said Facebook-shaming post would require a different approach on the research topic and a more in-depth study.

The primary purpose of this paper is to explain how The Gaze and Panopticism is manifested and reproduced in these Facebook-shaming posts. I will be discussing the said concepts and theories, as well as presenting the data I have gathered from an interview with a respondent for this study.

³ Collectively referring to social media users as a "community" is still up for debate as of date. Readers may refer to this link as an example: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Crzn4sxhzhk>.

⁴ Non – verbatim.

MICHEL FOUCAULT'S PANOPTICISM WITH THE GAZE/POWER RELATIONS AS ITS BACKBONE


"Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or 'anatomy' of power, a technology." – *Michel Foucault*.

I may deviate from Michel Foucault's "older" definition of Panopticism, specifically with his application of Panopticism in prison, and the comparison of prison environment and school environment (I am referring to his famous statement which gist is, "Schools are like prisons"⁴). However, I will discuss these concepts briefly for the reader to have a background on what Foucault meant by Panopticism.

English philosopher Jeremy Bentham first proposed the Panopticon in the late eighteenth century. He described it as a circular building with, "the prisoners in their cells, occupying the circumference – The officers in the center. By blinds and other contrivances, the Inspectors concealed... from the observation of the prisoners: hence the sentiment of a sort of omnipresence – The whole circuit reviewable with little, or... without any, change of place. One station in the inspection part affording the most perfect view of every cell."⁵

⁵ Bentham, Jeremy. *Proposal for a New and Less Expensive Mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts*. London, 1798. Accessed July 2018. <https://www.utilitarianism.com/panopticon.html>.

Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon penitentiary by Willey Reveley, 1791.⁶



With Foucault, Panopticism is the surveillance “body,” as described in his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, published in 1975. Panopticism analyzes the disciplinary power/s of “punishment, proto – psychiatry, criminology and race war,” and “Foucault attempted to articulate disciplinary power in contradistinction to sovereign power.”⁷ Michel Foucault narrates in his book, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, the security measures taken when a plague befell a town in the seventeenth century, according to a town order.⁸ As an illustration of Panopticism, a brief narrative, some of it quoted, on the security measures taken by the said town and the manifestations of Panopticism are as follows:

Firstly, a strict “spatial partitioning” was implemented: “the closing of a town and its outlying districts, a

prohibition to leave the town on pain of death, the killing of stray animals; the division of the town into distinct quarters, each governed by an intendant. Each street is placed under the authority of a syndic, who keeps it under surveillance; if he leaves the street, he will be condemned to death... Each family will have made its own provisions; but for bread and wine, small wooden canals are set up between the street and the interior of the houses, thus allowing each person to receive his ration without communicating with the suppliers and other residents... If it is absolutely necessary to leave the house, it will be done in turn, avoiding any meeting... Only the intendants, syndics and guards will move about the streets... It is a segmented, immobile, frozen place. Each individual is fixed in his place.⁹

In its original Foucauldian definition, Panopticism is therefore, an apparatus of control to impose discipline on various individuals. In Foucault’s conceptualization and when Foucauldian academics and thinkers write about Panopticism, it is usually applied in the context of the law, politics, government, and other authorities. However, I argue that all aspects of our lives are already considered politics in themselves; as well as sub-lived worlds in our lived worlds exist in the sphere

⁶ Tait, W. *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*. Vol. IV. 172-3. 1843. PDF.

⁷ Dianna Taylor. *Michel Foucault Key Concepts*. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011. p. 27.

⁸ Michel Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. First English ed. New York City, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. p. 195.

⁹ *Ibid.*

of politics.¹⁰ Thus, we are all subjected to manifestations of Panopticism at any time and in any place. Presently, “mass surveillance has become a norm in developed countries, through both the proliferation of overt measures like security cameras but also more subtle and invasive means like data trawling, wherein governments, corporations and other powerful entities are able to comb through large volumes of data on specific people or larger demographics in order to gather information on them and exert control over them.”¹¹ More examples of these manifestations of Panopticism may be in the form of synchronized activities for a certain group of individuals (for instance, lunch breaks or recess in schools that are given at the same time for all students), parents and teachers observing a child’s performance and behavior in school and in home, or even the act of allowing one’s romantic partner access to private messages on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram when dubious of the other’s activities. Those are some of the few examples of the manifestation of Panopticism in our own lives, which we have oftentimes regarded as simply part of routine or the status quo.

Foucault, in the same book (*Discipline and Punish*), proceeds to add in the narrative “the gaze alert is everywhere.” I hypothesize that surveillance bodies have become normalized in modern times: the omnipresent

use of close – circuit televisions (CCTVs) in both private and public establishments (such as homes, neighborhood streets, schools, businesses), and rules and regulations imposed by institutions, to name a few of its manifestations. In addition to that, I also hypothesize that a new emergence of a platform for Panopticism is evident – the use of social media sites. Online shaming posts, specifically those on Facebook, are a display of modern Panopticism, as they raise “the gaze alert” by monitoring and chastising individuals who have committed an offense or who deviate from societal norms. Panopticism will help the researcher in determining how Facebook, as a “surveillance”¹² body, helps to replicate the “gaze alert” that is occurring in the tangible world into the “online world.”

This paper will explore how Michel Foucault’s Panopticism is manifested and reproduced in Facebook-shaming posts – the discourse dynamic between the “criminally condemned”¹³ and the offended individual/s. The objectives of this study will mainly focus on the power relations and panoptics that manifest in the Facebook-shaming posts. I include Foucault’s power relations, as it is almost inseparable with Panopticism under the Foucauldian lens.

In its most basic definition, to “gaze” is to “look steadily, intently, and with fixed

¹⁰ I am arguing that everything that comprises our lived worlds in this tangible life is already politics itself.

¹¹ Sheridan, Connor. *Foucault, Power, and the Modern Panopticon*. Master's thesis, Trinity College, Spring 2016. Connecticut: Trinity College Digital Repository, 2016. 1-89. <https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1564&context=theses>.

¹² I am implying that Facebook has become a platform for surveillance, functioning similarly to close – circuit televisions (CCTVs) for monitoring purposes.

¹³ The term “criminally condemned” does not necessarily pertain to individuals who have violated laws. For this paper, I have taken the liberty to define “the criminally condemned” as individuals (the subject of the Facebook-shaming posts/the person being shamed) who have deviated from societal norms or who have caused offense.

attention.”¹⁴ However, this research paper will explore the postmodern and more philosophical definition of “gaze” using Michel Foucault’s concept. The Gaze, in Foucault’s terms, is not something that one uses, but is a relationship into which someone enters. Quoting Foucault in an interview, “It’s clear that power should not be defined as a constraining act of violence that represses individuals, forcing them to do something or preventing them from doing some other thing. But it takes place when there is a relation between two free subjects, and this relation is unbalanced, so that one can act upon the other, and the other is acted upon, or allows himself to be acted upon.”¹⁵ Readers may refer to the Appendix for my interview with a respondent for this study to be able to fully grasp the Gaze/power relations between the “criminally condemned” and the offended party in Facebook-shaming posts. It should be noted that there are specific questions in the Appendix that narrates how the respondent perceives the criminally condemned after the latter has caused offense, which comprises of The Gaze.

Foucault emphasizes that freedom plays an integral role in the power relations dynamic. By his use of the phrase, “allows himself to be acted upon,” it is clear that individuals within the power relations dynamic

both participate in the discourse of power through conversation and the circumstances that they are in. In our own lived worlds, we may not be consciously aware of the power relations we partake in, for these exchanges and relationships have been normalized, among other reasons. Power is “always there.” I argue that while we participate in power relations through our daily conversational exchanges¹⁶, many individuals are merely forced to enter into in causing unbalanced power relations. This is evident in cases of abuse, as an example. Clearly, in some cases, there is the *oppressed* and the *oppressor*. Such as in the objective of this paper, the original uploaders¹⁷ of the Facebook-shaming post may have felt oppressed by the subject¹⁸ of the shaming post.

Power/Knowledge is a work by Michel Foucault that contains his interviews (interviewed by various interviewers) and other writings. As a primary source, this work will reinforce the power relations that occur in a modern and “new” platform – social media, particularly, Facebook. Although considered a somewhat distorted view on power, I will be focusing on Michael Foucault’s writing on Power’s manifestation in “the pure form of “Thou shalt not.”” For a brief explanation of Power as “Thou shall not,” Foucault himself has stated that reducing power into the “love of the master” is problematic.¹⁹ Power as “love

¹⁴ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “Gaze,” definition 1.

¹⁵ “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual.” Interview by Michael Bess. Michaelbess.org. (Michael Bess’ interview with Foucault was conducted on 3 November 1980 at the University of California, Berkeley.)

¹⁶ I have made use of daily conversation as an example through which we enter into power relations, as it is the most instinctive and obvious application of the Gaze and Power.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



¹⁷ The “original uploaders” will henceforth be referred to as “**Victim.**” This is following the logic that these individuals would not be narrating a Facebook-shaming post without a violation of their person or property.

¹⁸ The “*subject*” of the post will henceforth be referred to as “**Criminal.**” This is following the logic that these individuals would not be shamed on Facebook without them causing offense.

¹⁹ Michel Foucault. *Power/Knowledge*. 1972 ed. Worcester: The Harvester Press Limited, 1980. p. 139

of the master” has caused Power to be reducible to the law. This then breeds new problematic roles, one of which “enables power to be never thought of in other than negative terms: refusal, limitation, obstruction, censorship.”²⁰ Despite discouragement from Foucault himself on the reducibility of Power as a form of “Thou Shall Not,” I hypothesize that the “prohibition” aspect of power is partly what drives the uploaders of the viral Facebook shaming posts to act on a violation of their person or another person committed by an individual through online shaming. “Thou Shall Not” or the “prohibition” aspect of power is almost always evident in these shaming posts. It usually manifests itself in the captions written by the Victims that go along the lines of, “Person X should not be doing Y.” Foucault himself states, power is “‘always already there,’ that one is never ‘outside’ it, that there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system to gambol in.”²¹ In short, Power is omnipresent. It is this definition of Power that fortifies the Panoptics that is manifested in these shaming posts. The Victim’s posts on the Criminal – which almost always includes the Criminal’s name along with his/her photo or video clip – warns others of these individuals, with a chastising caption that can be summarized to, “One should not be behaving the way the Criminal did,” as stated above. Foucault’s statements on power will strengthen this research on the manifestations of The Gaze, Panopticism, and power relations in Facebook-shaming posts. I will further discuss the other concepts and narratives of Michel Foucault in the coming chapters and as the research progresses.

By combining The Gaze and Panopticism by Michel Foucault, the researcher will be able to use these concepts in applying Postmodern philosophical theories in social media, particularly through Facebook-shaming, a research area that is modern and relevant.

THE MANIFESTATION OF PANOPTICISM ON THE RESPONDENT’S FACEBOOK-SHAMING POST THROUGH AN INTERVIEW

“Knowledge doesn't really form part of human nature. Conflict, combat, the outcome of the combat, and, consequently, risk and chance are what gives rise to knowledge. Knowledge is not instinctive; it is counter instinctive, just as it is not natural but counter natural.” – *Michel Foucault*.

I intended to interview three respondents who are Victims.²² My categories for selected and interviewing Victims are as follows:

- The Victim (the original uploader) must have posted a photo and/or a video clip of a person in the act of causing offense/s, regardless of their relationship, with a purpose to publicly shame the individual. In the absence of a photo and/or a video clip, the Criminal (the person being shamed²³) must be named in the shaming post.
- The Criminal’s actions must be perceived as something that has violated a certain social norm or law.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 195.

²³ *Ibid.*

- The privacy settings of the post must be made Public and has at least one hundred (100) likes or other Facebook “reactions”²⁴, one hundred (100) shares and comments condemning the Criminal.
- The incident that has caused the Victim to shame the Criminal must have occurred within Metro Manila.²⁵

However, at the time of writing, I was only able to interview one respondent so far. After much research, I was able to correspond with **VINZ**. Vinz is an officer in Anakbayan Manila. For its background, Anakbayan is a leftist mass organization in the Philippines, whose main demographic is Filipino youths from the ages of thirteen (13) to thirty – five (35) years old. Anakbayan “holds the belief that Philippine society today is not truly free nor democratic. It is under the control of U.S imperialism, along with local landlords, big capitalists, and corrupt government officials.”²⁶ Vinz was recruited on 2013 and has since been part of mass protests and other various mobilizations across Metro Manila and Luzon.

For this study, I have chosen Vinz’s viral Facebook-shaming post dated 20 October 2016. The status he posted was his narrative of the US Embassy 2016 incident, where a certain police officer purposely ran over student – activists and Lumads, just as they were about to disperse after a major protest. I have recorded the interview using my smartphone,

however, the interview transcript will not be provided due to time constraints at the time of the writing. I will provide the interview questions with Vinz’s responses, and will narrate what transpired in the US Embassy 2016 incident with Vinz as my first-hand source.²⁷

On 19 October 2016, various activist groups such as Anakbayan (which Vinz is a member of) and the League of Filipino Students, among others, were organized for a major protest at the US Embassy located at Roxas Boulevard, Ermita, Manila. With them, were Lumads coming from various places in the country.²⁸ The prominent leftists groups and the Lumads were gathered at the US Embassy to protest against capitalism, US imperialism, and the destruction of the Lumads’ ancestral lands to provide space for foreign companies, among others. Vinz, being a bonafide member of Anakbayan, was present in the said protest/action. During the mobilization, various members of the leftists groups gave speeches; the Lumads narrated how they were forced to flee their ancestral lands to provide space and resources for foreign companies; and both the Lumads and the activists participated in cultural movements, where many of them gave performances.²⁹ The police, in Vinz’s narrative, was not particularly antagonistic towards them. According to Vinz, the neutral and civil correspondence among the activists and the police was the status quo, as he even

²⁴ Aside from “Likes,” the other Facebook reactions are “Haha,” “Love,” “Wow,” “Sad,” and “Angry.”

²⁵ This is to emphasize that this research is conducted under the lens of the Philippine society.

²⁶ “About.” Anakbayan. Accessed January 20, 2018. <http://www.anakbayan.org>.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



²⁷ Please refer to the Appendix.

²⁸ The Lakbayan was also being held on October 2016, hence the presence of the Lumad groups in Manila. The Lakbayan occurs annually, usually during the month of October.

²⁹ We collectively refer to these activities as “Program/s.”

stated that some activists and some police officers have maintained friendly relations with each other. As the protesters and the Lumads were about to disperse at the end of the Program, Vinz and other protesters were startled when some police officers were roaming around saying, “*Oh, kung may mangyari*

po, nautusan lang po kami... Trabaho lang po”³⁰ (“In case anything unfortunate happens, we are merely following orders and doing our job”). A few minutes later, a police car started speeding up in the direction of the Lumads and protesters.

Figure 1. A screenshot of the video clip from when PO3 Franklin Kho started running over the protesters and Lumads.³¹



According to my interview with Vinz, PO3 Franklin Kho was the driver of the police car that ran over the protesters and the Lumads. He adds that the incident was clearly intentional, as the Manila police was aware of the fact that the rally was about to be dispersed. The police officers’ “warning” (“*Kung anong mangyari, trabaho lang po.* / If anything unfortunate happens, we are merely following orders”) implies that the incident was planned.

Vinz was nearly run over by the moving police car. He describes that as he watched the moving police car speed closer and closer to him and his other comrades, everything felt surreal. It

³⁰ Non-verbatim, but that is the gist.

³¹ABS-CBN News. "WATCH: Police car runs over protesters after US embassy scuffle." ABS-CBN News. October 19, 2016. Accessed January 20, 2018.

<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/19/16/watch-police-car-runs-over-protesters-after-us-embassy-scuffle>. Updated as of Oct 19 2016 05:21 PM

was fortunate that he had agency, hence, he was able to dodge the moving police car, operated by a raging maniac, as he narrated.

Figure 2. Vinz (encircled in red) nearly run over by the police car driven by PO3 Franklin Kho.



Figure 3. Vinz dodging the police car.



Figure 4. Vinz getting himself to safety.



After the chaos subsided and after Vinz had gotten himself to safety later that night, he browsed through his Facebook Newsfeed and found that the incident was not given much importance at the time. Hence, he decided to “share” a post by Pinoy Weekly (a Facebook page) regarding the incident, as seen on **Figures 5 - 6.**

On 20 October 2016, a day after the US Embassy incident, Vinz decided to post a status narrating what had transpired. It was the first post that he has set to “Public,” intending to reach a wider audience. **Figures 7 – 9** are the screenshots from Vinz’s status.

Figure 5. Pinoy Weekly’s post that Vinz shared after the incident occurred



Figure 6. Pinoy Weekly's caption on the post that Vinz shared on his timeline.



Figure 7. The first part of Vinz's status.




Figure 8. The second part of Vinz's status.

ranks of the police was also of calm. We could hear the same manner of small talk from the police. The atmosphere was so easy that laughs were actually shared between us and the police.

However, as the program drew to a close, we noticed a number of changes in the ranks of the police. For one, the police line has received reinforcements. Two, truncheons were being distributed to the officers opposite us. It was clear then that they were going to push us. In the conduct of protests, this is to be expected and comrades are oriented to steadily withdraw to keep the cohesion of the protest line. By now, the police were repeating lines such as "Ma'am/sir, kapag may nangyari po, nautusan lang po kami ah".

But the development that rang alarm bells was the presence of SWAT teams, black-clad, and armed with long arms - assault rifles. I heard an address from the police to step a bit back. We couldn't, those behind us is yet to budge as the command to withdraw was yet to be given. Not even a minute passed, we heard a command for the police to raise shields. Thus commenced the pushing and shoving that the media loves to capture. We held ground as preparations to withdraw were being completed. A singular bang was heard and I saw a puff of smoke descend on us. It was teargas. I looked to my right and my rear and saw that our lines were broken, people were fleeing. A large gap between us and the police was present.

At the corner of my eye, I saw a speeding vehicle. I turned and saw the subject of yesterday's terror. Events from the numerous videos transpired, and I was eventually pulled to the side. People were fleeing and the police were in hot pursuit. Our small group of four decided to cross Roxas Boulevard to avoid the police. Officers caught on to us, beating us with shields and sticks - while we were running away. We rested at a cafe whose employees were kind enough to dispense care. Police were rushing past us to Kalaw en masse so we rightly decided to head the other way and go back to Plaza Ferguson. From there, we were

Figure 9. The third part of Vinz's status.



While I was conducting the interview with Vinz, he stated that he felt it was his ethical imperative to raise awareness on the issue. Clearly, the Gaze/Power Relations and Panopticism have manifested in this selected Facebook-shaming post. The “gaze alert” was clearly raised, hence, Vinz’s decision to share the Pinoy Weekly’s post and to write a status update narrating the incident. Based on the number of reactions on **Figure 9**, it is clear that Vinz has achieved his goal of informing “netizens” of the injustice. The presence of the unbalanced power relations between Vinz and PO3 Franklin Kho is evident on how Vinz feels, views, and “gazes at” the subject of his Facebook-shaming post.¹

CONCLUSION


The Gaze/Power Relations and Panopticism is clearly evident in this study, specifically in my interview with Vinz. Although I was unable to meet my goal of conducting interviews with three respondents,² I can assume that the two other respondents would also feel that it has become their ethical imperative to warn other individuals of a certain Criminal who has violated the norms or has committed a crime. It should be noted that in this study, Vinz posted the status updates on Facebook on his own imperative. The “prohibition aspect” of Power, as I have hypothesized in the earlier paragraphs, is what also drives Victims such as Vinz, to narrate the incidents with the Criminal on Facebook. The

effect and manifestation of Panopticism on the Facebook-shaming phenomenon in the Philippines is regulatory and normalized. Panopticism regulates people’s behaviors in the tangible life as they driven by the fear of being shamed online. They may now be more mindful of their behavior in the “real world” to avoid being shamed online and becoming viral. Panopticism has normalized the Facebook-shaming phenomenon, as users of the site would frequently encounter the said posts. Vinz, himself, has stated in the questionnaire that he “usually encounters viral shaming posts on Facebook.” One can assume as well that like public shaming in the past (as discussed in the Introduction), cost effectiveness may also be a reason why people nowadays would shame people on Facebook, since it is cheaper than having Criminals imprisoned. Since our society does not practice public shaming as societies from the past have done so (this is thanks to human rights laws), individuals continue to chastise, condemn, and persecute Criminals through the emergence of a (relatively) new platform – Facebook. It is through Facebook that individuals exercise a new Panoptic eye.

¹ Please see the Appendix for Vinz’s responses on the Interview Questions.

² I will still conduct the interviews with the two remaining respondents.

Figure 10. The depiction of power relations that transpire in Facebook-shaming posts.



While this paper does not explore the manifestations of Panopticism from the audience of these Facebook-shaming posts, the power relations that transpire between the Victim and the Criminal is still interesting to note, observe, and study.

It is indeed interesting how the emergence of the World Wide Web and social media platforms have created numerous cultures and sub – cultures. I see much potential in the application of Postmodernism, Post-structuralism, Critical Theory, and other philosophical concepts and theories to social media.

APPENDIX

• VINZ'S RESPONSES TO THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME: Vinz S.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF SHAMING POST: US Embassy 2016

AGE: 23

SEX: Male

CITY OF RESIDENCE: Manila

Disclaimer: All information you provide will remain between the researchers and within the academe. It will not be publicly discussed. In the case of presenting the research, all names will be acronymically presented, as follows: first name, surname initial (ex. Maria Cruz will be presented as Maria C.)

1. Do you usually encounter viral shaming posts on Facebook?

YES

No

Notes: _____

2. What motivated you to upload the said incident on Facebook?

(No answer, but stated reasons in the interview)

3. Do you think that the subject of your post deserves to be chastised online through your post?

YES

No

If yes, why: _____

4. Upon the occurrence of the incident, what were your thoughts on the subject of your post?

I figured that posting about the incident was an absolute imperative. I strongly felt that people had to know about the post's subject and the unique insight I had into the matter.

5. How did you feel upon the occurrence of the incident? (Did you feel that you were powerless and unable to fight back?)

I felt horrified and for a moment the incident was very surreal, impossible even. I had agency, hence my actions during that encounter, but the odds were stacked against me.

6. Did you plan on immediately uploading the said post to Facebook?

No.

7. What made you decide to set the privacy settings of the post to “Public”?

To reach a wider audience.

8. After uploading the post about the incident, what were your thoughts on the subject of your post?

I still render the subject of my post as an absolute dreg to humanity, among the worst specimens our species ever had.

9. What were your thoughts on the subject of the post after the said post has incited reactions from Facebook users?

The rage and indignation regarding the subject and his actions are well – justified but ultimately (a) futile effort towards gaining a sense of justice.

10. Do you encourage people who have experienced similar incidents to post about it on Facebook?

YES

No

Notes: _____

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ABS-CBN News. "WATCH: Police car runs over protesters after US embassy scuffle." ABS-CBN News. October 19, 2016. Accessed January 20, 2018. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/19/16/watch-police-car-runs-over-protesters-after-us-embassy-scuffle>. Updated as of Oct 19 2016 05:21 PM
- Anakbayan. "About." Anakbayan. Accessed January 20, 2018. <http://www.anakbayan.org/about/>.
- Bentham, Jeremy. *Proposal for a New and Less Expensive Mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts*. London, 1798. Accessed July 2018. <https://www.utilitarianism.com/panopticon.html>.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish*. 1977 ed. New York City, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
- Foucault, Michel. *Power/Knowledge*. 1980 ed. Worcester: The Harvester Press Limited, 1980.
- Foucault, Michel. "Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual." Interview by Michael Bess. Michael Bess. michaelbess.org. Michael Bess' interview with Foucault was conducted on 3 November 1980 at the University of California, Berkeley.
- Goldman, Lauren. "Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in Public Shaming Punishments." *American Criminal Law Review*, 2015, 52.
- Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. "Gaze," definition 1.
- Sheridan, Connor. *Foucault, Power, and the Modern Panopticon*. Senior's Theses, Trinity College, Spring 2016. Connecticut: Trinity College Digital Repository, 2016. 1-89. <https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1564&context=theses>.
- Tait, W. *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*. Vol. IV. 172-3. 1843. PDF.
- Taylor, Dianna. *Michel Foucault Key Concepts*. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011.
- Zephoria Digital Marketing. 2017. <https://zephoria.com/>.

The Paradox of God's Divinity in the Context of Jean-Luc Marion and Thomas Aquinas

Ralph Janssen Purugganan

University of Santo Tomas | puruggananralph@gmail

Abstract: This paper aims to present how God, for Jean-Luc Marion, is both related and contrasted with the views of the Thomistic interpretation of His essence. There have been two distinctions of God created by the traditional metaphysics—first, His physical essence and second, His metaphysical essence. In addition, this paper attempts to give an analysis on both philosophical thoughts. The traditional metaphysical interpretation of the existence and essence of God is something that Marion challenges in his book *God Without Being*. Marion attempts to absolutely free God from the reduction of His infinity into a finite being more comprehensible by man. The four theological themes are namely the *distance*, *icon*, *gift*, and the *love*; all of which are interrelated. With the implication of the four themes that Marion proposes, the Thomistic view creates a problem-- through fitting God in man's language, it limits His capability as a higher being knowing that He is even beyond man's determination of such. In addition, Marion also sees that defining God is *limiting the infinite being's capacity* to be. Caging God's being into man's concept is similar to defining what the Supreme is himself, contrary to the fact that man can never know God without Him showing himself to man. It is also definite that the common ground for this comparison is that both agree on the *infinitude* of the Supreme Being. This paper intends to end by demonstrating how Marion's four theological elements are essential in our attempt to further grasp the Supreme.

Keywords: Distance, Icon, God, Marion, Aquinas

Before Aristotle established *Metaphysics*, man has already inquired about the creator of everything. We can thus say that discourses on the divine being have been a classical subject to talk about. Different perspectives arose about the Divine's "beingness". The divine has formed part in different mythological creatures before finally settling

into calling the divine being as "God". Through time, God has become a symbol that man seeks help from in time of his need. God

then, therefore becomes someone's needs according to how He is needed.¹

The problem that Marion observed in this context was that man kept on putting God in definitions that man sees fitting. Marion asserts that God should not be thought of as the conventional classification "Being"², for that decreases God to a very human idea which he calls "Dieu". In a sense, a violence is done to God and our understanding of God, for we delimit that which by nature is indeterminable - God.³ Marion provokes man to think about God not as a being but beyond it.

Both philosophers clash even though both fight for God to be known. Marion claims God as *causa sui*, since He caused being itself, Marion sees God beyond being. Similarly, Aquinas' second proof of God's existence, he describes God as the ultimate cause of reality. However, since Aquinas also argued using *via negativa*, Marion opposes to its use because God's definition therefore becomes ambiguous. Through the use of *via negativa* God becomes vulnerable to be interpreted in vain.

The traditional metaphysics⁴ conceded with the idea that our knowledge of God is limited, Thomas Aquinas recognizes the

difficulties that entails with understanding the divine being.⁵ However this does not necessarily mean we should be evasive about God's being. Thus we, while still recognizing the impossibility of the task, should make ends meet through reconciling what finite beings know about the Supreme.

THE THOMISTIC VIEW OF GOD'S BEING

In Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*, he inquires about the names of God. Similarly with Marion, Aquinas agrees that God is above being named since God's essence is above all that we understand about God. On the contrary, we name God through our natural conception of Him since it is the peak of our natural ability to signify Him. Aquinas therefore uses natural reasoning to argue about God since it is where men are commonly grounded wherefore man can talk about God where both could understand the discourse.

The metaphysical perfection of God talks about the attributes that is distinct from (and beyond) the beings' attributes.⁶ We predicate God with attributes that transcend all his other perfections could be called as the *metaphysical essence* of God. For example we call

¹ For example, Egypt's Sphinx or Nietzsche's *Übermensch* wherein man has become like God.

² God is seen as all-too perfect without knowing the perfection of God himself.

³ Antonio Calcagno, "God and the Caducity of Being: Jean-Luc Marion and Edith Stein on Thinking God," 20th WCP: God and the Caducity of Being: Jean-Luc Marion and Edith Stein on Thinking God., accessed July 29, 2017, <https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliCalc.htm>.

⁴ God can be identified into two properties: the physical essence the metaphysical essence. The former discusses what entails the simple identity that we attribute with God. The latter on the other hand, talks about God as a subsisting being.

⁵ Peter S. Eardley and Carl N. Still, *Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2010), 23-24.

⁶ Henri Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, trans. J. P. E. O'Hanley (Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan's University, 1948), 294.

God as the infinite being, we predicate God with the context that he is beyond quantities and qualities—God encompasses beyond what is comprehensible by the man’s intellect. Such is possible since Aquinas argues corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only since He is incorporeal.⁷

Additionally, the traditional metaphysics would attribute God as an infinite being for we—the creatures are the effects of God⁸. Both are in its physical and metaphysical essence. First, on the physical essence, man describes God as a perfect being, and because of God’s creation, man is formed out of his goodness (thus our being follows as good as well). On the other hand, God is attributed as “infinite”, in its metaphysical essence, all beings God has created acts on God’s effect which is infinite as well—since God’s creations could not be quantified nor comprehended by man’s limited capacity to know.

MARION’S VIEW OF GOD AS WITHOUT BEING

For Jean-Luc Marion, man limits God with what man can comprehend it with. To speak of God in traditional metaphysical language is inadequate to such task.⁹ Furthermore, Marion wants distance for man to recognize the supremacy of God by

accepting God’s transcendence from nature and know that He is subsisting himself. Marion thus, seeks an appropriate metaphysical language for us to use (may it be philosophical or theological). He wanted a language that talks about God in an *iconic* manner instead of *idolatrous*.¹⁰ The philosophy of Marion was deeply concerned with finding God a fit language¹¹; a language that does not negate Him but looks for a new name for God but discover God to His own accord. He sees the problem with the use of analogy as a way of describing God. Since Thomas Aquinas mentioned the use of analogy and proportion¹² as means to know God, Marion aims to do away with the method. Through his four theological themes he has come up with his version to discuss about God—a God free from language understood by man but understood by those who seek to know Him.

Although some of them try to escape metaphysics or reject traditional idols of God, all of them either institute new idols¹³ or do not exceed the old ones sufficiently or successfully. In Marion’s more theological works, he therefore attempts to outline such an overcoming himself by formulating a kind of language about God that would escape metaphysical

⁷ Kevin Knight, "Question 13. The names of God," *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The names of God (Prima Pars, Q. 13)*, 2013., accessed July 30, 2017, <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1013.htm#article 1>.

⁸ Eardley and Still, *Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed*, 25.

⁹ Christina M. Gschwandtner, *Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹² Eardley and Still, *Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed*, 26.

¹³ New idols were that of Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* or Heidegger’s *Dasein*.

constrictions and speak of God more adequately.¹⁴

THE FOUR THEOLOGICAL THEMES OF MARION

Since Marion deals with the refusal of idolatrous descriptions of God thus he came up with the *Icon*. Marion concedes with the idea that there has been a definite essence of God that the metaphysical language has created; however the problem was because of the description, God was limited. The icon that Marion proposes goes beyond *gazing*, it transcends beyond what is just merely a representation. The icon *sees*, moreover the icon invites us to see while it sees us. The icon preserves God's transcendence for it refuses the mirroring function (*gazing*) of the idol.¹⁵ In his example we see that we gaze upon what is in front of us, however it limits its representation and blocks the wholeness of God. Through the icon, we discover the distance between God and man. The distance however is not a bad thing since because of the distance we recognize that we are indeed connected to God.¹⁶ Insofar as the distance is concerned, for Marion, it is necessary since it 'protects the identity of God' as an unfathomable being however it does not limit our capability to take a little step closer to God.¹⁷ The question lies within, if God is therefore distant, how do we know Him?¹⁸

Marion imposes thus of the *Gift*. Remember that God was first described in terms that man could talk about (example would be "goodness, perfection, etc).¹⁹ Since we keep on giving God a label, through *kataphatic*²⁰ way, Marion insists that it was inappropriate. We should also remember that God for Marion is incomprehensible with the ideas [of God] of the human mind alone. Marion poses the idea that through the Gift—we find ourselves. Because of man's attempt to know God, God gave us the gift to identify ourselves. This is the gift. We cannot speak of God, we cannot even comprehend to come close to the distance itself; however the gift makes us know more about ourselves that helps us know a piece about God.²¹ The gift makes the representation of the invisible become visible. A great example of such concept is God's act coming down from his divinity to immerse Himself with the man to save humanity from sin. He humbled himself and faced the life of a finite. God's redemption of humanity from sin is a gift that makes God known; God lets himself comprehensible with man. He puts himself vulnerable with the distance however he lets it be. God is beyond words however God defied it as well by putting God's divinity away and instead, shared God's grace with the humanity. God's nature was to love.²²

¹⁴ Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics, 130.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 132.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 137.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 138.

²⁰ In the words of Dionysian theology, describing God with terms that are all perfect (goodness, powerful, omnipotent).

²¹ Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics, 139.

²² Joseph S. O'Leary, "The Theological Significance of Jean-Luc Marion's Thought," Joseph S.

Thus, in order for us to receive God's gift we have to accept it with *love*. According to Marion, love is the only way we understand the gift of God, it is by which we are able to grasp the abundance [the excess] that the gift of God has brought forth.²³ Love is transcendent among all comprehensible things, such that it is the language appropriate to speak with God of.²⁴ God's love for us is overflowing it is uncontainable. Since love is boundless, it is indeed fit for such to talk about God. Through charity we free God from all metaphysical language of his so-called being.²⁵ Through love, it mediates us to empty oneself for us to be filled with the excess or the gift that God is offering to man.²⁶

We might ask why Marion suggested the name Love or Charity as the name of God? We could imply the famous saying "God is love". According to Marion, Love overcomes being and renders it insignificant.²⁷ Through *love* the distance of God and man is reduced since we experience God through it.

INFINITUDE: THE SIMILARITY

In the traditional metaphysics, God has always been considered as the infinite entity. Through Thomas Aquinas, he brought about the concept of *Via Negativa*, identifying what God is and what God is not reducing, therefore, the quantities that invalidates His perfection. The same thing goes as well with

Marion, he told us of the *saturated phenomena*.²⁸ Both attempted to tackle the impossibility of man to know God. The distinction lies in the middle, the traditional metaphysics talked about God in the words comprehensible for mankind, while Marion gave reasons why we cannot comprehend God's infinitude; he however, proposed a language that both man and God can understand—charity²⁹.

There is still this point that remains for the paradigm of the traditional metaphysics and that is we cannot deny not to use analogy for praising God. In that sense that is how we, humans, acclaim God's perfection so we cannot be not be guilty of it. The problem is will that be part of Marion's argument that we limit God of earthly language? Marion was criticized for that.

While Marion wants to free the divine from restrictions, he actually limits and confines any notion of revelation... The coming of Revelation in fact loses its capacity ever to disturb the discipline—Phenomenology, just because it has become such an apt instrument for describing a God beyond measure, become God's measure.³⁰

The comparison lies again in its common ground however this time it is for the traditional metaphysics. Marion proposed the

O'Leary Homepage, January 7, 2006, accessed December 03, 2016, http://josephsoleary.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/01/the_theological.html.

²³ Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics, 141.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

²⁸ The "excess".

²⁹ "Love".

³⁰ Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics, 153.

idea of God doing away with divinity to share³¹ his gift to us. However, does that mean that the divine essence of God lessens because he stooped down to the level of human beings? Knowing that the Thomistic God is the God of perfection—nothing is impossible. Thus it is right to deny that his divinity or infinitude becomes less since God is God. God can never be the same with our genus even if he sacrificed divinity for us. It only goes to show his infinitude—proving the *impossible*.³²

God is unique (absolutely one) in as much as the divine nature does not admit of any other being similar to itself either in species or in genus. The angelic nature admits of other beings similar to it in genus, but not in species: God alone does not admit of another being similar in genus.³³

Marion also has his take on account for the possibility of impossibility. He concedes that it is true if we speak of God's possibility to do the impossible however man is wrong to say that God is described in a language only man can understand since it limits God's infinite quantity.

Marion therefore argues that God becomes “defined by impossibility as such” and begins where the possible for us ends... For God, nothing is

impossible. Nothing, therefore, can make God impossible.³⁴

GOD'S PERFECTION

We keep on reiterating that God is perfect thus he cannot be spoken of or through human thoughts only, we forget thus of what perfection means.³⁵ For Thomas Aquinas (the side of traditional metaphysics), we just keep on stating the material form that we objectify God with. There is more to God than just the definitions we impose.³⁶ In a way we see that they have the same argument with Marion.

Let us just reiterate that Marion stressed out that no names can be attributed to God but love, he replaced *causa sui*³⁷ with *charity* for the reason that Marion finds it more fitting since love loves without any condition whatsoever. Both philosophers grasped the idea that God is never fitting for any language that we resort to what we can attribute to him even though it may seem as though it is an understatement. The beauty of God lies within what we can speak of, however we should not remain stagnant nor should we be stoic about it just because we cannot find any word fitting for God.³⁸

³¹ In Marion's terms to share is “agape” wherein we participate as well in the gift that God offers us, and we accept the gift through and through with love.

³² Impossible (includes becoming one with the Humans, saving humanity through His death and resurrection) proves of his divine nature since such attribute is only accounted for God alone.

³³ Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, 301.

³⁴ Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics, 159.

³⁵ Ceniza R. Claro and Abulad E. Romualdo, Introduction to Philosophy (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2001), pp. 116-117.

³⁶ Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, 294.

³⁷ “being”.

³⁸ Eardley and Still, Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed, 25.

CONCLUSION

We saw God as someone who caused everything that is why God is relevant. God is necessary since God is the root of every being that affected all its constituents. God was described first by Thomas Aquinas as the *Causa Sui* or being. A being that entails all infinitudes that man describes with God. God for the traditional metaphysics is the God of perfection; the being that has infinite *goodness* that we may acclaim for such.

As time progresses, Marion enters by denying the metaphysical attributes of God. Conceding that God is an infinite being, therefore God must not be limited with the human language. Through his four motifs, he addresses the problem of how are we going to name the iconic God. He first established the distance for man to realize that man is connected with God, through the icon God reveals himself by the use of the Gift. However the Gift that God offers are so much that man cannot confine it ourselves, there enters the fourth motif—love. Love is the container of the saturated phenomena or the excess.

Then Marion concluded that to speak of God we must use his language, charity. Since through charity, we see that God manifests himself “iconically” by showing his infinitude, though uncontainable, we can talk of it for it is subject to understanding God’s knowledge.

Both conformed to the knowledge of incomprehensibility of God’s identity, but the traditional metaphysics attempted to speak of God as being simply because God is the center

of beings thus he is necessary, and we should not be silent about it. For Marion, he attempted to know how to grasp (since he conceded that man’s rationality alone cannot comprehend God’s identity) God’s gift—his identity, the icon.

Metaphysics thus, do not hinder our ability to know something about the divine being. Moreover it helps us to know who we really are—what our identity is as a being. The icon that Marion talks about helps us to know and grasp our identity. Perhaps to know ourselves, we can know more about God knowing that he is the cause of all beings, and we all have ourselves a piece of God.

Metaphysics in its classical sense brings us closer to the study of Beings and its creators but it is also the influence of modern metaphysics through Marion to say that it is the other way around. God brings us closer to itself. It was possible to know and figure out ourselves because metaphysics taught us so.

God’s power is beyond limits; God’s love is beyond our words. God’s divinity, infinitude, his essence are all nothing compared to God’s identity. We only have a piece of God’s attributes, there is more to that than what we know. The important thing here is that we have come to know our roots and our root is Love. An infinite abstract thing that helps us enjoy and share it with other beings that God has provided us with. And for that it is necessary for him to be praised, not with language that we know, but transcend it with other beings so that they may see themselves with the identity of the icon—charity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Calcagno, Antonio. "God and the Caducity of Being: Jean-Luc Marion and Edith Stein on Thinking God." 20th WCP: God and the Caducity of Being: Jean-Luc Marion and Edith Stein on Thinking God. Accessed July 29, 2017. <https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliCalc.htm>.
- Eardley, Peter S. and Still, Carl N. *Aquinas: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum, 2010.
- Grenier, Henri. *Thomistic Philosophy*. Translated by J.P.E. O'Hanley. Vol. II. III. vols. Charlottetown: St. Dunstan's University, 1948
- Gschwandtner, Christina M. *Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
- Knight, Kevin. "Question 13. The names of God." *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The names of God (Prima Pars, Q. 13)*. 2013. Accessed July 30, 2017. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1013.htm#article1>.
- O'Leary, Joseph S. "The Theological Significance of Jean-Luc Marion's Thought". Joseph S. O'Leary Homepage. http://josephsoleary.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/01/the_theological.html (accessed July 16, 2017).

The Contemplative Life and its Practice According to Aquinas

Christian R. Ramos

University Santo Tomas | cc.ramoschristian@gmail.com

Abstract: Thomas Aquinas properly categorizes the diversities of man's life, emphasizing its rational capabilities, in two categories: (1) Contemplative; and (2) Active. Of the two, the former is considered to be the more noble in nature. Wherefore, he lists nine arguments to support his claim, eight citations coming from Aristotle, and the final coming from the Lord Himself. In today's context, the contemplative can be attributed to the terms: "cloistered", "esoteric", or "too-religious", while the latter as "adventurous", "vigorous", or as choosing the "pro-active" life. As such, the new generation of thinkers, who are the few, and thoroughly-accustomed to critical thinking, are naturally inclined to be called "contemplative", while at risk to be given a clear-cut separation to the exterior life. In short, it seems that today's intellectuals are at the verge of being labeled as only occupying the interior life. This paper, as if taking water from an ocean, will faithfully try to shed light on Aquinas' conception of the contemplative and active life, in an attempt also to emphasize the co-dependence of each other rather than its separation. Now, thereof understanding Saint Thomas, the happiness of man is the contemplation of divine essence; but happiness essentially consists in the act of the intellect [contemplative], while accidentally on the act of the will [active]. Therefore, happiness consists in both the object of the two forms of life. Hence, I agree that a proper practice of the intellectual life must not stop in the joy of contemplation, but must needs be participating in the active life to overflow that joy, since also it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself. Finally, here lies the nobility of teaching, a form of an active life, yet more excellent than being merely contemplative – since it is a mixture of both.

Keywords: Aquinas, Practical, Contemplative Life, Active Life,
Happiness

The motivation of this paper rightly follows: (a) to show the co-dependence of contemplation and external action, (b) emphasize the nobility of the mixed life,

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



specifically the profession of teaching, and (c) establish that both ends of the kinds of life are directed to a participation in the life of a charity, as becoming a receiver through

Page | 105

contemplation and a giver through acts of charity. I claim that a proper practice of the intellectual life must not stop in the joy of contemplation, but must needs be participating in the active life – so as to overflow the delight that the intellect has received in possessing the knowledge of truth.

CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND ACTIVE LIFE

St. Thomas Aquinas widely categorizes two forms of human life according to man's intellect. He says that the intellect can be divided for two uses, the first is towards the contemplation of truth – specifically, divine truth, and the latter towards some external action.¹ Among these, the contemplative life is said to be more excellent for nine reasons; of which I will explain three.²

The contemplative life is said to be better since it is that which is most proper to the nature of man i.e. to become rational. In man, all other functions of the body are ordained that he might be able to use his intellect to contemplate.³ Also, the active life is also taken up inasmuch as it is directed to something else, and not for its own sake. Whereas the contemplative life is occupied for its own sake.⁴ Lastly, he attributes the excellence of the contemplative as regards to its object, viz. to divine things, whereas the

active life is merely related towards human things.⁵

However, this is not a clear-cut shunning away from the active life. Since it is taken up in order to dispose man into contemplation.⁶ All other external activities are directed towards the cultivation of the interior life.⁷ The contemplative and active life are actually co-dependent; both are ordained towards reaching happiness, which is man's only end.⁸ There are three reasons regarding the connection of finality and the co-dependence of the two kinds of life: (1) Initially, attention towards the object in which happiness consists is caused not by intelligence, but attention is caused by the act of willing. (2) This corresponds that the will must be fine-tuned to direct external actions that cultivates the interior life and disposes it to attain none other than the chief good of man that is found in contemplation. In short, the active life strengthens the will to attain the fruits of contemplation. But finally, (3) in so far as the act of the intellect possesses the object in which happiness essentially consists, and the delight of happiness, which pertains to the act of the will, only comes accidentally, then all external actions must only be caused inasmuch as it directly pertains towards attaining and practicing the truth. Again, to put it tersely, all desires are only acted upon inasmuch as it is one way or another related towards practicing the fruits of contemplation.⁹ And wherefore

happiness as the final end of man. Aquinas further explains that this happiness must consist in God, which is an eternal happiness. Therefore, that which more properly pertains to the final end of man regarded noble.

⁶ ST., II-II, 182, 3, co.

⁷ But that is not the only case since the soul consists the body and not otherwise. In other words, from the intentions of the heart comes all the other actions. Belief systems affect human acts.

⁸ For Aquinas, the life of man is an *exitus-reditus*. Man is born into the world in order that he might be reunited to his creator when he dies.

⁹ It is good to highlight that the final end of man is none other than “knowing the divine essence” or simply “knowing the truth”. c.f. ST., I, 16, 5, co.

¹ Aquinas, Thomas. 1920. *Summa Theologiae*. Second and Revised Edition. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Accessed July 2017. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa>. II-II, 179, 2., Hereafter will be regarded as “ST” for citation.

² ST., II-II, 182, 1, co., The order consists in the eight, followed by the fifth, and finally the seventh.

³ The rational soul consists the powers of the vegetative or nutritive (nourishment and growth) and sentient (sense and locomotion).

⁴ In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says that the chief good must be loved for its own sake. Such is the case for the contemplative life.

⁵ It must be understood that both Aristotle and Aquinas are teleological – thereafter taking upon

regarding these three reasons, happiness may consist in one kind of life, but more noble in a mixed life.

As to the first reason, Saint Thomas puts it as:

... two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness [viz. perfect knowledge of divine truth]; the other, that is as it were its proper accident. i.e., the delight connected with it.” And, “... the essence of happiness consists in the act of the intellect [he calls intelligence], but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. [will here is used as act of the will – or a desiring, i.e. a movement towards]¹⁰

In more familiar terms, the intellect just “grabs” knowledge, but the movement towards the good and as well as the delight that arises from attaining it comes from the will. Think the claw machine in fun zone. The will are your hands moving the arrow keys and the claw is the intellect. Once the you press the red button, the intellect just grabs the prize. Therefore, knowing and willing are inseparable because happiness consists essentially in the act of the intellect, and accidentally in the act of the will.¹¹ But remember that it was actually your hands which moved the claw, and it will be your hands who will hold the prize. Desire is the efficient cause of knowing.¹² For fundamentally, as Peter Kreeft explains, “it is the will that commands the mind”. It is what directs our attention towards contemplation.¹³ And it is the will that is delighted, for thence is found the appetite. The intellect has no

appetite. Your heart wants the prize, and so the hands are compelled to move. The claw doesn’t have an appetite for the prize – you have. And maybe that’s why the claw machine seems so impossible.

Secondly, the contemplative life is dependent on the active life. This is because the will must be cultivated in order that it may attain which is most proper to it. Hence, the active life is a taming of the “inordinateness of the internal passions” that the mind may as much be undistracted.¹⁴ A strong will corresponds to a tranquil mind. Saint Thomas attributes this to one of the functions of the moral virtues.¹⁵ Growing in justice, temperance, fortitude, and temperance essentially belongs to strengthen external actions, but it also disposes the soul to a peaceful study.

Finally, the active life is as well dependent on the latter because all external actions are caused inasmuch as it practices the truth in which the contemplative life only attains. This is the meaning of what is aforementioned: happiness cannot consist essentially in the will that acts, but only through the act of the intellect - which forms belief systems.¹⁶ Belief takes precedence over delight, that is why delight is accidental. Think comparing an optimists and pessimists. Optimists are happy with the smallest of things because their happiness is brought forth by their happy go lucky philosophy, while pessimists take less delight. Therefore, the act of the intellect is more essential because willing precedes from thought. In other words, happiness is an inside job.

¹⁰ ST., I-II, 3, 4, co., Emphasis mine.

¹¹ ST., I, 79, 7, Ad. 1.

¹² The efficient cause is the agent that moved while the final cause is goal behind its movement. The efficient is concerned with initiation while the latter with termination.

¹³ Kreeft, Peter. 2014. “#200. The Contemplative life”, In *Practical Theology: Spiritual Direction from St. Thomas Aquinas*. San Francisco: Ignatius press, p. 206. Hereafter it shall be regarded as “PT” for citation.

¹⁴ ST., II-II, 182, 3, co.

¹⁵ ST., II-II, 180, 2, co. c.f. I-II, 61, 3, co.

¹⁶ ST., I-II, 3, 4, co.

ABUNDANCE OF THE MIXED LIFE

... that form of **active** life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such life is built on an **abundance** of contemplation, ...¹⁷

Hereafter is established the co-dependence of both kinds of life. The active life strengthens moral virtues as to dispose the passions towards attaining the truth through contemplation; while the contemplative life produces the belief systems from which emerges the external actions that the active life practices. But so as to arrive at a central standpoint, Saint Thomas does not marginalize the attainment of happiness in one kind of life. Instead, he creates the mixed life, his synthesis of both the contemplative and active. This is caused by an “abundance of contemplation” that seeks to communicate itself, and wherefore engages in external actions. This implies, and I strongly agree, that the intellectual cannot stop at merely the act of contemplation, but he must share the fruits of the goodness in which he has been immersed because “it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature”.¹⁸ But the object of contemplation is the divine essence – which is goodness. Therefore, it belongs to the object of contemplation to communicate itself. Peter Kreeft puts it uniquely simple as: “So love is ... the motive that moves the intellect to contemplate God, ... what it ‘consists in’, ... and the final cause.”¹⁹

Note that Saint Thomas places the mixed life in the category of the active. This is correct for two reasons: (1) the mixed life is

properly categorized as active because its final cause is to communicate – or to transmit, pertaining to an external action; and (2) its material cause, i.e., preaching and teaching, are of the active life.²⁰ Further, since the most proper activity of man is the use of the intellect, wherefore its two uses, which are the contemplative and active, both consists in the mixed life, it follows that the most noble profession for man is contained in either teaching or preaching.

Regarding the final cause of the mixed life: it is not merely a short-stop to become average, i.e., to have a third of the day each to: sleep, leisure, and study. But it is excellently put in the context of the Dominican Spirituality, which the Saint lived: to share the fruits of the harvest found in contemplation.²¹ The motto emphasizes the primacy of contemplation over external works, as the introductory section of this paper explains. But if there be any, those are acts of charity. Therefore, the Dominican spirituality emphasizes the co-dependence of the two kinds of life, but it remains that happiness consists essentially in the act of the intellect, and accidentally in the act of the will.

To ask which kind of life consists happiness more excellently is a wrong question. Because both consists happiness, but distinct by the nature that they do so. It is like asking which cup is better used: whether a teacup-full of tea or a glassful of water. This also is the case regarding the difference between one man to another. A man may prefer the active life in regard to his vibrant spirit, or as Saint Thomas terms, his “restless soul”.²² Whereas his happiness consists more in the active life. But a man may also be naturally inclined towards contemplation, whereas his happiness consists better in silence and meditation.

¹⁷ ST., III, 40, 1, ad.2.

¹⁸ ST., III, I, I, co.

¹⁹ “#200. The Contemplative Life”, In PT., p.

²⁰ ST., II-II, 181, 3, co.

²¹ Refer to <http://www.op.org/en>

²² ST., I-II, 183, 4, co.

But the case is so regarding as the happiness of man may differ in object. All men choose the particular life they have on account of the happiness that they see potentially contained wherefore. The better question would not be assessing where individual happiness better consists, but in which life more directly pertains to participation in the life of charity.²³ Hence, the question is more universal rather than particular. This is because the saint's philosophy is largely based upon his metaphysics.²⁴ The twentieth-century, *existential, neo-thomist*, Norris Clarke describes his metaphysics as a "whole basic philosophy and theology of ecology"²⁵ The charity of God is that which causes existence. Man, who in receiving charity is caused into existence, is called to participate in an overflow of charity through the created world, and as well as through the destined eternal rest with his creator. And that life which is more according to this cause, which Saint Thomas describes as more deserving in reward, is the contemplative life.²⁶ However, there may happen in some cases where by an excess of charity man is compelled to communicate this goodness through external actions.²⁷ As such, although the contemplative life is simply regarded not only to become more noble, but also more meritorious, until now there is no clear cut that it is the only life to be lived. But for Christians, and might as well to those who strongly affirm his metaphysics, life should be lived "radically in charity", whether consisting in the contemplative, active, or mixed.²⁸ If two is better than one, then accordingly, the most charitable life consists in the mixed.

PRE-CAUTIONS FOR THE MIXED LIFE

I deliberately re-emphasize at this juncture that the final happiness of man consists in knowing the divine essence, an operation consisting essentially in the act of the intellect and accidentally in the will. As the Dominican Spirituality, silence and external works go hand-in-hand, inasmuch as the external works are results of the fruits of contemplation. In this sense, I do not only denote that the active life is a pre-requisite to the other, but also that the converse I posit. Wherefore I clarify that my arguments put a distinction between the nature of the two kinds of life, in their object and their method. Again, essentially in the contemplative, and accidentally in the active. A peanut may be essentially A, but accidentally B. Nevertheless, both A and B refer to the same peanut. Hence, I prefer not to place myself standing in one extreme. The Thomist abstracts from one side to another in accordance with looking at reality as one picture – as one truth. Touching heaven may consist in one kind of life, but more excellently done if through a synthesis. As Sertillanges, in his what I would describe as "the-student-handbook", *The Intellectual Life*, puts it: "The True is a single whole; all things are connected in one supreme Truth..."²⁹

But to that which pertains not merely to the particular happiness of man, but also to his nature, since happier is a thing which more directly consists its life according to its nature, as a man is happier when treated genuinely "humane" rather than "objectified", I agree

²³ ST., II-II, 182, 2, co.

²⁴ c.f., Kreeft, Peter. 2009. *The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*. LLC: Recorded Books. P.49.

²⁵ Clarke, Norris. 2001. "The Great Circle of Being and Our Place in It: The Universe as Meaningful Journey", In *The One and The Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press., p.307.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



²⁶ "Meritorious". c.f., ST., II-II, 180, 7, co.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ ST., II-II, 184, 1, co.

²⁹ Sertillanges, A.G. 1987. "The Spirit of Work", In *The Intellectual Life: Its Spirit, Conditions, Methods*. Reprinted Edition. Cork, Ireland: The Catholic University of America Press., p.137. It shall again be regarded as "IL".

that the contemplative life is more noble – not only noble, but properly so.

There are pre-cautions for the mixed life, if my arguments, and as well as the testimony of Saint Thomas, be convincing enough to compel the audience to engage in the arduous search for truth: (1) contemplation is not an isolation, but a unity; (2) external acts are demanded but not with the expense of contemplation; (3) it is most important to highlight that its object is charity.

Thinking is one act involving the one man. His health is to consider, relationships, and as well as businesses. Today is presented with necessities. Hence, not all the time should man immerse himself in isolation, but better if he trains himself to attain the skill of finding the unity of truth among all his activities.³⁰

Secondly, while man is busy thinking with his whole self, it is easy to amass a great number of occupations. But he must also train to un-box the truth that is presented before him. Contemplation requires silence. The more conducive the atmosphere, the more tranquil the mind becomes. The more silence, the more space can the truth occupy. The intellectual must also train to acquire the habit of setting aside time for contemplation, so as he runs not dry and “to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether.”³¹

The final pre-caution is the most important one: everything is ordained towards charity. Wherefore the active life may dispose man to the contemplative, or the fruits of contemplation produce good works, every life

consists in participating in that overflow of charity which starts and ends in God.³²

THE PRACTICALITY OF TRUTH

Every truth is practical... The only holy truths are redeeming truths.³³

A thing requires practice inasmuch as its nature consists in the will moving it. But the truth requires practice. Therefore, the nature of truth consists in the will moving it – and this is aforementioned shown; since it is the will that moves the attention of the intellect. And this movement is done inasmuch as the object is loved and has the potential for delight. But the latter description also pertains to truth. Therefore, the will naturally moves towards what is true because the truth is delightful. That is how God presents himself to us: by presenting His truth in our intellects, He seizes that opportunity to invite us to move closer to him.³⁴

In regards to the mixed life, I have thus far argued that the intellectual is lead to the mixed life since goodness communicates itself. At this juncture, I conclude as far as to say that loving God and neighbor are inseparable. As far as my endeavor has done, I can only explicate the theological premise with one philosophical claim: the act of the intellect, [which is intelligence], and the act of the will [which is desiring], as knowing and loving, cannot be separated.³⁵ Knowing is a Ferrari, Loving is a Porsche. They are distinct in engine, but either which may be picked, both of them are designed for movement. In the strict sense, from the start they were already inseparable

³⁰ c.f. IL, In “The Virtues of a Catholic Intellectual”, p. 20.

³¹ ST., II-II, 182, 1, ad. 3.

³² The origin is both start and finish. c.f., ST., II-II, 180, 7, co.

³³ IL., p. 13.

³⁴ The Truth of God is contained in Divine Revelation and through His Divine Effects.

³⁵ Here I spark comparison between intelligence and knowing, also to desiring and loving. Knowing is attributed analogously, yet only accordingly, to intelligence. This too applies to the latter, since love is the first act of the will.

because both are caused by charity. Saint Thomas lays it as:

“Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in the act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is **urged** to the **contemplation** of God.”³⁶

This I will try to work in detail with three reasons: (1) We receive an outpour of love from God; and (2) the overflow of that outpour moves the will; finally, (3) the will directs our attention towards the source of that outpour. Imagine water is suddenly poured on your head, we automatically turn our attentions

to look for the source. When we suddenly receive a mail, we directly look for the name of the person who sent it. This is what Saint Thomas meant by saying that we are “urged” – its reflex.

Since we know that loving and knowing are inseparable, the same can be attributed to loving God and neighbor. Loving God is knowing God. But knowing God entails loving our neighbors. Therefore, loving our neighbors consequently means that we love God. And the better explanation to this juncture would already be venturing on the commentaries about the order of the Lord’s two commandments.³⁷

³⁶ ST., II-II, 180, 7, co. Emphasis mine.

³⁷ See Matthew 22: 37-40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, Thomas. 1920. *Summa Theologiae*. Second and Revised Edition. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Accessed July 2017. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/>.

Clarke, Norris. 2001. *The One and The Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kreeft, Peter. 2014. *Practical Theology: Spiritual Direction from St. Thomas Aquinas*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

—. 2009. *The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*. LLC: Recorded Books.

Sertillanges, A.G. 1987. *The Intellectual Life*. Reprinted Edition. Cork, Ireland: The Catholic University of America Press.

Afterimages: ~~Liberation~~ Ideology in the Culture Industry

Anton Heinrich L. Rennesland

University of Santo Tomas | antrenn@yahoo.com

Abstract: I argue how one's afterimage of art has turned ideological due to technology's heavy influence in the reproduction of and to individuals' incessant consumption of artworks. Art has the capacity to be historicity's expression and its antithesis. Its reach has been enlarged due to technology's democratization of artworks. It should follow that mass production of artworks foster an emancipatory and critical standpoint, yet this fostered instead the reduction of priceless and fine artworks to commodities, easily downloadable and available for public consumption. Rather than being society's antithesis, the afterimage of emancipation has been fetishized into an ideological-image of fulfilling a fantasy (the promise of '*jouissance*'). The 20th century's dictum "They know very well it is false and [are] still doing it!" embodies the consequence – despite the empty promises – of capitalism: ~~liberation~~ ideology (a mistaken understanding of ideology as liberation).

Keywords: Adorno, Art, Afterimage, Culture Industry, Alienation, Ideology

AFTERIMAGES: ~~LIBERATION~~ IDEOLOGY IN THE CULTURE INDUSTRY¹

1

Against the backdrop of culture industry, facets of culture must be reconsidered. This short essay is concerned with the effect of art and the afterimage it produces: from an emancipatory-image to an ideological-image. My use of “~~Liberation~~” (the word *liberation* with a strikethrough) is intentional to stress the heavy importance of a mistaken idea that artworks project and promise. Instead of censorship, a strikethrough enables readers to see what has been deleted; epanorthosis as a figure of speech and way of writing reflects self-correction. What I intend to underscore is this self-correcting consciousness, dealing with mistaken liberation and outright ideology, through the two afterimages of art that serve as primal argument. Strikethroughs throughout this article garners evidence of how an

emancipatory idea brews within illusion’s confinement.

My main argument banks on art’s afterimage. I situate art in relation to the art-experiencer. This is a dialectical process: art supplies content while the experiencer² gives the form—be it emancipatory or ideological. The emancipatory-image serves as society’s antithesis, positing another state of things; the ideological-image strengthens commodity’s presentation and fetishizes a need to consume more. Rather than reflecting the present milieu or serving as an antithesis, art in the second respect makes consumers focus on specific parts of a piece and caters this fetishized taste. It is during the “art event” that the exchange of commodities takes place and that afterimages are formed. It becomes an oscillation of the afterimage to the after-image, reflecting liberation to ideology.³

2

Adorno presents art as an autonomous development “located in a historically changing constellation of elements; it refuses definition.”⁴ He shows how art aims at

throughout this piece yet the specific usage is grounded on context.

³ Paintings, sculptures, film, and architectural works – among others – become photographs, graphic artworks, recordings, and even “icons” for locations. My use of the term “after-image” is a play of words and is separate from the afterimages of emancipatory- and ideological-image. After-images are literally images created *after* artworks. I would not like to classify them as derogated appearances of the opus, but that through the mediatory platform they have become something distinct from the artwork. This is aligned to my argument that technology and media fetishize our consumption and make artworks available for public consumption (e.g. printed on cards and apparel and bolstered through social media).

⁴ Theodore W. Adorno, “The Autonomy of Art,” *Negative Dialectics*, tr. E. B. Ashton, from the

¹ This is a revised version of the essay “Art and Alienation: ~~Liberation~~ Ideology in The Culture Industry”, which I presented during the Second Annual De La Salle Undergraduate Philosophy Conference last 4-5 August 2017 at the De La Salle University, Taft, Manila. My change in title stresses the importance of afterimages, a concept I have formulated but have not clearly laid out in my previous construction. This revision has given necessary importance to *afterimages*—albeit still languid in demonstration. Admittedly, I present my ideas in a rather sporadic manner than the previous delineated approach. I roughly group and number them accordingly. The transition therefore between ideas are less of my concern as compared to the exact demonstrations. Hence, groupings vary in length but are considerable substantial in content.

² I loosely use and interchange the terms “art-experiencer,” “individual,” and “art-consumer”
© TALISIK

challenging its own definition. This is important because of the blindness that art assumes—blindness produces uncertainty, which gives art its critical feature: “the uncertainty over what purpose it serves. It is uncertain whether art is still possible; whether, with its complete emancipation, it did not sever its own preconditions.”⁵ What art engenders therefore against the emerging backdrop of the culture industry is rather a façade—the insecurities of art indeed is what draws consumers to consume more of it. Art affirms itself by being its own antithesis: “Art must turn against itself, in opposition to its own concept, and thus become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber.”⁶ In similar vein, Hegel comments: “But [external existence] is not what makes a work into a product of fine art; a work of art is such only because, originating from the spirit, it now belongs to the territory of the spirit.”⁷ Art’s classification as fine is precisely because of its reflective nature; the artwork *from Geist* is grounded on historicity as *Geist* develops *through* time.

The universal and absolute need from which art (on its formal side) springs has its origin in the fact that man is a *thinking* consciousness, i.e. that man draws out of himself and puts *before himself* what he is and whatever else is. Things in nature are only *immediate* and *single*, while man as spirit *duplicates* himself, in that (i) he is as things in nature are, but (ii) he is just as much for himself; he sees

himself, represents himself to himself, thinks, and only on the strength of this active placing himself before himself is he spirit.⁸

What art is as a product of human activity is therefore a representation of what individuals are at a particular milieu; art-experiencers see themselves in artworks as the latter engenders the *Zeitgeist*. Yet these works are antithetical by being thought-provoking, challenging individuals to see themselves in such works. As art struggles for its freedom, so do individuals.

3

There is a certain given-ness in oeuvres that people take for granted—the limits of artworks: ends of canvasses, borders of pictures, lenses of cameras, technicalities of music-making (composing, performing, etc.), duration of performances (of theatre arts), and even the entire landscape where architectural or sculptural works are displayed and/or crafted. Each individual approach these borders, and the art event commences. I rework Tia DeNora’s musical event for a more inclusive presentation of the encounter between the individual and the artwork as I seek to stress the impact and formation of the afterimage in individuals. DeNora presents three times:

TIME 1 – Before the Event (all prior history as meaningful to A)

original, *Negative Dialektik* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), 2.

⁵ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, from the original *Ästhetische Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), (London: Continuum Press, 1997), 1.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “Introduction,” *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

1. Preconditions Conventions, biographical associations, previous programming practices

TIME 2 – During the Event (the event may be of any duration, seconds to years)

2. Features of the Event

A. Actor(s) Who is engaging with music? (e.g., analyst, audience, listener, performer, composer, programmer)

B. Music What music, and with what significance as imputed by Actor(s)?

C. Act of Engagement with music What is being done? (e.g., individual act of listening, responding to music, performing, composing)

D. Local conditions of C. (e.g., how came to engage with music in this way, at this time (i.e., at Time 2 – ‘During the Event’))

E. Environment In what setting does engagement with music take place? (material cultural features, interpretive frames provided on site (e.g., programme notes, comments of other listeners))

TIME 3 – After the Event

3. Outcome Has engagement with music afforded anything? What

if anything was changed or achieved or made possible by this engagement? And has this process altered any aspect of item 1 above?⁹

Time 1 is before the art encounter: all the education that artists and art-experiencers receive, the practices and drafts, the preparation of the venue, and akin. This establishes the boundaries of the artwork—the artists choose the locale, the art-experiencers learn about these artworks and is drawn. Time 2 is the exact encounter between artwork and art-experiencer with five features. Time 3 consists of the afterimages that are formed in the consciousness.

The art event in itself does not have determining characteristics. It does not prefigure alienation or a more authentic experience of the artwork. These valuations are appraised through the experiencer’s encounter—especially with emphasis on Time 1: the individual’s culture-formation, how art is understood, and the value ascribed to it. ~~Through this type of education, consumers understand the aesthetic value of art.~~ Against the backdrop of the culture industry and in association to my arguments, I prefigure consumers with a specific mindset gathered through their education and exact living: “[t]he listener is converted, along his line of least resistance, into the acquiescent purchaser.”¹⁰ Despite the conscious repulsions – if there are any – consumers are unconsciously held tighter by the industry. Thus, I argue that during this art event an exchange of commodity takes place and the afterimage formed. On part of

⁹ Tia DeNora, *After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49.

¹⁰ Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening,” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), 32.

the consumer, what is made available for exchange ranges from money in form of payment, pleasure with discs rather than watching in the cinema, time spent browsing for high-quality photographs of sculptures and architectural designs, upgrades from record players to online streaming, or even contentment with imitations or photographs rather than the actual experience of the artwork. What the artwork offers for exchange, regardless of specific branch of art, is the content of commodity fetishism. This exchange happens simultaneously and continues to nurture one another: the consumer ~~pays for freedom~~ pays for unlimited access for more commodities under the pretense that one is experiencing art and freedom. Furthermore, the afterimage is self-deceiving because of the consumer's illusion of understanding the artwork yet at the same time is blinded by art's demagogic essence. The culture industry is motivated by the entertainment it offers its patrons: ~~Entertainment promises freedom.~~ "Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment."¹¹ The fact that it entertains forces the individual to think less and to focus on familiar leitmotifs. Ideology breeds further ideology. Instead of an emancipatory-image, the individual forms an ideological-image as one is drawn to further

consume more entertainment, more familiar themes, and more of the same.

4

Prior to the Enlightenment, many things (and activities) made sense in so far as it had to be made manually (*manus* [Lt. *hand*]). However, with the dawn of efficient and standardized processes, less use of the hands was needed and technology became the intermediate. Quite ironically, the root word finds difference in contemporary meaning: □□□□□□ (*technē*) would have conveyed a particular skill or ability of an individual, whilst the contemporary word (technology) portrays the skill of something artificial. The imprint of the human person is only through the production of something mechanical or artificial. This slow regression of human's direct imprint made possible ways of (re)producing art and branding it as a delicacy to be consumed: One can just look, to be more specific, how the internet has made available for download and consumption artworks that were previously restricted for museum- or concert hall-visits. This even made possible the use of these artworks to be printed on shirts and bags, up on posters, and as symbols of the places from where they originate. The entire idea of a (re)production of art is based on the accessibility to the consumer.¹²

¹¹ Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, tr. Edmund Jephcott, from the original *Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940–1950* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fishcher Verlag, 1987), (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 113.

¹² This work presupposes technology's (re)production of art. An affinity that I can draw, albeit a rough comparison, would be to Plato's dichotomy of

worlds. "Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible[.]" (Plato, *The Republic*, VII, trans. Benjamin Jowett, available from <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.7.vi.html>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2016) He posits an epistemological rift. MacIntyre follows this saying: "Plato supposed . . . that if there are objective standards for the use of such predicates, it must be the case that such predicates be used to refer to

The effect of a mass culture that is dissociated with those it identifies itself with becomes a pseudo-normative basis, replacing consciousness with a quasi-transcendental ideological image or cultures its taste for such a fetish. “The power of the culture industry’s ideology is such that conformity has replaced consciousness.”¹³ ~~Conformity enables further progresses in society through an oriented principle that diminishes ambiguity.~~ The underlying unifying principle, i.e. the culture industry, that consumers unknowingly cling to destroys peculiarities by subsuming them.¹⁴ “The concepts of order which [mass culture] hammers into human beings are always those of the status quo. They remain unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, even if they no longer have any substance for those who accept them.”¹⁵ Ideas that remain hovering over the entities they ought to

objects, and objects not belonging to the multifarious, changing world of sense but to another unchanging world apprehended by the intellect precisely through its dialectical ascent, whereby it grasps the meaning of abstract nouns, and of other general terms. These objects are the Forms, through the imitation of which or participation in which the objects of sense perception have the character that they have.” (Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* [Oxford: Routledge, 1998], 40-41)

I veer away, however, from such juxtaposition for several reasons: (1) the scope of this study is to see how technology severs the effect brought about by the arts notwithstanding the disparity between authentic and represented; Plato’s work takes into earnest consideration the ontological properties and that basically all things present in the Visible World are deemed imitations of the Pure Form. (2) Art’s prominence throughout history ties a strong link between the individual and the artwork, hence the dawning of the culture industry merely carried on this ideal by incorporating (and fetishizing) one’s consumptions of artworks; Plato’s theory merely lays down fundamental principles regarding a state of immediate cognition, not present therein is a spark of any emancipation—sans the escaped prisoner from his Myth of the Cave (as seen in *The Republic* (514a-517c)). (3)

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



identify with become oppressive as they alienate form from content, subscribers from ideas, while presenting them as basic presuppositions. What creeps into individuals is a consciousness “developed retrogressively”¹⁶ by organizing objects into fetishized products of society; they do not beg to be challenged; they pass off as something efficient and pleasing.

5

[I]deology [is] a set of representations which constitute social subjectivity. These representations exist in conjunction with communal rituals and an unconscious social fantasy which conditions the enjoyment of subjects’ participation in their political community. By regulating the relationship between the visible

This sees the vitality of – but does not question – what technology does to an artwork by presenting and bringing it closer to individuals through the internet. So, the question as to whether the artwork is merely reproduced, or an entirely new form *is* produced remains unanswered; Plato’s theory would provide an immediate solution in that they are reproductions of reproductions. In both ends, technology either reproduces or produces (anew) artworks: The former as it is gives in a digitalized format what one previously needed to venture to experience; the latter due to the question of the extent the work is reproduced in being digitalized, as something novel is entirely created. These new presentations however are not reflected in my use of after-images because the former stresses the novelty of the (re)produced work, while the latter merely reflects this gray region that technology creates.

¹³ Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered,” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, 104.

¹⁴ This is labelled as “the objective spirit of an age in the single word ‘culture’.” It is seen as an all-reaching, all-encompassing objective idea that contains all therein. Cf. *Ibid.*, “Culture and Administration,” *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

and the invisible, ideology structures the social reality.¹⁷

Ideology becomes a performative basis qua social reality in which ideological practices mediate conscious and unconscious actions. “[W]ithin our practical interrelations’ — Marx locates the fetishistic illusion not in thinking, in how we misperceive what we do and are, but in our social practice itself.”¹⁸ Marx sees the social dimension: ideology does not breed in isolation; as social structures come about, there flourishes this corruptive practice of adhering to ideologies. Analyzing these ideologies form the bridge between the conscious and unconscious. With the shift of consciousness, Žižek speaks and even reforms the classic Marxist statement of „*Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es*“ into „*Sie wissen das, und doch tun sie es*.“¹⁹ The movement from *not knowing and doing* to *knowing yet still doing* signifies how mass culture has preconditioned consumers to simply accept whitewashed realities presented by the industry. The establishment of the ideological-image which strengthens this performative basis is the promise of *jouissance* or a fantasy that could be received.

For Žižek, every ideology attaches itself to some kernel of

jouissance, the regulation and organization of which is central to its functioning. Following Lacan, Žižek reads *jouissance* as a Real, the paradoxical emergence of pleasure through pain which is always constituted as a surplus. [...] Consequently, *jouissance* returns symptomatically in the form of distortions and disturbances, which can be read in the process of ideology critique.²⁰

The lack of critical assessment which the culture industry promulgates through amalgamizing what is entertaining and excluding what is contradictory builds the semblance of a well-functioning system. The inherently errors of this structure is something devoid of language because “[w]hat the official ideology cannot openly talk about may be revealed in the mute signs of a building.”²¹ Hence, the close connexion of ideology and fantasy or *jouissance* is revealed: fantasy ushers in a lust for another state of things. This is what the emancipatory-image is precisely about. The *lust for* is translatable to *a possibility for* another state of things. Yet there is but a thin line that differentiates a motivation and a self-referential idea—the latter is the illusion that ultimately

¹⁷ Samuel Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical Methodology,” *International Journal of Žižek Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2016).

¹⁸ Slavoj Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (London: Verso, 2010), 223, Quoting Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.), 171-173; available from www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpA1.html; Internet; accessed 25 April 2017.

¹⁹ The first statement of „*Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es*“ is a well-known Marxist statement found in the *Kapital* (Karl Marx, , Erster Abschnitt: Ware und Geld’, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Buch 1: Der*

Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals; available from <https://archive.org/details/KarlMarxDasKapitalpdf>; Open source; accessed 25 April 2017). The second statement „*Sie wissen das, und sie tun es*“ is a creative rendition of the first following the thought of Raybone as he presents how Žižek recreates the Marxist dictum into that of the 20th century dictum of the adherence to ideology (Cf. Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical Methodology”). The German translation is mine for a better parallelism between the two statements.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Žižek, *Living in the End Times*, 255.

can be coined as a “fragile ideological fantasy.”²²

Once more I return to the importance of the emancipatory-image as *jouissance*. “Its great task is to break the hold over us of the superego injunction to enjoy, that is, to help us include in the freedom to enjoy also the freedom not to enjoy, the freedom from enjoyment.”²³ The freedom that the emancipatory-image assures individuals is the freedom to indulge in such promising fantasies that engages one’s potentialities. In this respect, it is a freedom prior to actual freedom; “fantasy is not a hallucination or an illusion, or a potential avenue of escape from reality, but the very stuff of our social reality.”²⁴ In fantasy, in *jouissance*, an individual comes to terms with one’s social reality: another state of things, of how reality *could have* been.

6

In essence, culture is this form of an independent totality which embodies reality: “[something] higher and more pure, [untouchable] which cannot be tailored according to any tactical or technical considerations. [...] the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its functional relationships within society.”²⁵ From this precise account of culture, it shifts to a “passive site onto and through which the phantasmic visions which bolster the status quo are projected and experienced.”²⁶ Amidst this,

what remains is a disposition and a personal encounter with culture, specifically with art. “Artworks are afterimages of empirical life insofar as they help the latter to what is denied them outside their own sphere and thereby free it from that to which they are condemned by reified external experience.”²⁷ Art can show otherwise—for this reason people are drawn to it: the harmony of songs, the strokes of paintings, the arrangements, shapes, and order of architectural designs. These drop inklings of the emancipatory-image. In an individual’s encounter with art, there still present is this *jouissance*, however the tendency for the ideological formation is ever strong, and unknowingly the consumer has embraced it. ~~It is a self-referential idea that convinces individuals to lust for what they see: a static way of living.~~ Instead of liberation, consumers embrace ideology through their fetishized tastes for after-images of art. A self-referential lusting must capacitate individuals for a dynamic understanding of reality. Hence, it is not the numerous experiences with the artworks but the quality of those that the emancipatory-image forms; “[w]hile the artwork’s sensual appeal seemingly brings it close to the consumer, it is alienated from him by being a commodity that he possesses and the loss of which he must constantly fear.”²⁸ It is in consuming commodified art that *jouissance*, this lust for the emancipatory-image, is relegated to the valley of ideology in the after-image of art.

²² *Ibid.*, 285.

²³ Žižek, *Living in the End Times*, 74.

²⁴ Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical Methodology”.

²⁵ Adorno, “Culture and Administration,” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, 108.

© TALISIK

Volume V, Issue no.1

ISSN 2362-9452



²⁶ Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical Methodology”.

²⁷ Adorno, “The Autonomy of Art,” *Negative Dialectics*, 4.

²⁸ Adorno, “The Autonomy of Art,” *Negative Dialectics*, 13.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adorno, Theodore W. *Aesthetic Theory*. Edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, from the original *Ästhetische Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). London: Continuum Press, 1997.
- _____. “The Autonomy of Art”. *Negative Dialectics*. Translated by E. B. Ashton from the original, *Negative Dialektik* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966). New York: The Seabury Press, 1973.
- _____. “Culture Industry Reconsidered.” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. Edited by J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge, 1991. 98-106.
- _____. “Culture and Administration.” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. Edited by J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge, 1991. 107-131.
- _____. “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening.” *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. Edited by J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge, 1991. 29-60.
- Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception.” *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Translated by Edmund Jephcott, from the original *Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940–1950* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1987). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. 94-136.
- DeNora, Tia. *After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. “Introduction”. *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. *A Short History of Ethics*. Oxford: Routledge, 1998.
- Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. Available from www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpA1.html. Internet. Accessed 25 April 2017.
- _____. *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Buch 1: Der Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals*. Available from <https://archive.org/details/KarlMarxDasKapitalpdf>. Open source. Accessed 25 April 2017.
- Plato. *The Republic*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Available from <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html>. Internet. Accessed 24 September 2016.
- Samuel Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical Methodology,” in *International Journal of Žižek Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3. 2016.
- Žižek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. New York: Verso, 1989.

_____. *Living in the End Times*. London: Verso, 2010.

Contact Us

If you wish to send us your feedback, general questions about the journal, questions about article submissions, theme suggestions for future issues, kindly send a message to the following contact information:

Phone: +639451181724

Address: Room 109 Main Building, University of Santo Tomas, España, Manila 1015, Philippines

E-mail: Talisik.Journal@gmail.com